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In This Issue:
V. Gel’man: “How does one account for the ‘divorce’ between democratic
and liberal ideas in post-Soviet Russia that occurred in the 1990s and their sub-
sequent decline in 2000-2010? Was the present-day decline both of democratic
and liberal ideas due to that divorce? The search for answers to these questions
calls for a reconsideration of the role of ideas in Russia’s modernization and the
trajectories of democratic and liberal ideas over the past three decades... This
article seeks to state the problems of the genesis and evolution of these two ide-
ological trends of Russian modernization in the late 20th and early 21st cen-
turies, the contradictions between them, the cleavages within the ranks of their
supporters and the impact of the ideas of post-Communist modernization on the
progress and results of social transformations in Russia.”
N. Tikhonova: “Although the problems of social structure are of interest to
scientists, there are practically no works in the literature in Russia that use the
so-called gradation approach toward Russian society that distinguishes popula-
tions on the basis of life chances and risks... The purpose of this article is to
describe some typical characteristics of members of principal Russian social
strata and class aspects of these characteristics.”
A. Levinson: “People tend to think that any discussion of the fate of the
Russian Jewry and the ‘Jewish Question’ necessarily belongs to Judaic studies.
In our case, being realized within the frames and the paradigm of studies of
public opinion and public relationships in Russia, it falls under Russian studies...
Here I will discuss the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation of Russian
Jewry, the corresponding forms of identity or self-identity of those who identify
as Jews, and what Russians think about those whom they believe to be Jews... I
am prepared to discuss the already acquired results or, to put it differently, the
formula applicable to the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation process.”
A. Suzdaltsev: “On December 8, 2019, the Union State of the Russian Fed-
eration and the Republic of Belarus entered its third decade... Even if by the end
of the second decade of the new century the countries had not arrived at fruitful
allied relationships, the project survived... In view of the fact that the Belarusian
conception rested on access to Russia’s maximally cheap energy and Russia’s mar-
ket, starting in 2018 everything that Moscow was doing to withdraw Belarus from
its dependence was interpreted in the Belarusian and, later, European media as
Moscow’s pressure on the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus.”
O. Shurygina: “This is the first investigation into the Stalin Prize for archi-
tecture. With access to the primary sources that were out of reach of architecture
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historians and Zholtovsky’s biographers, I will try to sort out whether this high
award was an unbiased assessment of his creative achievements or an act of
political struggle.”
K. Troitskiy: “At a certain stage in the conversation, those who object to the
thesis that the moral ban on violence is absolute often challenge the adherent of
non-violence to conduct a mental experiment in which the champion of an
absolute ban sees a ‘villain’ threatening violence toward an ‘innocent victim.’ It
is assumed that the ‘villain’ can only be stopped by killing him. After describing
the experiment, the party that maintains that there is no absolute ban on violence
asks triumphantly whether the champion of the ban would passively observe or
implore the ‘villain’ who is in the process of maiming and killing ‘the innocent
victim’... The popularity and constant recurrence of attempts to justify violence
and lying, usually accompanied by attempts to elevate them to the position of
ordinary practice, makes the tasks of investigating the history of and... refuting
the ‘innocent victim’ argument and criticizing the underlying scheme particular-
ly relevant and important.”
V. Melnik: “The relevance of the question of creative evolution varies for
different writers. In the case of Ivan Goncharov, in spite of the rapid develop-
ment of Goncharov studies in the past three decades and thorough treatment of
particular problems, with a focus, among other things, on cultural studies, the
essential philological problems of his legacy remain unsolved and present a
research challenge... The question of the logic of the novelist’s creative evolu-
tion has never been raised before.”
E. Zadorozhnyuk: “Chizhevsky’s creativity and its cultural, philological
and philosophical scope demonstrate an important vector oriented toward the
cultural unity of peoples of the Slavic area, Europe and the world. The fragmen-
tary nature of many of his works... throws this vector into bolder relief. Every-
body agrees that it is highly important to turn to his works today in a time of rifts
caused by highly active factors that are alien to culture.”
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“Liberals” vs. “Democrats”: Ideational
Trajectories of Russia’s Post-Communist
Transformation
Vladimir GEL’MAN
Abstract. This article analyzes the struggle between the conflicting ideas
of modernization in Russia’s post-Communist transformation in the 1980s
and 1990s. I concentrate on the genesis and evolution of two major ideation-
al trends, namely, the “liberals” (who prioritized market economic reforms)
and the “democrats” (who prioritized political freedoms and democratic
institution-building). What are the sources of the contradiction between
these trends? What are the causes and consequences of their divergence?
And how did these ideas affect the outcomes of Russia’s transition? I argue
that the ideational struggle and the political conflict between Russian “liber-
als” and “democrats” is rooted in the intergenerational tensions between the
“men of the Sixties” and “men of the Seventies,” whose political attitudes,
life experience and perceptions of the country’s problems differed in many
respects. While the “democrats” (“men of the Sixties”) had a very vague
understanding of the market reforms and paid scant attention to the eco-
nomic aspects of transition, many “liberals” (“men of the Seventies”) were
skeptical about democratization, which they saw as a threat to market
reforms. These differences of priority and perception, multiplied by the
political conflicts of the 1990s, led to the “divorce” between the two camps
of Russia’s reformers. As a result, both the “liberals” and the “democrats”
failed politically, which had a major impact on the political and ideational
landscape in twenty-first century Russia.
Keywords: political ideas, post-Communist transformation, Russia, lib-
eralism, democracy, market reforms.
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What is the role of ideas in modernization in general and in post-Soviet mod-
ernization in particular? There is no consensus among experts on the contribu-
tion of ideas to the building of new institutions and practices in various countries
in various historical periods. They answer differently the question of whether
ideas cause transformations or the other way around. However, when it comes to
political, economic and social transformations in post-Soviet Russia, the pre-
vailing view is that ideas were secondary to the interests of key players [68].
Does that mean that the role of ideas in Russia in the late 20th and early 21st cen-
tury has been negligibly small and that political analysis should focus on the
activities of opportunists—politicians and businesspeople driven exclusively by
selfish motives, who achieve or fail to achieve their goals regardless of ideas, or
using them solely for manipulative purposes? Although post-Soviet Russia offers
many examples of this sort [37; 17; 7], it would be wrong to reduce the process-
es of economic and political change in the country to the struggle between
opposing interests and to ignore ideas: in the course of transformations, these
dimensions complement rather than supplant one another. 
Meanwhile, ideas and ideologies (elsewhere these terms will be used inter-
changeably) in modern Russia differed markedly from ideas in a number of post-
communist countries which, during the same period, faced a similar “dilemma”
of simultaneous political and economic transformations [50]. In the East Euro-
pean countries, the ideas of building democracy (here and elsewhere referred to
as democratic ideas) and a transition to the market economy (here and elsewhere
referred to as liberal ideas) mutually complemented each other in the process of
post-communist transformation from the fall of the former regimes until acces-
sion to the European Union [4], facilitating the solution of key tasks in a rela-
tively short time. By contrast, in the 1990s, Russia liberal and democratic ideas
(and their proponents) clashed. The notion that the country’s path toward eco-
nomic prosperity could and had to do without democracy, which could hinder, if
not reverse, economic reform, prevailed in public discourse and indeed influ-
enced political decision-making. As a result, the ideas of building democracy
were first excluded from the list of political priorities, then sacrificed to the ideas
of the country’s economic modernization, and in 2000-2010 were dropped from
the list of the ruling elite’s agenda altogether. By contrast, the ideas of building
an effective market economy dominated the official narrative of the ruling
groups and provided an important benchmark in charting the political course in
the 1990s and 2010s, although their traction was diminishing over time. Finally,
in the 2010s, they were stricken from the political agenda, such that today their
influence on the political processes and the political course of Russia is insignificant. 
How does one account for the “divorce” of democratic and liberal ideas in
post-Soviet Russia that occurred in the 1990s and their subsequent decline in
2000-2010? Was the present-day decline both of democratic and liberal ideas due
to that divorce? The search for answers to these questions calls for a reconsider-
ation of the role of ideas in Russia’s modernization and the trajectories of demo-
cratic and liberal ideas over the past three decades. These ideas were promoted
by their proponents—politicians, analysts and journalists (here referred to as
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“democrats” and “liberals”)1—whose role in the late 1980s and early 1990s can
hardly be overestimated. This article seeks to state the problems of the genesis
and evolution of these two ideological trends of Russian modernization in the
late 20th and early 21st centuries, the contradictions between them, the cleavages
within the ranks of their supporters and the impact of the ideas of post-commu-
nist modernization on the progress and results of social transformations in Rus-
sia.
I maintain that the “divorce” of democratic and liberal ideas in 1990s Rus-
sia was not predetermined from the start; but the weakness and inchoate charac-
ter of reformist ideas by the time of perestroika, the contradictions between the
60s and 70s generations, as well as false assumptions and expectations against
the background of sweeping change, made an indelible imprint on the ideation-
al trajectories of “liberals” and “democrats” and exacerbated the contradictions
between them. 
Ideas and Modernization: The Case of Russia
The works devoted to Russia’s post-Soviet political and economic develop-
ment proceed from the assumption that ideas played a limited role in these
processes. Thus, Henry Hale believes that in their bid to gain and hold power, the
authorities relied on mobilizing the patron-client networks while demand for and
supply of ideas was low, due to the dominance of the client-patron policy over a
programmatic idea [33]. Stephen Hanson, comparing the ideological landscape
of post-communist Russia to that of Weimar Germany and the emergence of the
Third Republic in France [35], noted that in the case of Russia ideas were insuf-
ficiently well formulated and structured which, in his opinion, stymied the for-
mation of the party system in the country. This writer largely shared similar opin-
ion, pointing out that after the collapse of the USSR ideas had little impact on
the transformation of Russia’s political regime, whose outcome hinged on the
character of the power struggle among the elites [27].
Does it mean that we can neglect ideas in analyzing post-communist mod-
ernization in Russia? Such a verdict would throw the baby out with the bathwa-
ter. Ideas have always been important in setting political priorities and state build-
ing in the country. They are very important at “turning points,” when politicians
make a strategic choice in favor of this or that option of the country’s develop-
ment. Indeed, the very fact that ideas have little influence on the process of
change in the country calls for an explanation. If ideas influenced the behaviors
of members of the elite and the masses in the course of modernization in other
countries and were an important driver of change during perestroika when vari-
ous ideas of reform were hotly debated in the USSR [71; 53; 59; 61], why was it
that in the following decade and later, the significance of ideas plummeted? 
To determine the place of ideas in Russia’s modernization, one first of all
needs to clarify the concepts. In this article, the author considers ideas in an
instrumental way, that is, not as a set of political doctrines but as a way of per-
ceiving problems. Ideas matter for the modernization process owing to their pos-
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itive and normative functions. They help the elites and the masses to formulate
their notions of the desired social system and ways of achieving it [49, p. 49], to
assess to what extent the status quo matches these notions and minimize the
amount of information required for making decisions (which is particularly
important under conditions of uncertainty). Thus, ideas enable the actors to form
and support a picture of the world in accordance with which they act after receiv-
ing information. This was the approach Vadim Radayev used to analyze the
change of economic ideologies in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s [52, pp. 276-
306], and the team of authors, including this writer, used to analyze the ideolo-
gy of reforming local government in Russia [31].
Such interpretation of ideas suggests that in routine conditions, there is little
demand for ideas: the elite and the masses can follow former schemes for a long
time, and the generators of ideas—politicians, experts and independent intellec-
tuals—can repeat earlier judgments, modifying them only partially. However, in
periods of rapid change characterized by radical transformations, like that of
Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, demand for new ideas soars. They arise and are
promoted by their producers and popularizers, who try to sell them to the elites
and the masses and gain support in the market of ideas  by ousting and/or taking
over rivals. Sometimes it takes several decades for new ideas to be formed and
promoted (as with Neoliberalism in the West) [65]), but sometimes they experi-
ence a boom much faster. Some ideas arise spontaneously and endogenously
while others are imported from political and intellectual contexts and are modi-
fied by their recipients in line with their perceptions, often undergoing meta-
morphoses in the process. The combination of changing dynamics of demand
and supply of ideas along with the impact of the activities of various agents
aimed at promoting them go a long way to determine the outcome of the ideo-
logical struggle in periods of radical change. 
The ideological situation in the Soviet Union as it entered the period of
transformations in the second half of the 1980s was rather peculiar. For decades,
the market of ideas had been monopolized by the dominant official version of
Marxism-Leninism, while alternative ideas penetrated this market in a round-
about way, facing the dogmatism of the establishment, which sought to suppress
dissent [58; 14]. The official Soviet dogma was so outdated that in the period of
“the long 1970s,” it was unable to perform positive functions: the life of Soviet
society was in stark contrast with official norms, and knowledge based on offi-
cial ideology could not offer valid answers to the country’s problems or possible
solutions. In the absence of conditions for the development of social and human
sciences, which could provide an intellectual environment for the development
of new ideas for transformation, discussions of options for the country’s devel-
opment were confined to narrow circles at the level of informal groups and sem-
inars [62; 8; 16].
The USSR was immeasurably less exposed to external ideological influ-
ences than the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The key figures of post-
communist transformations, such as Václav Klaus and Leszek Balcerowicz, reg-
ularly traveled as exchange scholars or to attend conferences at US and West
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European universities long before the start of reforms. Young Soviet economists
had to secretly read articles by their Eastern European colleagues at restricted
access libraries, while foreign travel for most of them was not allowed until the
start of perestroika [62; 72]. That is why Soviet specialists had only fragmentary
knowledge of the foreign experience of modernization and their contribution to
international discourse was all but non-existent. As a result, the views of Russ-
ian intellectuals on the problems of political and economic development of their
country and the world were, with few exceptions, inconsistent and prone to
change in accordance with circumstances. Having been isolated from the inter-
national environment over many decades, Russian intellectuals embraced the
idea of Russia’s “special way” and the uniqueness of its past, present and future,
an idea, which to this day is prevalent in Russian social thought [67]. These
trends manifested themselves in the rejection of the import of some ideas.
Joachim Zweynert, who studied the struggle of economic ideas during the mar-
ket reforms in Russia, came to the conclusion that in the 1990s, many Western
ideas met with such fierce opposition within Russia that here (unlike Eastern
Europe), they failed to take root in the decades that followed [81].
Small wonder that the collapse of the former monopoly on the Soviet mar-
ket of ideas in the late 1980s was a “big bang” against the background of the
rapidly changing situation in the country. The bans were dropped as demand for
new ideas on the part of the elite, which was looking for ways out of the mount-
ing crisis, and on the part of the public, soared [68, ch. 1]. Public debates among
intellectuals took center stage while the discredited official dogmas were losing
ground.
The resulting vacuum in the market of ideas was filled spontaneously:
import of ideas from abroad quickened interest in their ideological heritage and
fashions for ideas and their labels changed at a dizzying pace, while critical
reflection on the ideas was often wanting. The sky-high barriers for entering the
market of ideas dropped dramatically, paving the way for marginal ideas ranging
from Eurasianism to geopolitics [16]. Those who produced and/or promoted
these ideas had no difficulty gaining a foothold in the market to exert not one-off
but systematic intellectual influence on political decision-making and on the
hearts and souls of fellow citizens. 
As the transformations in the country gathered pace, demand for new ideas
diminished. Moreover, the range of problems changed dramatically: what was
discussed in the late 1980s ceased to be relevant in the mid-1990s. The political
agenda came to be dominated by the clash of group interests as ideas had less
and less influence on political decision-making. After the authoritarian regime
dug in in the 2000s, the Russian authorities, if they needed ideas at all, were
interested in the political and technological aspects. Modern Russian authoritar-
ianism is not anchored in a dominant ideology [27], and its leaders can prag-
matically use various ideas to further their ends. The public, which responded
enthusiastically to ideological struggle at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, was
paying less and less attention to ideas and their proponents, who were also evolv-
ing. The monopoly on the market of ideas was supplanted by pluralism so that
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in today’s Russia, one can easily find advocates of the most diverse ideological
trends. Unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they tend to ignore one anoth-
er and exist in parallel, rather like people in a restaurant sitting at separate tables
with separate menus for different categories of clients [2], with nothing like an
efficient dialog. Even so, ideas are an important filter for the perception of prob-
lems by the Russian elites and political leaders, who transmit their perceptions
to fellow-citizens [63; 66], and the legacy of the ideological battles of the 1980s
and 90s is still relevant to understanding the logic of this perception. Indeed, the
ideological trends of that period are still on the Russian political map: they
change over time but the experience of the 1980s and 90s is still an important
reference point for understanding the current problems and trends and for recipes
of further changes (or lack of them). Many producers of ideas were themselves
involved in or witnessed transformations, knowledge which made a big imprint
on their perception of the country’s current problems.
Vadim Radayev notes that within a space of less than ten years (from the
middle of the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s), the country saw a succession of
four dominant ideological paradigms: from socialist to democratic, then to liber-
al and conservative [52, pp. 276-306]. Each of these pivots followed changes in
the political arena: attempts to renew the Soviet economic system (1985-
1987/88), glasnost and democratization in the USSR (1987/88-1990/91), crisis
and collapse of the Soviet system and the launching of radical economic reforms
(1990/91-1993), and reforms running out of steam followed by post-revolution-
ary stabilization (after 1993). However, one should not see the transformation of
the ideological landscape solely as the projection of current political and eco-
nomic transformations in the USSR and Russia. Each of the critical junctures of
the 1980s and 1990s and their consequences were the results not only of the
struggle among interest groups (significant as it was) but also of the struggle of
ideas. This warrants a closer look at the ideas, which were oriented toward polit-
ical and economic reform and envisaged the building of democracy and a mar-
ket economy in the country. Such analysis is called upon to explain why (unlike
in many East European countries) [4]) in Russia the ideas of democratization and
market reforms were in many ways juxtaposed, which had a serious impact on
the outcome of political and economic transformations [6; 27].
Speaking about the clash of ideas in post-communist Russia, researchers
paid considerable attention to communist and nationalist trends [74; 21; 16; 41].
At the same time, works devoted to democratic and liberal parties in Russia,
which promoted the various ideas of the country’s modernization in the 1990s
[34; 28; 75], merely scratched the surface of their ideologies. Critical reflections
of the “democrats” and “liberals” themselves [59; 62; 8], although they contain
a fair amount of valuable data, only partially discuss the causes and conse-
quences of the “divorce” of these two ideological trends. We therefore need to
trace their genesis and mechanism of evolution against the background of tec-
tonic changes in Russia.
From the start, let us make it clear that the “liberals” and “democrats” in
Russia were rather like overlapping sets: the same politicians, analysts, journal-
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ists and other producers of ideas sometimes were at once “liberals” and “democ-
rats” and even publicly identified themselves with one or the other camp, and
some of them switched sides. However, in the framework of this article the two
categories are identified for analytical purposes as ideal typical specimens which
helps us to gain an insight into the logic of the ideological landscape of post-
communist Russia.
“Democrats” without Liberalism: Lost Illusions
The main advocates of democratic ideas during the Soviet perestroika were
active members of the 1960s generation, especially intellectuals and public per-
sonalities whose political views and professional and public careers were shaped
in the period between the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the crushing of the
Prague Spring in 1968.2 Khruschev’s Thaw and the hopes for successful devel-
opment of the country it generated shaped or substantially changed the world-
view of the “men of the 60s” [9]. However, subsequent stagnation under Leonid
Brezhnev stymied the careers of many members of that generation and rendered
irrelevant many ideas formed during the Thaw: the Sixties generation was
“frozen” for twenty years [80, ch. 9]. When the “men of the 60s” moved to the
forestage of social and political life during perestroika, it was as if the Soviet
Union was briefly back in the Thaw period. “The children of the 20th Congress”
moved into leading positions in the government structures, dominated the media
and proposed the main ideas for society’s development. Those who joined the
“democrats” in many ways took the cue from the “men of the 60s” and to some
extent still adhere to the intellectual and ideological traditions they had estab-
lished.
For the perestroika “democrats,” the main goal was to carry on the Thaw
program: political pluralism in the media and in decision-making, condemning
political repression, broader freedoms and lifting of the many Soviet-era bans
(censorship, foreign travel restrictions). Initially, the proposed plans were mod-
est [1], while the changes turned out to be too sudden: democratization and free
elections quickly whetted appetites, and it briefly seemed that it was enough to
remove the remaining barriers for Russia “to become Europe,” as one perestroi-
ka herald put it [11]. However, faced with real transformation problems, the
“democrats” proved to be unable to formulate meaningful and realistic positive
alternatives to the rapidly deteriorating situation [20; 59]. Their reading of the
situation in many ways reflected the system of coordinates set by the collective
experience of the Thaw, with all its good and bad characteristics. That system
envisaged gradual and partial changes of the Soviet political and economic rela-
tions (with the former put above the latter) and not their total revision or replace-
ment, something many “democrats” turned out to be unprepared for. It did not
take account of the changes that had occurred in the country and the world since
the times of the Thaw: “men of the Sixties” entered perestroika like the last bat-
tle of a (past) war, equipped with notions that were in many ways outdated. Not
surprisingly, they eventually lost that battle and the ideas they proclaimed were
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discredited. Their experience and worldview made them unfit for using the
opportunities perestroika offered for transforming society.
What was holding back the evolution of the ideas of the “men of the Sixties”
was above all lack of opportunities for translating words into deeds. The discus-
sions about the transformation of the USSR, which had been conducted from the
mid-1980s led nowhere. Articulating their position, setting forth their views and
communicating them to a narrow circle of readers were becoming an end in
itself. Disseminating ideas became more important than putting them into prac-
tice. “Men of the Sixties” probably never seriously thought about implementing
their ideas because that seemed to be a very remote perspective. So they direct-
ed all their energy, talent and passion into outwitting the Soviet regime in order
to air their views. When the hour of reform struck, many “democrats” failed to
come up with a viable alternative to the course pursued by the country’s leaders,
still less to implement it. Moreover, by no means all the “democrats” were ready
to assume personal responsibility for making and implementing key decisions.
Thus, for example, in 1992, looking for an authoritative figure to replace Yegor
Gaidar as Prime Minister, members of the Yeltsin team turned to Academician
Yury Ryzhov. A brilliant 1960s intellectual, appointed Russia’s ambassador to
France in 1991, he turned down the offer, not wishing to trade his exalted posi-
tion for the hard slog of taking the country out of its crisis [8]. Although many
rank-and-file activists among the “democrats,” especially in the provinces, obvi-
ously fell short of the standard required for taking part in the making and imple-
mentation of important decisions [20; 43], the more capable of them later learned
a lot and acquired considerable managerial experience (such cases though, were
few and far between).
Experience of the Thaw and the collapse of the suddenly bestowed and later
withdrawn freedoms engendered various complexes and syndromes. It was not
only that perestroika “democrats” sought to solve problems by petitioning the
authorities and rightly or wrongly were afraid to be deprived of freedoms. Many
of them shuddered at the thought of any actions by radical communists and/or
Russian nationalists, even though these trends had little support in the then
nascent market of ideas. Presenting their ideas to the public the “democrats”
reproduced the binary opposition of “the CPSU nomenklatura versus democra-
cy,” prompting many critical remarks to the effect that they perceived democra-
cy as the power of the “democrats” [43]. Although democracy was presented as
the necessary condition for eliminating the current challenges, the “democrats”
had a very vague idea of how to go about the job. For example, they proposed to
solve the nationalities problems with a "let's all be friends" attitude without a
serious effort to understand the causes of these problems [55]. The slogan, “Rus-
sia is one, but it is divisible” put forward by Yury Afanasyev, one of the democ-
ratic leaders,in the fall of 1991 in response to the challenge of separatism, puz-
zled even the activists themselves [51].
The economic agenda of the “democrats” was marginal in their worldview.
While supporting the country’s transition to the market economy (on the princi-
ple “for everything good against everything bad”) the “democrats” for the most
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part had a vague idea about how the problem should be tackled. That is why they
sometimes looked to outdated models (like Hungary’s “goulash socialism” or
Yugoslavia’s workers' self-management) and/or proposed a combination of
incompatibles, and, taken as a whole, their perception of the mounting econom-
ic problems in the country could not stand up to criticism [64]. Thus, the program
of the Democratic Russia bloc in the 1990 campaign to elect the People’s
Deputies of the RSFSR combined calls for equality of all forms of ownership and
the demand to freeze retail prices during the period of transition to market.
According to Viktor Sheinis, one of the authors of the program, it was basically
a compilation of the proposals put forward by various democratic candidates [59,
vol. 1, pp. 255-259] without as much as a hint of the mechanisms of implement-
ing it. The unrealistic character of such proposals even then met with justified
criticism, but it was not discussed seriously. History has no use for the subjunc-
tive mood and we shall never know what economic policy the “democrats”
would have pursued if they had come to power levers back in 1991, but one has
to go along with the claim that the “democrats’ ” ideas of economic reform (and
not only that) were based on wishful thinking [73].
In fact, the “democrats’ ” political program was fulfilled in August 1991, and
not so much through their own efforts as due to unintended consequences of ill-
thought-out actions of the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev. The col-
lapse of the former leadership, which came out of the blue, put the “democrats’ ”
ideas into question. The majority of them were obviously not equipped to work
out a new agenda [53; 59, vol. 2]. Some “democrats” were deeply disenchanted
with the first steps of the post-communist Russia [13], and the developments in
the wake of 1993 pushed them in the direction of hardline opposition to the Russ-
ian regime [28]. Ideological leadership was snatched from the “democrats” by
the representatives of the other trend, the “liberals,” whose baggage, priorities
and approaches to cardinal problems differed from those of their predecessors:
the Sixties “fathers” were replaced by the Seventies “sons.”
The dividing line between these generations was tenuous and although
1968—the crushing of the Prague Spring and the end of the Thaw in the USSR—
was an obvious watershed, the shaping of personal priorities took a long time and
was neither linear nor unambiguous, and the views of many Russians changed
substantially over time [63]. Among the “men of the Seventies” there were some
politicians, analysts and journalists whose perception of the world and the corre-
sponding system of coordinates were closer to those of the “men of the Sixties”
(the reverse happened much less frequently). The generation gap played a con-
siderable role in further divergence of the trajectories of the Russian “democrats”
and “liberals.” 
“Liberals” without Democracy: Politics without Illusions
“Men of the Seventies” came of age during the “long Seventies,” the period
between the collapse of the Thaw and the start of perestroika transformations.
This period was noted not only for the deficit of meaningful transformations in
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the USSR, the wish to preserve the status quo in politics and economics, but also
for a lack of hope for “a bright future” characteristic of the youth of the “men of
the Sixties.” The new generation had to learn to live by the moment according to
the ground rules set by the country’s leaders, which bred pragmatism and some-
times cynicism. Against the background of apathy and/or disdain of official com-
munist ideology, pragmatism took diverse forms, and it was necessary not to
dream of improving or worse, transforming the Soviet system, not to build “cas-
tles in the air,” but to achieve concrete results “here and now.” Very often a high-
level skill set and successful career went hand-in-hand with indifference to the
communist ideology [78; 32].
However, the fact that the “men of the Seventies” were indifferent toward
official ideology did not mean that they were insensitive to all ideas. Simply,
they perceived ideas through the prism of pragmatic interests, i.e., not in the nor-
mative but in the positive way, not as abstract benchmarks for the whole society
but as a means of furthering their own ends. So, while the rhetoric of the 1960s
“democrats” tended to juxtapose the authorities and society [1], the 1970s “lib-
erals” barely mentioned society in their memoirs [62; 8]. They were concerned
about the economy, while politics at best was seen as a set of conditions and
obstacles for the conduct of policy, and at worst attracted no interest at all. A
pragmatic perception of ideas determined the attitude to the transformations
under perestroika: unlike the “men of the Sixties” with their ungrounded expec-
tations, many “men of the Seventies” had no illusions from the start.
The “men of the Seventies” supported market reforms because they saw
them as a way of getting rid of the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy and
boosting living standards: these priorities along with acquired knowledge in the
economic sphere made them “liberals.” The economic agenda dominated their
discussions during perestroika [62; 72] and remained at the focus of debate in the
decades that followed [8]. For the “liberals,” the rest of the system of coordinates
(including but not limited to politics) was almost entirely linked with the cate-
gories of economic efficiency [40; 52, pp. 276-306]. Meanwhile, the ideas of
democracy that had moved to the foreground in the late 1980s were seen in a
strictly instrumental way and or at least with some reservations, which partially
reflected the general trends of post-communist neo-liberalism [4]. While they
approved of political liberalization as a means of lifting the more egregious and
irritating bans (lack of access to information, restricted foreign travel), the “lib-
erals” had mixed feelings about the ideas of democracy as the power of the peo-
ple, the separation of powers and protection of the interests of minorities. More-
over, against the background of the worsening crisis of the former system during
perestroika, they perceived the rambling and sometimes fruitless discussions on
general political matters as a “gabfest” and many of the Soviet leadership’s eco-
nomic policies as profoundly disappointing [5; 47].
In the late 1980s, differences over priorities (politics for the “democrats”
versus economics for the “liberals”) caused an ideological rift. The “democrats”
saw a clash of “good” and “bad,” seeing perestroika as a confrontation between
its ideological supporters and enemies [79]. The “liberals” stressed the struggle
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between “bad” and “very bad,” that is, the struggle between the reluctance to
change anything about way the economy and the country were run, on the one
hand, and incompetent attempts to fix the situation by half-measures, which
merely worsened the crisis, on the other [25]. While the “democrats” saw the
surge of social activism during perestroika as a sign of democracy, for the “lib-
erals” it was a sign of “chaos” and a source of risk for the economy and state
governance [26]. These different perceptions prompted the “liberals” to look for
alternative solutions in the realm of politics. It is no accident that some “liber-
als” took up the idea of the need for market reform under a tough authoritarian
regime as opposed to the “simultaneity dilemma.”
The idea that authoritarianism was necessary and even desirable as an instru-
ment of reforming the Soviet system was introduced into the public domain by
Andranik Migranyan (his joint interview with Igor Klyamkin published in Liter-
aturnaya gazeta under the tell-tale headline “Is an Iron Fist Needed?” [46]). That
discussion (like other episodes of the public debate of the time) did not have a
meaningful impact on the political agenda and it would be an exaggeration to see
it as a harbinger of an authoritarian pivot in Russia after the break-up of the
USSR [56]. However, the taboo on discussing authoritarian decisions of the
country’s problems was broken: while the 1960s “democrats” who had experi-
enced Stalinism and saw it brought down during the Thaw, rejected authoritari-
anism in principle because it was associated with repressions, the 1970s “liber-
als” saw it as one of the possible options for implementing economic transfor-
mations. 
In 1989, Sergey Vasilyev and Boris Lvin noted the widening gap between
the pressing need for drastic and painful economic reforms and the intention of
the authorities and the democratic public opinion to extend this process in time
using soft and ineffective measures. In their opinion, the Soviet leadership was
increasingly tempted to resort to authoritarianism for the sake of reform where-
as the Soviet republics might be pushed toward democratization under national-
ist banners [73]. In terms of policy recommendations, similar ideas informed The
Memorandum on the Concept of Transition to a Market Economy in the USSR
prepared in March 1990 by the Association of Social and Economic Sciences3
[51]. The authors of that document proposed a wide range of authoritarian mea-
sures designed to prevent the danger of a populist economic policy and mass
protests under anti-market slogans. They assumed that authoritarianism for the
sake of market reforms was inevitable and had no alternative. This was not a
combination of political and economic conditions characteristic of the majority
of post-communist countries: authoritarianism had almost nowhere contributed
to market successes [36; 23], as witnessed by the experience of market reforms
in Eastern Europe unfolding before the “liberals’ ” eyes [62; 8]. It is also worth
noting that the authors of the Memorandum saw the transition to a market econ-
omy as a one-off leap with a binary outcome (either success or total failure)
while intermediate and/or compromise variants were not even discussed. 
By that time, the models the “liberals” sought to emulate had begun to
change. As early as 1989, Vitaly Naishul suggested that in implementing market
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reforms, the USSR should emulate the examples not of Hungary and Yugoslavia,
and not even of Western Europe with its over-regulated economies but rather the
experience of the United States [48]. The search for models to emulate also
inspired the trip of Russian “liberals” to Chile organized by Naishul in April
1991 (crowned by a meeting with Pinochet who by that time had been forced to
resign under the pressure of democratization). Numerous positive references to
the success of Chilean reforms reinforced by photos in the company of the for-
mer dictator went a long way to change the perception of Pinochet. In the eyes
of the Soviet propaganda, the former villain turned into the chief reformer, while
in reality, the Chilean experience was complex, multi-faceted, and in many ways,
an exception from the rules [18; 69, pp. 587-600]. Although critics claimed that
after the trip to Chile, future Russian reformers sought to use Pinochet’s experi-
ence in practice [38], it proved to be a passing fad to the extent that years later
those who went on that trip recalled it without much emotion [62; 44]. Howev-
er, the myth about Pinochet as a “model” reformer (and similarly about the
“Chicago boys” as a role model for Russian “liberals”) acquired a life of its own.
Russian “liberals” did not forget the brief infatuation with Pinochet and later
some of them tried to detect the desired traits of a strongman-reformer in
Vladimir Putin. 
It would be no exaggeration to say that by the time of the start of economic
reforms in Russia in the fall of 1991, the Russian “liberals” had an adequate idea
of how to go about reform, what kind of economy was to emerge as a result of
reforms and what political system was necessary and desirable. They saw
democracy not so much as an obstacle in the way of market reforms as a luxury
Russia should defer, while the inherent “defects” of democracy—reliance on
elections, risks of a populist policy and a hamstrung government—were thought
to be incompatible with market reforms. Subsequently, many “liberals” [70, p. 8;
15] retained and even strengthened their view of politics that prevailed on the eve
of the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, that perception, which boiled down to
the formula, “a firm yes to liberal economic reformism, generally yes to democ-
racy in politics but not now and not as a priority,” surfaced in numerous pro-
grammatic documents of the Russian authorities (Strategy-2010, Strategy-2020,
etc.) to which “liberals” contributed extensively.
Two Roads toward the Edge of One and the Same Cliff
The year 1991 marked the start of a generational change in Russian politics.
Gaidar’s reforms elevated many Seventies “liberals” to leading positions in gov-
ernment and in the public sphere while the Sixties “democrats” were going
downhill, and not only because of age. The “democrats’ ” agenda seemed to have
been fulfilled while the “liberals” appeared to be just the right people to solve the
tasks of transformation. Without going into the argument as to whether the 1990s
offered other options of economic and political reforms and whether they could
have been implemented more successfully than did the Russian “liberals,” it has
to be noted that many traits of the Seventies generation left a significant imprint
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on the vector of transformations. While lengthy debates gave way to concrete
measures, they chose priorities and means of achieving the aims based on a prag-
matic agenda: ideas of what was desirable and what was possible, short-termism
in planning, flexibility and a penchant for compromise were combined with an
ability to get things done. Besides, the failure of the Sixties “democrats” who
missed the last chance of transforming the former system during perestroika sent
a clear signal to the Seventies “liberals” about how not to act. In this situation,
the approaches of the “fathers” and “sons” could not but be diametrically oppo-
site, including on the issue of prioritizing economic and political system trans-
formations: the “liberals” sacrificed democracy for the sake of market reforms. 
In late 1991, when Russia “froze” all the political institutions and the nation-
al state system, the number one priority for the political elites (and the public
opinion) was implementing economic transformations. The “liberals,” who
backed these moves, hoped that radical economic reforms would, within a rela-
tively short span of time, rescue the country from its crisis, whereupon the turn
would come of democratizing the political regime [8]. But these hopes were not
destined to come true: the Russian government failed to bring about an early
financial stabilization, economic reforms were greatly extended in time and the
transformational decline of the economy was full of dramatic twists and turns
and ended in default and devaluation of the Russian currency. The political con-
text of economic transformations in 1990s Russia bore little resemblance to the
experience of post-communist reform in Eastern Europe [3]. The difference was
partly due to the state’s military and distributive potential in the wake of the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union while the decline of production turned out to be more
serious and prolonged than in the neighboring ex-communist countries.
Subjective factors, which had to do with the political tactics of reforms car-
ried out by the “liberals” and their allies [60], also played a considerable role. It
was effectively a series of tactical agreements not with the losers at the first stage
of reform, but on the contrary, with those who benefited from it and were there-
fore not interested in further change [36], i.e., the oligarchs, regional leaders and
other rent-seekers. The Seventies “liberals” (unlike “the men of the Sixties”)
were prepared to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances and, if neces-
sary, easily made compromises to achieve what was possible having in mind
short-term tasks rather than starry-eyed dreams of “a bright future.”
This circumstance partly accounted for the phenomenon of 1990s Russian
reforms noted by specialists and actors themselves [62; 8]: on a number of key
issues of economic reform, the Gaidar team easily surrendered its positions, hop-
ing to gain a tactical advantage from compromises and seeking to gain the
desired result in other spheres. Thus, yielding to the pressure of powerful lob-
bies, it agreed to give up its anti-inflation policy arguing, among other things,
that it needed to hold its ground on the issue of privatization of enterprises. How-
ever, the course for privatization [12] was also compromised, as a result of which
the biggest beneficiaries, compared to the initial intentions, were insiders—the
work collectives and directors of enterprises [10]. “Appeasement” of the narrow
interest groups that sought to collect rent [6] led to high political costs of reforms
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(both for reformers and for the country as a whole), while subsequent change of
the government’s policy in the 2000s prompted a revision of some results of
transformations [76; 24]. In other words, the course the “liberals” pursued in the
1990s in many ways ran counter to their own ideas formulated before the start of
economic reforms. 
Part of the reason for such inconsistency was that initially, the “liberals”
themselves assumed the role of reformer-technocrats and not independent actors
on the Russian political scene and stayed out of the public struggle for power,
which made them vulnerable [30]. When, in the course of 1993 parliamentary
elections, they finally assumed a more active role, they discovered that their
ideas and leaders had limited support, while facing competition on the part of the
“democrats” who, in the wake of 1991, seemed to have been written off. Things
came to a head in September-October 1993 when political polarization in the
country, which had been mounting since 1990, reached its peak [54]. The “liber-
als,” who approved of Yeltsin’s actions, actively supported the dissolution of the
Russian parliament and the use of force to suppress it because they felt that these
measures removed the obstacles in the way of reform. At the same time, the
“democrats,” if not openly condemning Yeltsin’s actions, dissociated themselves
from them.
The ideological rift between the “liberals” and the “democrats” spilled into
politics in the shape of differences between Russia’s Choice bloc and its succes-
sor, Russia’s Democratic Choice and the Union of Right Forces, on the one hand,
and Yabloko on the other. Russia’s Choice, which was formed by leading “liber-
als” and made a bid for power in the course of 1993 elections, managed to make
use of the organizational resources of the former democratic movement but did
not do very well in the elections [45]; after some of its representatives lost their
posts, the bloc transformed itself into Russia’s Democratic Choice. It was a typ-
ical “semi-opposition” [28], combining as it was moderate criticism of aspects of
the government policy with unreserved support of the Kremlin on key issues
while its representatives kept important posts in government. In the unfavorable
economic context of the mid-1990s, such a strategy held no promise of divi-
dends, and the costs were considerable. Not being able to influence key deci-
sions, the “liberals” were seen by the electorate as being responsible for the gov-
ernment’s failures, and their influence in the corridors of power waned. By con-
trast, Yabloko, initially a motley assemblage of politicians, managed to get
across its programmatic principles and attitudes and attract a small but noticeable
number of voters. Subsequent efforts by Yabloko’s leader Grigory Yavlinsky and
some other members enabled it to become a full-fledged political party [34; 75; 28].
Thus, the “liberals” and “democrats” became political rivals and their rela-
tions became strained. This happened because institutional and political incen-
tives toward a coalition policy for the Russian parties were small even for ideo-
logically close parties: the only option for coalition-building was “unfriendly
takeover” of small entities by larger ones [57]. The difference of potentials of
Russia’s Choice—Russia’s Democratic Choice—Union of Right Forces and
Yabloko was not sufficient for such a takeover, and the claims of the pro-Krem-
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lin RDC, which had clout to trangle Yabloko in its embrace, met with fierce crit-
icism on the part of “democrats” [77]. If one looks at the way the two parties
positioned themselves on the more significant issues, their approaches differed
cardinally. During the December 1993 Constitution referendum, the “liberals”
backed the Presidential draft of the constitution and actively supported Yeltsin’s
re-election. The “democrats,” on the contrary, refused to back the draft Consti-
tution [59, vol. 2], and in the 1996 elections, Yavlinsky himself ran for president.
In the second round, Yabloko refused to back Yeltsin.
As regards strategic positioning, Yabloko “democrats” were torn between
drawing closer to the “liberals” and distancing themselves from them. Sporadic
attempts to shift Yabloko toward the “democratic left” niche never met with sup-
port from the “democrats.” Yabloko failed to clearly formulate an ideological
alternative to the “liberals” as regards the political course. The party’s position
on the whole was somewhat to the left of the rival “liberals,” especially on the
issue of privatization [19].These differences, however, were not always under-
stood by the members of both trends or by rank-and-file activists, which is why
the differences between the “democrats” and the “liberals” were perceived by
observers as signs of personal conflicts. “Liberals” for their part were not a
monolithic bloc; frictions in their ranks increased over time: today it is hard to
imagine that Sergey Glaziev, a statist and advocate of the “Russian world” con-
cept, and Andrey Illarionov, a radical critic of the policies of the Russian author-
ities, were both members of the “Gaidar team” in the late 1980s and early1990s.
Even when the “liberals’ ” programmatic positions remained more or less
unchanged on economic policy they did not always follow their basic principles in practice. 
Although the RDC suffered a debacle in the 1995 Duma elections, the “lib-
erals,” far from dropping out of Russia’s political elite, increased their influence
because they took an active part in the motley pro-Yeltsin coalition in the 1996
presidential elections and subsequently held a number of government posts [7;
22; 37]. After the 1998 financial crisis, which was blamed on the “liberals,” they
managed to rally and form a new coalition, which did well in the 1999 elections
as The Union of Right Forces. It is worth noting that by that time, the “liberals”
had made a strategic decision to renounce the legacy of the “democrats” and posi-
tioned themselves as the Right throwing their weight behind Putin during the
election campaign. Thanks to the Kremlin’s support, they managed to get back
into parliament and score a crucial victory over the Yabloko rivals. The “democ-
rats” in turn faced a profound internal crisis: Yabloko opposed the Kremlin’s ini-
tiatives, systematically refused to choose “the lesser of two evils” and ended up
becoming an opposition that was, in principle, unable to take part in government,
which hindered its efforts to broaden its electoral base. In the eyes of its sup-
porters, Yabloko did not look like a party capable of implementing its plans.
Attempts to reverse the situation failed and its poor performance in the 1999 elec-
tions demonstrated that the “democrats” electoral prospects were illusory [28].
As a result, in 2000-2003, both the “liberals” and the “democrats” were
reduced to the status of a “semi-opposition.” For the “liberals,” it meant that the
Kremlin only needed them as allies for tactical reasons, while the dividends from
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the claims to a junior partner of URF were insignificant. Yabloko’s crisis grew
worse during the same period. Several prominent Duma deputies and regional
activists resigned from the party, the demand for the “democrats’ ” former ideas
dropped and no new ideas were offered. Against this background, the URF,
which was the engine of the new wave of liberal reforms in the early 2000s and
seemed to have perked up, made several attempts to strangle Yabloko in the
embrace of the “democrats.” During the 2003 Duma elections, the “liberals”
sought not so much to garner votes as to get Yabloko rivals out of the way. The
latter responded in kind, which undermined the positions of both parties to the
conflict. Indeed, these elections were the “swan song” of both parties: the “lib-
erals” and the “democrats” failed to win seats in the Fourth State Duma, which
led the chief of the President’s staff Vlaldislav Surkov to declare that these two
parties had exhausted their historical mission in Russia. 
Subsequent events demonstrated a dramatic decline of both political camps:
the “liberals” split into “systemic” Kremlin loyalists and “non-systemic” critics
of the Kremlin who drew closer to the ”democrats,” who in turn became more
and more marginalized politically as authoritarian trends in the country
increased. Over time, their confrontation became less and less important in the
public eye, especially as a new generation of opposition politicians was emerg-
ing [29]. And yet, the causes and mechanisms of the ideological struggle between
the “liberals” and the “democrats” in Russia, as well as its influence on the tra-
jectories of transformation of the country and the prospects of reformist ideas in
the future remain unclear.
In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Rise and Fall of Reformist Ideas in Russia
Why do some ideas make an impact on the processes of social change and
others do not? The answer to this question can be gleaned through the prism of
demand and supply in the market of ideas. The demand grows in the periods when
the situation in this or that society is perceived by the elites and by public opin-
ion as one of crisis, but as uncertainty disappears, it may fall leaving those who
produce and disseminate ideas out of a job. From that point of view, the rise of
reformist slogans during perestroika, the decline of the “liberals” and “democrats”
in the 2000s can be explained as the consequences of the dynamics of demand for
ideas. Before the start of perestroika, interest in alternative ideas was artificially
restricted, and after the post-communist transformation, as the new political and
economic system in Russia took root, demand for liberal and democratic ideas
disappeared. A new groundswell of demand in the market of ideas in the 2010s
brought to the foreground concepts far removed from modernization while
democracy and market reforms could find no niche in this market. 
However, in the analysis of the struggle between various reformist trends,
the study of demand in the market of ideas has to be complemented by an assess-
ment of supply, not only in terms of the content of these ideas but also of the
actions of those who produce and disseminate them. Although supply of con-
cepts is not always directly linked with their impact on the current agenda [65],
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one can hardly speak of the impact of concepts without articulated programs and
active efforts of various agents. Supply on the part of “democrats” was too gen-
eral and poorly articulated while its producers and disseminators were not
equipped to meet the sudden surge of demand. The demand on the part of the
“liberals,” although more coherent, focused on just one key aspect of the post-
communist transformation (the building of a market economy) and was geared
to one-off application in the concrete context of reforms. The “democrats” and
even more so the “liberals,” both in the supply of ideas and their implementation,
had in mind not the broad masses but rather narrow interest groups, which lost
them the trust of the elites and of society. Although the “liberals” were able, due
to a favorable concatenation of circumstances (change of generations amid dis-
affection with the democratic narrative), to score a tactical victory in the market
of reformist ideas in the early 1990s, both the “liberals” and the “democrats” suf-
fered a crushing defeat in the medium-term perspective.
Another important lesson of the Russian experience in the late 1980s and
early 2000s was that what matters in the struggle is not only or largely the con-
cepts as such, but their acceptance/non-acceptance by the elites and the public,
multiplied by the perception of the figures of the producers and disseminators of
these ideas. The Sixties “democrats” lost to their younger, better educated and
more modern rivals, the Seventies “liberals.” However, they too failed to become
the intellectual beacons of large groups of intellectuals, not to speak of the broad
public (although some of them influenced the positions of the Russian elites in
the 1990s) even though they played no small part in the preparation and adop-
tion of significant decisions (the “liberals” still have some traction but only on a
small scale).
The defeat of the “democrats” and the “liberals” does not mean that their
ideas proved to be useless for Russia’s transformation in the late 20th century.
The fact that Russia managed to build a market economy and proclaim itself to
be a democracy, declaring (but not putting into practice) the principles of politi-
cal and civic freedoms, was to a large extent the result of the promotion of
reformist programs. Although the producers and disseminators of these ideas in
the late 1980s and early 1990s would hardly find signs of implementation of their
ideas in the 2020s Russia, the reformist ideas helped our country to come out of
the impasse in which it found itself at the start of perestroika and helped to make
this result irreversible. However, this fact in itself does not guarantee against new
impasses in the future and neither the “democrats” nor the “liberals” were pre-
pared for such a turn of events by the beginning of the 20th century. 
By the early 2020s, the “men of the Sixties” had left the stage and even their
successors, “men of the Seventies,” are unlikely to propose anything new in the
market of ideas. But what can the new generations of “democrats” and “liberals”
bring to the struggle of ideas that is distinct from their predecessors? Will their
programs be met with demand in the foreseeable future, and if so, what will be
their main thrust? The answer to this question is anything but obvious. Granted,
after the debacle of the 2000s, the “democrats” more or less successfully
switched to human rights activities to preserve the core of their producers and
distributors. But the “niche” character of their slogan, although making it possi-
ble to reproduce the former ideals, objectively leaves little chance that if fresh
demand for democratization arises in Russia, the “democrats” will be in demand
in this capacity. Attempts to transform the “democrats’ ” ideas by grafting pop-
ulism from Aleksey Navalny [42] in the 2010s are questionable. Although these
attempts are called upon to stimulate fresh demand in the market of ideas, it
remains unclear to what extent supply will be integral and successful, or whether
it will end up as another political technology ploy in the struggle against the cur-
rent regime. It is more difficult to assess the prospects for the Russian “liberals”
whose ideas (and proponents), after short-lived success, were in many respects
(justly or unjustly) discredited in the eyes of the Russian public. The advent of
the new generation has not changed the landscape in this political camp, and the
new slogans need to be better articulated if they are to seriously battle for the
hearts and minds of Russians. 
Be that as it may, the programmatic ideas for the Russian modernization pro-
posed by the “democrats” and the “liberals” in the late 20th century should not
be thrown into the trash can. In the future, new attempts to move forward will
need reform programs, which of course will differ from those that were preva-
lent 20 or 30 years ago. Their success in the market of ideas will go a long way
to determine the agenda of the new round of Russia’s transformation, which is
why the experience of the “democrats” and the “liberals” remains relevant in
terms of Russia’s prospects.
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Notes
1 Here and elsewhere the terms in quotation marks are self-appellations.
Whether the views and actions of the Russian “liberals” and “democrats”
correspond to the respective doctrines is a question beyond the scope of this
article (see critique in [40; 43]).
2 Here and elsewhere the materials of an article published earlier are used [32].
3 Founded in 1989 and headed by Anatoly Chubais.
Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Typical Views, Attitudes and Self-Identifications
in Principal Strata of Today’s Russian Society
Natalya TIKHONOVA
Abstract. In this article, I analyze typical views, attitudes and self-
identifications in the three principal strata of today’s Russian society from
the perspective of Max Weber’s theory of positive and negative life chances.
By analyzing the returns of two national surveys carried out by the Federal
Sociological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2015
and 2018, I demonstrate that these strata differ from each other not only in
terms of occupational structure and living and education standards but also
in terms of their members’ typical self-identifications, sets of principles and
values, and views on the current situation in Russia.
While the lower and middle strata are relatively similar to each other, the
upper stratum, which accounts for about 20% of the population, stands out
with its majority’s specific self-identifications, planning horizons,
nonconformism and internal locus of control. Most upper-stratum members
have greater ambitions and are more optimistic about the general situation in
Russia than the rest of the population. The upper stratum also puts distinctive
expectations on the state—it mainly wants the state to ensure a scientific and
technological breakthrough for the country. Social solidarity is rarer while
the stigmatization of the poor is more common in this stratum than in the
other two strata. The upper stratum’s principles and values manifest
themselves in the behavioral strategies of its members.
I come to the conclusion that dividing Russian society into these three
strata meets principal neo-Weberian criteria of class and that, within the
limits of this social structure model, the upper stratum with its objective and
subjective characteristics can be seen as the middle class.
Keywords: social stratification, social structure, life chances,
stratification model, stratum, strata, social reproduction, self-identifications,
social status.
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The Theoretical and Methodological Basis for the Study. General
Characteristics of the Proposed Russian Society Stratification Model
Based on Life Chances and Risks Criteria
The structure model of Russian society brought about by the reforms of
recent decades—its type and the character, roles and sizes of individual social
groups—has regularly attracted scholarly interest (see [29; 22; 9; 15; 20; 23; 4;
16; 17]). However, although the problems of the social structure are of interest to
scientists, there are practically no works in Russian literature that in structuring
Russian society are using one of the versions of the so-called gradation approach
which distinguishes populations on the basis of the specific chances of life of their
members and the risks they experience. Exceptions are relatively few (see [1; 13;
21]), and they still generally fail to draw comparisons between the typical
subjective characteristics of members of different groups. There are some studies
of such characteristics in individual groups, but they normally have the bottom
line idea that the Russians are united in terms of values they espouse [11; 10]. The
purpose of this article was to describe some typical characteristics of members of
principal Russian social strata and class aspects of these characteristics.
From the theoretical and methodological points of view, this approach
follows the neo-Weberian tradition: it is owing to Max Weber’s works that
sociologists have been basing social stratification models on the life chances
criterion. Weber saw life chances as the chief determinant of the status of the
individual in the hierarchy of capitalist society [25]. He attached the main
significance to life chances determining the individual’s position in the system
of economic relations, i.e., their being a member of a specific economic class,
though he also paid serious attention to the specific character of life chances in
other areas, e.g. consumption. 
Weber distinguished between positive and negative economic privileges—
the former representing meaning an advantageous status vis-à-vis a social norm
and the latter standing for various kinds of privations and risks—and a medium
position between them.
This inevitably implies the existence of three principal strata—a stratum
enjoying positive privileges, a stratum having negative privileges, and a middle
stratum [25]. These strata can be considered as classes in the proper sense if they
have their own distinctive mentalities and behavioral patterns.
This modeling of stratification based on the life chances criterion has been
developed further in the neo-Weberian tradition. Sociologists have clarified
concepts of life chances and risks (see [3; 8; 14; 18]) and described what they
believe are chances and risks specific to various spheres, e.g., economic security,
occupations, and consumption (see [3; 5; 7; 14; 24]).1 This approach enables a
sociologist to more accurately indicate homogeneous groups and rank them
vertically on the basis of the material status criterion instead of merely stating
income levels or amounts and costs of property owned. It makes it possible to take
account of a diversity of lifestyles with some people spending most of their money
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on services and others on goods. Different degrees of rationality of expenditure
should also come into account, as is the role of non-monetary resources such as
social capital, cognitive abilities and noncognitive skills in addressing situations
where there are unequal life chances and risks despite equal incomes.
Extensive studies in various countries have produced results that can be used in
empirical studies of chances and risks in Russia. However, this is not an easy or
trivial task due to methodological questions that Weber’s life chances theory puts to
the researcher. One of them is what are positive and negative privileges in a specific
society (today’s Russian society in our case) at a specific moment in time. To be able
to answer, one needs to know what were the ordinary Russian’s typical life chances
and risks in the mid-2010s.2 Chances and risks typical for a maximum of 45% of
Russians were examined as indications of positive or negative privileges.
It was also quite a difficult question what specific life chances could be
considered criteria to determine a group’s place in the social hierarchy. But
Russians normally use what is generally a standard set of values as social status
criteria, and this made this question easier to answer [20]. This enabled us to
primarily take account of opportunities in spheres of life that matter to the majority
of Russians in determining indications of positive and negative privileges.3
Two sets of data formed the empirical basis for our study—returns of two
large-scale monitoring surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal
Sociological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, one
conducted in October 2015 and the other in April 2018.
Each survey involved questioning 4,000 people who were aged 18 or more
and had been selected through a multistage region-by-region process, which
guaranteed the representative character of the selected group. The first-stage
selection was based on the economic territorial division of Russia used by the
Federal State Statistics Service. The second stage involved selecting typical
administrative territorial units within each economic territorial region. The third
stage involved the calculation within each administrative unit of quotas for five
types of populated areas: Moscow and St. Petersburg; administrative centers of
federal constituent territories; administrative centers of districts; urban-type
settlements; and villages. The fourth stage involved direct selection of
respondents based on social, occupational and gender quotas and on five age
quotas—ages 18 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, and 60 or more. 
We put together two scales—a positive privileges scale and a negative
privileges one—to underlie a vertical stratification model of Russian society
based on the life chances and risks criterion. Each scale comprised four subscales
that were based on three positive privilege indicators and three negative privilege
indicators (Table 1). Our analysis covered not only economic class characteristics
such as employment aspects and disposable resources but also life chances in
other spheres, e.g., consumption and leisure facilities. For this reason, we used
stratum instead of class as the concept to base our analysis on and decided to
assess the results that this analysis was going to lead to the class perspective.
Hence, although we did use Weber’s ideas as guidelines, our methodology was
not unconditionally based on them and went beyond their limits.
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T a b l e  1
Subscales and indicators used in building a Russian society stratification model based
on the life chances and risks criterion
Positive privileges scale indicators Negative privileges scale indicators
Economic Life Conditions subscale
Owning a second home suitable for year-
round residence
Large debts
Simultaneous ownership of a second piece
of real estate and a car
High inelastic current expenses, e.g. rent
Investments and savings sufficient to live
on for a long time
Unstable income due to lack of stable occupation
Job Situation subscale
Influence potential at work Unfavorable employment conditions 
Holding a job one wants (interesting etc.)
Law violation by employer, e.g., due to absence
of formal employment contract
Availability of employee benefits package
Risk of prolonged unemployment (being
permanently unemployed for more than 3 months
per year)
Subscale on Opportunities for Preservation and Enlargement of One’s Human Capital
Accessibility and affordability of paid
education for adults and children in a
household
Inaccessibility of essential education for
household members
Accessibility of paid health services
Likelihood of significant health deterioration
due, e.g., to inaccessibility of essential medical
assistance or hazardous work
Digital skills—regular and diversified use
of Internet
Impossibility of everyday use of information and
communication technology due to its
inaccessibility or to lack of skills
Consumption and Leisure subscale
Possibility of diversified consumption
(number of durable goods items in
household 0.25 higher than national
median)
Limited range of consumer goods used (number
of durable goods items in household 0.25 lower
than national median)
Housing comfortability higher than 
average (large floor space and adequate
amenities)
Poor housing conditions (lack of amenities, per
capita floor space of less than 12 square meters
Good vacation opportunities (possibility of
vacationing outside one’s home at least
once a year)
Unsatisfactory nutrition (one’s dissatisfaction
with one’s nutrition, e.g., due to saving on food)
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The values of the Life Changes and Risks Index (LCRI) were obtained by
adding the indicators of the positive privileges scale to those of the negative
privileges scale with the latter indicators stated as negative numbers. The LCRI
readings were used as the basis for a general model of stratification of Russian
society, which is represented in Figure 1. This model has on the whole proven
stable and worked under different economic situations, providing an essentially
accurate picture of stratification.
Fig. 1. The LCRI-based model of stratification of Russian society, 2015-2018, %.
We carried out a statistical and theoretical analysis to detect boundaries on
our scale between the middle stratum and the strata marked by the domination of
negative and positive privileges. We used various methods to ensure greater
accuracy, including two-stage cluster analysis based on the Jenks natural breaks
classification method [1; 21].
The upper stratum as singled out via the use of these methods brings together
about one-fifth of Russia’s population (19.6% of respondents in the 2018 survey
belonged to it). The lower stratum makes up a little less than one-third (29.4% of
respondents) and the middle stratum about half of (50.9% of respondents) of the
population. 
The occupational aspect of life chances in the positive privileges section
shows the greatest polarization—differences in social security degrees, the
nature and independence of work, etc. This is not surprising—the three strata
show significant differences in occupation status and education levels (Table 2).
This suggests that the different life chances of the three strata are effectively
class differences stemming from the place of each stratum in the economic
relations system. Hence, each stratum with its combination of distinctive
structural characteristics may be viewed as a class in the making. Income
differences corroborate this: the average income in the upper stratum is
practically twice the size of that in the lower stratum.
Table 2
Education levels, income levels and occupational status in the three strata, 2018, %4
*Half of the working middle-stratum members without a higher education and half of manual
workers belonging to the upper stratum have spouses with a higher education.
**More than 70% of manual workers in the upper stratum belong to the “labor aristocracy,”
i.e., possess top skills in their occupation.
Self-Identifications, Social Self-Perceptions and Basic Principles 
in the Three Strata
The existence or absence of specific self-identifications of individuals is one
of the key criteria for determining whether a class in the making has or has not
become a full-blown class with its distinctive class consciousness.
SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. 51, No. 2, 202030
Indicators
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
Education level
Holding postgraduate degree or being graduate of two or
more higher education institutions
0.5 2.4 6.8
Holding higher education qualifications 14.6 30.2 52.9
Holding secondary specialized education qualifications 55.4 53.2 33.5*
Having general secondary education, complete or
incomplete
29.5 14.2 6.8*
Per capita monthly income, rubles 
Average 18,689 23,631 34,732
Median 16,000 20,000 30,000
Modal 15,000 20,000 30,000
Occupational status, % of the workers
Holders of traditional middle-class positions (chief
executive officers, entrepreneurs, professionals)
14.3 35.3 69.9
Other non-manual workers 32.3 29.2 16.8
Manual workers 53.4 35.5 13.3**
Additional information
Total proportion of non-workers, including: 33.7 28.6 15.5
Non-working pensioners 23.8 18.3 4.7
Students 1.6 7.5 9.8
Women on maternity leave 0.7 0.8 0.0
Other categories 7.6 2.0 1.0
Due to the important role of self-identifications, sociologists have developed
numerous methods to evaluate them. Among them are diagrams for a respondent
to indicate what they consider their social status and requests for respondents to
describe their status or to state how close they believe they are to various social
groups. We used two methods in our study—a 10-point scale for a respondent to
indicate their perceived place in society and a verbal test to determine how close
a respondent thought they were to various social groups. Both methods showed
the upper stratum to be characterized by self-identifications making it stand apart
from the other two strata. For instance, in the verbal test, the upper-stratum
respondents named more groups they identified themselves with than the
respondents from the lower or middle stratum. Upper-stratum respondents
normally named three or four of the 11 groups listed in the questionnaire. In the
2018 survey, the average number of instances of such self-identification by
upper-stratum respondents was 3.6 compared with 2.7 among the lower-stratum
and 3.3 among the middle-stratum respondents. Hence, the lower stratum was the
least affected by the notorious “identity crisis.” 
This does not disprove the point of Yelena Danilova and Vladimir Yadov that
unstable social self-identifications are normal in today’s societies in general and
in Russian society specifically [6]. However, typically, members of the Russian
upper stratum stably feel close to people who are in the same occupation or
pursue the same hobby or hobbies (Table 3).
Table 3
Social groups that members of the three strata feel close to, 2015, %
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Perceived degree of closeness to group
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
People in same occupation
Significantly close 35.1 48.0 60.9
Somewhat close 49.1 41.3 35.9
Not close at all 15.8 10.7 3.2
People pursuing same hobby/hobbies
Significantly close 43.1 55.0 63.2
Somewhat close 42.9 36.0 31.6
Not close at all 14.0 9.0 5.2
The poor
Significantly close 10.6 8.9 6.2
Somewhat close 44.6 41.9 33.7
Not close at all 44.8 49.2 60.1
Europeans
Significantly close 5.0 9.6 9.2
Somewhat close 32.3 37.0 43.9
Not close at all 62.7 53.4 46.9
The upper stratum is also marked by distinctive negative self-identifications,
i.e., the complete impossibility of self-identification with a specific group. In the
upper stratum, unlike in the other two strata, the majority do not identify
themselves as poor, and nearly 60% do not identify themselves as members of
the lower class either (Table 3). In fact, Russians have a rather peculiar concept
of class. In any case, as Table 4 shows, self-identification as a member of a
specific class only approximately shows where one stands vis-à-vis in respect of
the life chances and risks hierarchy: the majority of members of each stratum
feel that they belong to the middle class. Though self-identifications as middle-
class members are more common in the upper stratum than in the other two strata
and more common in the middle stratum than in the lower stratum, and self-
identifications as members of the lower or working class show the opposite
pattern of commonality, there are no significant statistical dependences between
these variables. This means that class self-awareness is still in embryo in Russia.
Table 4 
Self-identifications in the three strata with various classes, 2015, %
Now let us go to our 10-point scale graphic test. It makes clear that, although
in each stratum there are those feel at the top of society and those who feel at the
bottom, each stratum shows a social status ladder different from that of the other
two strata (Figure 2). About three quarters of the upper stratum put themselves
in the top half of the hierarchy. In the middle stratum, in which typical self-
identifications practically coincide with those in Russian society as a whole, only
a minority put themselves in the top half of the hierarchy—45.9% of respondents
did so. The lower stratum is characterized by low self-identifications. By the
same token, the bottom four rungs of the ladder5 are claimed by the majority
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Perceived degree of closeness to class
Lower
stratum
Middle
Stratum
Upper
stratum
Lower class
Significantly close 10.7 9.1 6.1
Somewhat close 43.9 38.3 35.8
Not close at all 45.4 52.6 58.1
Working class
Significantly close 22.0 22.9 17.7
Somewhat close 52.2 45.8 45.3
Not close at all 25.8 31.3 37.0
Middle class
Significantly close 15.1 20.8 21.6
Somewhat close 50.5 51.3 54.8
Not close at all 34.4 27.9 23.6
(55.5% of respondents) of the lower stratum, one-third (32.3%) of the middle
stratum, and only every tenth member of the upper stratum.
Hence, stratum self-identification is quite distinct, unlike class self-
identification. This means Russians have gone a long way in developing
perceptions of their status: they intuitively identify themselves with a specific
class but cannot yet clearly put that into words.
Fig. 2. Stratification models within the three strata based on self-identifications, 2018, %.
Upper-stratum characteristics include status reproduction: more than 60% of
stratum members put not only themselves but also the family in which they grew
up in the top half of the hierarchy. This contributes to the stability of status self-
identifications in the stratum. This conclusion is objectively underscored by the
fact that at least one of the parents of the majority of upper-stratum members (as
was the case of 52.0% of respondents compared with 30.5% of middle-stratum and
15.5% of lower-stratum respondents) had a higher education. In the upper stratum,
71.3% of respondents aged 30 or less had parents at least one of whom had a higher
education. As for respondents aged over 30, the older they were the lower this
proportion was, which was a consequence of different generational patterns of
education levels and an indication of increasing reproduction of the social group
with higher education that forms the core of the upper stratum. It should be
expected that self-identifications and principles that are typical of it will continue
to spread through this stratum. It was no accident that 64.9% of respondents who
came from families represented by the top half of the scale had clear occupational
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self-identifications compared with only 49.3% of respondents who placed their
parents on one of the bottom three rungs of the ladder. Those who did not identify
themselves as European made up 48.0% of the former and 63.8% of the latter
group. This not only reflects the role of one’s social roots in one’s self-
identification but also means that people who are at least second-generation
members of middle and upper sections of society are more European culturally.
Differences in ways in which members of the different strata perceive their
social status are also reflected in their degrees of satisfaction with their status and
with their life in general. Table 5 shows that the majority of upper-stratum
members are definitely satisfied with both and that positive sociopsychological
sentiments are dominant in this stratum. 
On the other hand, the majority of lower-stratum members are dissatisfied
both with their social status and with their life in general, and negative
sentiments such as anxiety, annoyance, embitterment, and aggressiveness are
typical in this stratum. 
The middle stratum shows mixed sentiments: on the one hand, it is
predominantly positive sociopsychologically but, on the other, the majority of its
members are dissatisfied both with their social status and with their life in
general.
These are the patterns of all age groups in each stratum.
Table 5
Degrees of satisfaction with life, perceptions of one’s status and dominant sentiments,
2018, %
The upper stratum also has some values and principles that make it different
from the other strata.6 One of these principles is long-term life planning
(Figure 3). In the 2018 survey, only 16.5% of upper-stratum respondents both of
whose parents had a higher education did not make long-term life plans. The
average proportion of upper-stratum respondents who made no plans was 25.5%. 
Possibly, one reason why planning horizons are different in the different
strata is that goals themselves differ from stratum to stratum. On the other hand,
the three strata are similar to each other in terms of typical principal goals set in
them and it is usually hopes for achieving them that vary. But there is one typical
objective in the upper stratum that makes it significantly different from the other
strata—the majority of its members seek to belong to a specific social group,
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Indicators
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
Those considering their life generally good 8.3 24.7 60.1
Those considering their social status good 8.3 25.8 55.0
Those emotionally upbeat or calm 41.8 61.9 84.4
Those indifferent or anxious, annoyed, embittered or
aggressive
58.2 38.1 15.6
attain a position of influence, i.e., a specific place in the social hierarchy, feel that
they play a significant role in society with the minimization of alienation
common in modern societies. The strata also differ in terms of how much the
possibility of good education, receiving a prestigious and interesting job, and
achieving high professional standards matters to them (Table 6).
Fig. 3. Life planning horizons in the three strata, 2018, %.
To sum up, members of the upper stratum generally set themselves more
ambitious objectives in life than people in the other strata. These ambitious
upper-stratum objectives are usually professional goals—occupation is the main
class criterion.
Table 6
Life goals of members of the three strata, 2018, %
Goals such as leading an honest life, building a happy family, giving good
upbringing to one’s children, having reliable friends, having a lot of leisure time
and being able to spend it enjoyably, having good earnings, having a business of
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Goals
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
Interesting work 90.1 93.3 98.9
High standards in one’s occupation 88.4 93.4 98.1
Good education 75.5 83.6 93.2
Prestigious job 78.2 82.1 90.8
Visiting various countries 69.0 80.8 90.4
Successful career 54.8 62.9 79.4
Accession to specific social circle 38.7 44.0 54.6
Playing influential role in society 44.0 49.0 53.0
one’s own, becoming rich, or being no worse off financially than others have
practically the same significance in all three strata.
The three strata also have similar ways of spending leisure time—there is
practically the same desire to attend entertainment facilities such as clubs or
discos, have regular meetings with friends, and spend a lot of time with one’s
children. But members of the upper stratum much more often want to read
books, newspapers or magazines, pursue cultural activities such as going to the
theater or to the movies or visiting museums or exhibitions, to regularly practice
sports, e.g., going to gyms or fitness centers, and obtain knowledge and skills
either related or unrelated to their work. In the 2018 survey, only 37.1% of
upper-stratum respondents but the majority of the middle-stratum and two-
thirds of the lower stratum respondents said that they had no desire to pursue
one or more of these kinds of activities. The strong motivation of members of
the upper stratum for such activities does not depend on their age or education
level.
Upper-stratum distinctions also include a strong internal locus of
control—the belief that one can control one’s life. This was the conviction of
75.2% of upper stratum respondents in the 2018 survey. Members of the other
two strata predominantly have a strong external locus of control: 50.8% of
middle-stratum and 72.7% of lower-stratum respondents in the survey thought
that one’s life was mainly controlled by external factors. This is a hugely
significant distinction in today’s Russia, especially in combination with
planning horizons, since these two factors plus one’s state of health have been
the chief determinants of the dynamics of one’s material status over the past
several years [19].
Differences in loci of control and life horizons are particularly striking
among upper stratum members whose parents had higher education and held a
high social status (Figure 4). It can be expected that these factors as combined
with the above-mentioned upper-stratum reproduction will serve to widen the
gap between the upper stratum, on the one hand, and the other two strata, on the
other. At the same time, data in Figure 4 shows that one’s wellbeing in today’s
Russia depends not only on one’s personal characteristics but also on the
position that one holds in the social hierarchy and that, in varying degrees,
enables these personal characteristics to manifest themselves.
Nonconformism also places the upper stratum apart from the other strata. In
the 2018 survey, 54.8% of upper-stratum respondents held the attitude that being
different was better than being like everyone else. The rest of the population
mostly takes the opposite attitude: 70.0% of lower-stratum and 60.9% of middle-
stratum respondents in the survey believed that living as everyone else did was
the better option. This was the dominant attitude in all age brackets of the two
strata.
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Fig. 4. Proportion of members of the three strata having a mainly internal locus of control
with equal characteristics of the families they came from, 2018, %.
However, besides their indisputable advantages for members of the upper
stratum, self-reliance and being different have their minuses as well. Solidarity
with the disadvantaged is much less a feature of the upper stratum than it is of
the middle or lower stratum while stigmatizing the poor is more common in the
upper stratum than in the other two, although the majority of the upper stratum
still blames poverty on the state (Table 7). Behind the upper stratum’s
stigmatization of the poor is a belief that Russia is a meritocratic society while it
is the dominant assumption in the other two strata that good luck and good
connections are the main guarantees of success.
Table 7
Typical views in the three strata, 2018, %
Attitudes 
(choice in alternative statement pairs)
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
Favorable status in Russian society is primarily the
result of high education level and professional
standards, effective work, and personal efforts
28.1 39.1 52.6
Favorable status in Russian society is mainly the
result of good luck or good connections
71.9 60.9 47.4
One should seek material wellbeing by one’s own
efforts, and let those who do not want to make an
effort be poor—this is fair
37.2 48.3 53.4
One should be humane—the well-to do should help
those who are poorer
62.8 51.7 46.6
The majority of the poor have the state to blame for
their poverty (low wages and pensions etc.)
72.0 62.1 51.0
The majority of the poor have themselves to blame
for their poverty—bad habits, laziness,
unwillingness to change their way of life
28.0 37.9 49.0
Views on the Situation in Russia in the Three Strata
In the 2018 survey, 53.6% of upper-stratum respondents considered the
situation in Russia normal, while 56.7% of lower-stratum and 50.9% of middle-
stratum respondents saw it as a crisis and many—considered it disastrous.
Evaluations by respondents of the situation in their region, city and town showed
even bigger gaps (Figure 5). It needs to be noted that behind those discrepancies
are evaluations by upper-stratum respondents who came from high-status
families or had parents both of whom had a higher education, i.e., by members
of the core of the upper stratum, its wealthiest section, which largely explained
their positive assessments.
Fig. 5. Evaluations in the three strata of the situation in one’s region and city/town, 2018, %.
Moreover, the upper stratum, on the one hand, and the lower and middle
strata, on the other, differ in the ways they look on changes in Russia over the
past few years. In the 2018 survey, nearly 60% of upper-stratum respondents
expressed approval of these changes, the majority of the lower-stratum
respondents believed that the changes had harmed the country, while the middle-
strata respondents showed no dominant attitude to them. Moreover, half the
upper-stratum respondents expected that Russia would do well during the next
year as well, the majority of the lower-stratum respondents thought the country
was in for a hard time while most of the middle-stratum respondents expected no
serious near-term changes.
The majority of the upper stratum, despite its optimistic view of the situation
in Russia, believes the country needs major economic and political reforms. An
analysis involving attitudes to the agenda represented by national projects
proposed by President Vladimir Putin suggests that, by such reforms, the upper
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stratum primarily means faster scientific and technological progress. More than
90% of upper-stratum respondents in the 2018 survey said that more rapid
scientific and technological progress would be very important for them
personally. Faster scientific and technological progress was advocated by 78.6%
of lower-stratum and 86.6% of middle-stratum respondents, which means it is
wanted by an overwhelming majority of Russians.
Much less significance is attached in all three strata to the ideas of boosting
the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, reducing the role of the state in
the economy, increasing freedom in all spheres of society, strengthening
democratic institutions, and giving more powers to local government. At the
same time, there is a strong desire in all three strata for accessible and high-
standard medical services, for better regional and local roads, for higher real
wages and pensions, for the construction of modern rural infrastructures, and for
equal educational opportunities.7
The three strata are also nearly unanimous in what they see as the worst
social inequalities—unequal access to medical services, education and
employment opportunities, housing conditions, and general opportunities for
children from different social backgrounds. However, there is no unanimity over
inequalities affecting members of the three strata personally (Figure 6). The
proportions of respondents who denied experiencing any of the nine types of
inequality listed in the questionnaire also differed from stratum to stratum:
23.2% of upper-stratum, 7.8% of middle-stratum and 2.6% of lower-stratum
respondents. The average numbers of what were perceived as personally painful
types of inequality were 2.8 for upper-stratum, 3.3 for middle-stratum and 3.3 for
lower-stratum respondents.
Fig. 6. Particularly painful personal inequalities of respondents from the three strata, 2018, %.
This concern about inequalities does not mean that Russia is a pro-
egalitarian society—58.7% of respondents subscribed to the view that equal
opportunities for self-realization are more important than equal incomes, social
status and living conditions and only 41.3% took the opposite view. However, in
Typical Views of Principal Strata of Russian Society 39
the lower stratum the majority put income equality above the equality of
opportunity. Champions of income equality form practically the same
proportions of working and non-working respondents in the lower stratum unlike
in the other strata, where the majorities of equal income advocates belong to the
economically inactive population. 
Russians are quite tolerant of social and economic inequalities that they see
as being in line with meritocratic principles. But this tolerance takes different
forms in the different strata. Work effectiveness is the main criterion of
equality/inequality (Table 8). It is accepted as such even in the lower stratum.
However, most Russians believe that this criterion is ignored in Russia and that
this makes the country’s entire system of inequalities illegitimate. Only 14.1%
of working respondents—or between 11.8% and 17.6% for all three strata—
assumed that Russians were fairly remunerated for their work on the basis of
their skills and their intellectual and energy input. Dissatisfaction with
remuneration levels is particularly strong in the lower stratum: 53.1% of lower-
stratum respondents in the survey felt that they were paid much less than their
skills and input entitled them to while 45.2% of middle-stratum and 30.5% of
upper-stratum respondents had such feelings.
Table 8
Perceptions of justice, 2018, %
*Data for working respondents.
Many of the respondents in the 2018 survey expressed the belief that
opportunities for earning and improving one’s status by one’s own efforts had
shrunk over the past five years, a serious setback given the importance attached
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Statements
Lower
stratum
Middle
stratum
Upper
stratum
It is fair that faster and more effective workers receive
higher pay than less effective workers in same-kind jobs*
53.2 62.3 70.9
It is fair for some people to have more money than others
if they have had equal opportunities to earn it*
43.7 51.1 59.9
It is fair that well-to-do people can afford better housing
than people of modest means
35.6 47.4 58.9
It is fair that those with a higher level of education should
earn more*
39.1 42.7 51.7
It is fair that one should give one’s children better
education if one can afford this
29.7 37.8 48.0
It is fair that higher wages should mean a higher pension* 25.4 29.6 41.0
It is fair that levels of remuneration should be different in
different occupations*
19.1 23.1 32.9
It is fair that wealthier people should have access to better
medical services 
17.4 22.8 29.8
by Russians to effective work as a source of a higher income. That opportunities
to make a better living had gone down was the opinion of 36.7% of working
respondents while only 8.9% believed that the range of such opportunities had
increased while the rest felt it had remained unchanged. Upper-stratum
respondents had different perceptions—19.6% believed there were fewer
opportunities in 2018 than there had been five years before and 27.8% thought
the range of opportunities had grown. At the same time, 36.6% of middle-stratum
and 48.2% of lower-stratum respondents thought opportunities had gone down
and 16.0% of middle-stratum and 9.2% of lower-stratum respondents thought
they had improved.
The views of people in the three strata and their principles, such as the
internal locus of control, self-reliance, nonconformism and long-term planning,
that stem from their resources and social status, affect their actual and planned
social behavior. In any case, members of the upper stratum pursue more effective
adaptation strategies, which are mainly focused on the labor market, if they need
to improve their material status. Moreover, they can afford to choose the most
convenient strategies, e.g., a sideline or overtime. This freedom of choice is
practically non-existent in the middle and lower strata, with its absence being
more striking in the lower stratum. This makes members of those strata,
especially the lower stratum, more passive or opt for relatively ineffective
strategies such as borrowing or farming on a family allotment [12].
It also depends on which stratum one belongs to whether one is prepared to
defend one’s rights as an employee. Every tenth working member of the upper
stratum would take no action if they had their employee rights violated. In the
working segments of the middle and lower strata, this would be the option of
every seventh and every fifth person respectively. The most common form of
employee rights defense is an attempt to reach a direct agreement with the
employer—40.8% of upper-, 33.7% of middle- and 33.4% of lower-stratum
respondents would have taken that route. Court action is the second-most
common form—this would have been the option of 20.5%, 12.3% and 6.4% of
respondents respectively. Acting through trade unions or the media would have
been other forms of defense. Willingness to use any of these methods is more
common in the upper stratum than in the other strata. Middle- or lower-stratum
employees are more prone than their upper-stratum counterparts to put up with
rights infringements or to react to them by looking for another job or taking part
in collective protests.
The three strata also differ in terms of other forms of social behavior, e.g.,
pastimes and ways of human capital renewal. One-third of upper-stratum
respondents had taken extra education or advanced training courses over the past
three years with every fourth respondent taking paid courses. Among the middle-
stratum respondents the extra education or advanced training was undertaken by
16.4% with 4.9% opting for paid courses, and the lower-stratum respondents had
proportions of 11.5% and 3.4% respectively.
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Conclusions
Russian society can be divided into three principal strata on the basis of life
chances and risks. The upper stratum accounts for about 20% of the population
and is comprised of people having good life chances in various spheres—
occupation, daily routines, ways of spending leisure, etc. The majority of this
stratum are people with a higher education and with parents at least one of whom
has had a higher education too. Occupationally, this stratum mostly consists of
professionals, entrepreneurs and business executives.
The lower stratum, which makes up about 30% of the population, consists
of people having living standards below average, a status that can essentially be
described as poverty, even if not purely monetary poverty. Their lives are
dominated by various kinds of privations and risks, and they have a very limited
range of opportunities.
The middle stratum forms the majority of the population and in terms of
composition and material status is rather similar to the lower stratum. Belonging
to this stratum is potentially a volatile status that depends on specific life
circumstances and may be altered easily by various factors.
An analysis of typical views in the three strata shows that the upper
stratum, especially its core consisting of people from high-status families or
families where at least one of the parents had a higher education, has a
distinctive set of principles, values and views on what has been happening in
Russia in recent years. Moreover, the upper stratum has all of what are
traditionally considered middle-class attributes, which manifest themselves in
every age, educational and occupational bracket within the stratum. People in
this stratum, unlike members of the other two strata, tend to do long-term
planning, are nonconformist, active, set themselves goals and are determined to
achieve them by their own efforts. Those in the middle and lower strata
predominantly espouse the philosophy of living “here and now” and being no
different from anyone else and are convinced that one’s life is determined by
external circumstances.
The three strata are not very different from each other in terms of goals their
members set themselves, although the upper stratum stands out somewhat in this
respect as well—its members tend to set themselves more ambitious goals.
The upper stratum is different in terms of self-identifications of its members
too. Self-identification with occupational groups is the most common form of
positive self-identification among them. Also, self-identification as Europeans is
more common there than in the other strata. As regards negative self-
identifications, the majority of members of the upper stratum do not identify
themselves as belonging to the lower class or to the poor. They much more often
see Russian society as meritocratic. Possibly because of this, solidarity
sentiments are much less common and the stigmatization of the poor is much
more common in the upper stratum than in the other two strata. The upper
stratum is also more optimistic about the general situation in Russia than the
other strata.
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Summing up, the upper stratum is characterized not only by relatively high
living standards based on its special role in the system of economic relations or
by its members’ satisfaction with their life and social status but also by principles
and values that are passed from generation to generation and manifest
themselves in behavioral strategies. For instance, belief in self-reliance in
pursuing a goal is manifested in relatively intensive practical activity. 
In all these respects, the middle and lower strata seriously differ from the
upper stratum, although there are things they have in common. There are
similarities between views, values and behavioral patterns although the three
strata have different levels of wellbeing at specific moments depending on
circumstances. At various points in their life, members of the middle and lower
strata balance, sometimes more successfully and sometimes less so, between the
typical life chances of the average Russian and the inability to maintain average
living standards. Members of the upper stratum have a much more stable status.
The differences of status and views of the three strata are essentially class
distinctions, i.e., they are based on each stratum’s place in the economic relations
system, primarily its employment and qualification characteristics. For this
reason, the upper stratum can be considered a middle class in the making, a
section of society characterized by a clear social reproduction trend, and the
middle and lower strata can be regarded as the lower-middle class and the lower
class. However, in view of our definition methods and the ideological meaning
of the class notion in Russian sociology, it is preferable to use the term “stratum”
for the three sections of society that we describe in this article. Moreover, these
sections are classes in the making and class self-identifications existing in them
are intuitive rather than conscious. It is only very gradually that they would
evolve into full-blown classes. As a result of their increasing reproduction, each
of them would develop a much clearer identity from the standpoint of the status,
views, self-identifications, interests, and consequent behavioral patterns of its
members. Then a class-based model would become the optimum instrument for
analyzing the structure of Russian society.
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Notes
1 For a detailed analysis of the history of the life chances concept in sociology (in
economics the term “life capabilities” is normally used to denote this concept) see [2].
2 A team comprising Vasily Anikin, Anastasia Karavay, Yulia Lezhnina, Svetlana Mareeva,
Yekaterina Slobodenyuk, and the author of this article developed a methodology for the
analysis of life chances and risks.
3 We deliberately factored out assessments by Russians of their own place in the social
hierarchy and of their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it, and of whether they
were satisfied with their life in general—assessments that Weber considered important
consequences of differences in life chances,—in order to be able to double-check our
results (see below).
4 The gray background is used for indicators that significantly differ from stratum to
stratum, i.e., indicators of higher than 50% for one of the strata and indicators of lower
than 50% for the other strata. All connections mentioned in the text were statistically
tested. Depending on the character of the variables, we used Pearson’s chi-squared test,
the Pearson correlation coefficient or Spearman’s coefficient.
5 Point 6 from top represents the status claimed by most Russians and simultaneously a
turning point, as it were. Therefore, we did not include this point in our calculations of
data for either the top or the bottom half of the scale.
6 In this area of analysis we used chi-square automatic interaction detection (CHAID), one
of the regression analysis techniques. CHAID is normally used to detect interactions
among a large number of variables and build classification trees that can find
combinations of factors having the strongest impact on the target variable. In our case, we
used the first function of CHAID, which enabled us to detect from several hundred
variables representing value systems, principles, social self-perceptions, and assessments
of reality the most significant characteristics of the different strata and to focus on them
in our subsequent analysis.
7 This list of concerns represents proportions of respondents who prioritized each of them
in descending order. 
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Jews in Contemporary Russia: 
Assimilation and Dissimilation
Alexey LEVINSON
Abstract. Throughout its centuries-long history in Russia, the Jewish
minority knew oppression, pogroms and genocide, as well as inclusion and
tolerance demonstrated by the Russian majority. The Jewry responded with
escape (Palestine/Israel, the U.S. or elsewhere) or assimilation in the course
of which those who remained in the Soviet Union abandoned their faith, lan-
guage, traditions and ways of life. They tried hard to look and behave like
standard Soviet Russians with a slight tint of “Jewishness,” which helped
them be very successful in chosen professions, science and art. During the
last 20 years, those of the Jews who decided to stay have been enjoying
unprecedented tolerance demonstrated by the authorities and common Rus-
sians. In this atmosphere, the dissimilation trends (back to Judaism and tra-
dition) have flourished alongside with continued assimilation and emigration.
Keywords: Russian Jewry, assimilation, dissimilation.
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The constructs suggested here are fairly complicated. On the one hand, they
rely on the studies of interethnic relations, attitude to the Jews, their principles,
etc., and, in particular, on the results of the focus-groups organized by the Lev-
ada-Center in 2019, which represented the Jewish population of big and medium
cities of Russia.1 On the other hand, these constructs are offered as outlines of
intended or planned projects. This means that my conclusions and assertions
might spread to the problem fields of disciplines and branches of knowledge in
which I am a dilettante and, therefore, need verification. 
I know that many great Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers have offered their
opinions on the “Jewish question” and Jewish identity, yet the volume and
nature of this article do not allow me to skim, let alone to sum up their opin-
ions. Here I offer just another opinion on the “Jewish question” without any
claims to absolute prominence. 
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People tend to think that any discussion of the fate of the Russian Jewry and
the “Jewish Question” necessarily belongs to Judaic studies. In our case, being
realized within the frames and the paradigm of studies of public opinion and pub-
lic relations in Russia, falls under Russian studies. (The “Jewish Question” is not
a question addressed to the Jews but to the society, in which Jews are present, a
special element in some respects.)2
Here I will discuss the current stage of the assimilation/dissimilation of the
Russian Jewry, the corresponding forms of identity or self-identity of those who
identify as Jews, and what Russians think about those whom they believe to be
Jews. These opinions will be presented below. 
I, therefore, deemed it necessary to offer my opinion of the process of assim-
ilation per se before discussing these particular elements. 
Some General Comments on Assimilation
The definition of assimilation that can be found in dictionaries and the
author’s own definition aside, let us accept as truth that the process of assimila-
tion of the Jews who lived and are living in Russia was and is ongoing. 
I am prepared to discuss the already acquired results or, to put it differently,
the formula applicable to the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation process.
Here are several comments on those who are involved in the process; in other
words, on those who look at themselves (or defined by others) as both Jews and
Russians.3 In which social formats are they involved in the process, and are they
its subjects or objects?
Russians, as participants in the process of Jewish assimilation, look at them-
selves as a “people” to the extent to which they ponder on the process. Not an
essentialist myself, I would like to point to the essentialist nature of this self-defi-
nition. By identifying themselves as a people, they associate themselves with the
forces of nature, the essence of the world as the source of the absolute nature of
their rights. The right to their own land/soil is one of these fundamental rights.4
Land, as a space, is a “frame” within which all and everyone are “those who
belong,” and where the rules and order should be observed or taken into account
even by those who violate them. This might be different for nomads, for those who
live on islands, in the mountains or in forests. For those who believe themselves to
be Russians5 or Jews an awareness/emotional perception of social space also
means land or territory. 
We all know that throughout centuries of Jewish dispersion, “their own” land
was not the land on which they lived. It seems that their continued awareness of
reference to “their land,” the Land of Israel, a virtual object, reconciled the Jews
of the diaspora with living in enclaves, ghettos  etc. on land that they could
accept as “theirs,” the rights to which they interpreted as conventional, but not
natural and not theirs from the very beginning. 
Assimilation is a process of realization of mutual yet asymmetrical relation-
ships. It seems that the asymmetry—the hegemony of Russians in their relations
with Jews—rested, and still rests to a certain extent, on the idea of both sides of
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land as the source of rights. Indeed, in Russia (and other countries) the rights of
Jews were spatially limited by the Pale of Settlement and ghettos.6 Emigration
and repatriation of Jews from Russia is a spatial gesture that cuts down the
process of (this) assimilation and sheds light on the key importance of space for
the assimilation as a process. On the other hand, re-acquisition of “their land,”
as represented by Israel as a state and a country with its own territory, slows
down or reverses the process of assimilation of Jews in Russia. (More about this below.) 
The structure of this particular type of assimilation, namely, assimilation of
those who are aware that they live on the lands of another people, is fraught with
important implications. Two trends in Eastern European, in particular Russ-
ian/Soviet Jewry that cropped up during World War II have been noted and
repeatedly commented upon. On the one hand, heroism and valor of the Jews
who fought in the ranks of the Red/Soviet Army, in the rear in partisans and
Resistance units, in Jewish armed formations and the Israel Defense Forces. On
the other, the Jews who found themselves on occupied territories demonstrated
absolutely no willpower to take up arms (which makes the Warsaw Ghetto
Uprising an episode rather than the rule). 
In this context, identification with land was the key factor. Having accepted
the Russian or any other land as their own, Jews joined the ranks of Russians and
other peoples. Being aware that they were “on the right side of history” in the
war against the occupants, the Jews poured their strength into it. In an absence
of this identification, the Jews crowded in ghettos or concentration camps
accepted the German occupational administration as legitimate and obeyed it
without murmur, even if fully aware of the fatality of its actions. External
observers were greatly amazed. 
Assimilation is a combination of impulses of inclusion and exclusion, pre-
sent in their own forms on the side of the hegemon and the side of the oppressed.
This began when Jews came to the land that Russians (Poles, Lithuanians,
Ukrainians, Moldovans, etc.) believed to be theirs. This is the moment of inclu-
sion. Exclusion begins with hostility toward the newcomers and the desire to
push them out of one’s own social space or keep them away from it. Inclusion
can be conscious in the form of hospitality, friendship, peaceful coexistence or
readiness (for a while) to demonstrate patience and tolerance. There is another
type of inclusion much more typical of Russia today: inclusion in the form of
indifference to the fact that neighbors are Jews or inattention to the differentiat-
ing features like appearance and everyday manners. This means that it has
become impossible to identify Jews, that they have become indistinguishable.
Inclusion means that the Jews have penetrated our milieu, that they are living in
it and that they can no longer be identified as Jews. Have they retained the fea-
tures that Russians interpret as Jewish? The more frequent answer is: yes, they
have preserved them in their hearts. 
This is the classic picture of the process of assimilation as seen by the hege-
mon. It should be said, however, that at least on one, yet key, point the picture as
seen by the hegemon and the minority is identical, at least formally. This is the
issue of Jewish identity at the stage when assimilation has already reached high levels.
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In the course of our studies, we tried to find out what made Jews different
when such features as appearance, speech and manners had become undistin-
guishable. The answers of Jews and non-Jews (including anti-Semites) were
practically identical. All of them pointed to something that was present but could
not be identified or especially important, rejected identification or any exact def-
inition. This makes Jewishness the best (even if tautological) term. 
All attempts at defining it in rational terms were reduced to “Jewish brains,”7
“Jewish wits,” “flexibility” and “dodging.” “They keep together” is another fre-
quent answer related to the social context. 
These definitions point to a certain mystical quality that, according to a gen-
eral accord, is still present even if the features described above are absent.
According to some people, it cannot disappear; it is acquired by birth, “with
blood,” no matter how much “Jewish blood” is in any given person. People are
ready to detect it in completely secularized or even Baptized Jews. According to
many Jews who observe all Jewish customs and rites, Jewishness disappears in
converts. The Russians, especially those who do not like Jews, insist that Jew-
ishness does not disappear: “a convert cannot be trusted.”
We formed our focus-groups out of those who identified as Jews when
answering the question about nationality. In the course of group discussions, they
were expected to answer the question “Why are you a Jew?” and substantiate
their Jewish identity in an informal conversational manner. 
Participants were asked separately, one by one, within the frames of a group
discussion, which meant that every answer was correlated with the earlier or pre-
supposed answers. This means that the answers—each of them separately and in
their totality—can be interpreted as a collective opinion. The sum-total of sever-
al groups can be interpreted as a common opinion of this social category, viz. the
Russian Jewry. 
Kinship (“blood”) and self-consciousness (self-attribution) were two main
foundations of self-identification: some of the respondents answered: “Because
my parents, my grandmas and grandads are Jewish,” “What do you think I am?
All my relatives are Jews.” 
Many “not pure” Jews explained: “My Mum is Jewish”; “I am Jewish by
Halakha—my Mum is Jewish.” Some referred to kinship in second generation
along their mothers’ line: “Our Gran was Jewish and I think that I am a Jew.”
There were those who referred to kinship by fathers’ line: “My father was a Jew.
He married a Russian. I am convinced that I am a Jew. Israel recognizes this.”
Others spoke of their self-awareness and identified themselves by feelings:
“Why am I a Jew? I feel that I am a Jew”; “My feeling about the world is Jew-
ish,” “I think that I am Jewish, that’s that!”
There were answers that combined kinship and self-identification: “I feel
that I am a Jew; my parents and all ancestors are Jews…,” “My Mum is Jewish
and I also feel Jewish.”
Some answers contained an important theme of time: some deemed it nec-
essary to point out that they had always felt like Jews: “From my childhood I
knew that I was Jewish”; “In was in the kindergarten that they explained to me
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in relevant terms that I was a Yid. So everything is correct”; “Well, my family was
Jewish, so I had no choice for as long as I can remember.”
What is important is the fact that there were indirect indications that not all
of those who referred themselves to Jews had been aware of this before.
The Main Assimilation Frontier
Assimilation is a two-line process, since the changes affect not only the
assimilated but also the assimilating ethnicity. It is one of the variants of cultur-
al contact and cultural exchange. The most prominent elements are borrowings
the assimilated people accepts from the embracing majority. The majority, like-
wise, borrows certain cultural elements from the accepted minority. The Russian
language (in most cases through the Odessa slang) borrowed certain expressions
in Yiddish. What is more important is the fact that Russians paid attention to and
marked as “Jewish” certain types of behavior, discursive practices and world
outlooks. A considerable part of the process of assimilation unfolds as a conflict
between ethnic groups; some of them might become chronic, others unfold as
explosions. The practice of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire increased cul-
tural isolation hence the Jewish specifics within the Pale of Settlement. Assimi-
lation was limited to those who, for different reasons, left the Jewish communi-
ty and were living among Russians. As the Jewish enclaves were gradually open-
ing up, assimilation spread to the entire Jewish population. From that time on,
anti-Semitism of the Russian (Ukrainian, etc.) majority became an important
factor of assimilation. Excesses—pogroms at the turn of the 20th century—
reverberated in many ways, primarily through escape, emigration/repatriation of
Jews. Under pressure of aggression, humiliation and mockery of certain features
and symbolic elements of the image of a Jew, those who stayed behind rejected
them as promptly as possible. To shorten the distance that separated them from
the dominant ethnicity, Russian Jews, who were gradually leaving their settle-
ments within the Pale, were gradually, one generation after another, rejecting the
basic components of their culture—language, religion, everyday traditions, style
of clothing, oral and musical folklore.
The Critical Frontier
The process of Jewish assimilation in Russia crossed an important line: Jews
lost their status and quality of a people. This deserves more attention. The Jew-
ish population of shtetlekh, small towns in the south of Russia, in Ukraine,
Poland, Moldavia, and Lithuania demonstrated the majority of the constitutive
features of a people (nation, ethnicity). They had a language, religion, traditions
and customs of their own; they lived compactly and formed, within shtetlekh,
ethnically uniform communities. Pogroms (see [1]) organized by members of the
dominant ethnicities in the course of the Civil War differed in their forms—from
total liquidation of the Jewish population without plundering to total plundering
without great loss of life. A combination of mass murders, total destruction of all
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main means of life, houses and storages prevailed. There were other variants—
shtetlekh were totally destroyed, with their former land ploughed.
Many authors pointed out that over the course of the Civil War, none of the-
political forces involved in it (White, Red, Green, etc.) were alien to pogroms.
Commanders or chiefs played a double game: they banned pogroms but did not
prevent them.
Eye-witness accounts, reminiscences and attempts at analysis of what was
going on point to certain very important things. Not infrequently, the psycholog-
ical state of the attackers was described as paranormal. Some authors wrote about
inhuman automatism; eyewitness and participants frequently likened soldiers
and armed militants to beasts. This cliché is an exact definition of the unhuman
emotional state of these attackers. The comments describing them as “drunk with
blood” or “intoxicated by murder” speak of the same. Those who had taken part
in pogroms later shuddered as they spoke of them. The inhuman nature of these
crimes was invariably mentioned. At the same time, they were purposeful and rational.
Pogroms are explained by different reasons stretching from psychological to
political and economic, yet the clearest among them was proclaimed by thugs,
“Beat up Yids!” They wanted or even craved the complete annihilation of Jews
as a people: they physically exterminated all representatives of this people or,
having left some of them alive, deprived them of any conditions of compact liv-
ing on the land that was theirs, albeit temporarily. This explains houses set on fire
and the ritual of ploughing up the land on which shtetlekh stood. In the Foreword
to The Book of Pogroms, its compiler has pointed out that the pogroms of the
Civil War time in Russia and Ukraine were an introduction of sorts to the Holo-
caust [1, p. XV]. In some respects, these processes are very close, yet there is
something that keeps them apart. Pogroms and the actions later known as the
Shoah, or the Holocaust, had only one purpose, viz. physical liquidation of Jews.
The Holocaust, as a chain of planned and organized actions, pursued a clearly
stated aim—physical extermination of Jews as a people in the places of their
compact living. The Nazi bureaucracy transformed the process of liquidation of
people into a process of searching for and liquidation of those Jews who no
longer lived as one people, who had detached themselves from the Jewish peo-
ple and joined the process of assimilation to the German and other hegemonic
ethnicities.8
At the turn of the 20th century, partially or deeply assimilated Jewry living
in big cities of the Russian Empire were, nevertheless, objects of pogroms.
Pogroms of the Civil War period were aimed at shtetlekh, the zone of minimal
assimilation. It is highly important to point out that pogroms differed from the
Holocaust by their spontaneous and barely controlled nature, while the Holo-
caust was a bureaucratized and perfectly organized business. (It is known that in
some regions and fairly frequently local forces began violent actions against
Jews independently and spontaneously yet their share in the total process was
small. Main actions proceeded according to plans and orders from the center.)
The Holocaust was a rationalized bureaucratic plan and a state policy earlier real-
ized through pogroms. 
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How can we describe this process? It was defined as spontaneous and as a
genocide, but neither definition explains why certain uncontrolled, irrational and
spontaneous actions were carried out to exterminate a certain people. The degree
of rationality of those involved in the process varied greatly. The Zhitomir and
Proskurov pogroms were carried out under the slogan of building a “national
state” in which there was no place for Jews [1, p. 47]. In other cases, there were
practically no ideological justifications—the participants were convinced that
Jews should be liquidated or driven out. 
Assimilation as viewed by the assimilating majority is a deliberate, con-
trolled process. It begins with the penetration of small groups into the social
space which the majority believes to be theirs and therefore, this intrusion should
be ended either by physical extermination of the intruders or by squeezing them
out. If the newcomers shed the specifics that the majority regards as important
they cease to be intruders.
Society and Population
Time has come to define the social status of the subject defined here as the
majority or the hegemon. These definitions point to its role in the relations with
the assimilated minority. Its qualitative state, which makes similar collective
responses to the new situation possible, is highly important. These responses are
defined as xenophobia, exclusion, discrimination, racism, Chauvinism and,
finally, pogroms. They are identical in different subjects, in an absence of regu-
latory and administrative instances their actions are, nevertheless, spontaneous-
ly synchronized or organized. (The responses stirred up, led or organized by ini-
tiators or leaders of all sorts, by the media among others, were also frequent, yet
it is much more interesting to analyze unanimous responses of huge crowds in
an absence of a leader of any sort.)
I will not discuss here the negative attitude to external enemies outside “our”
spaces. It seems that spontaneous responses to the appearance of aliens in “our”
inner space are stirred up in populations as social entities by their systems of
organization of collective actions. The living creatures that belong to the same
population are mutually orientated without differentiation; they behave identi-
cally, they are driven by similar or even common impulses of protecting their
integrity and, frequently, their space. The system of mutual orientation, types of
collective fears and collective aspirations that determine collective behavior are
rooted in the deep, pre-cultural layers. They are not regulated, therefore, by sys-
tems of social control that appear at the much higher levels of social organiza-
tion. These are powerful drivers, their coercive and collective impulses strongly
affect people. They exist outside social control, reflection and explanation. Peo-
ple hate aliens just because they are aliens. All other explanations are rational
and, therefore, belong to different levels. This road leads to theological justifi-
cation of the extermination practices, “scientific” racial theories and scientifi-
cally substantiated methods of extermination of those who have been defined as
a hostile force. In their primary form, these drivers in a combination of certain
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conditions can guide a pack, crowd, gang or a more or less organized group of
people determined to raid and loot. Why should these people be raided? Because
there is no place for them here (on our land). 
If we talk not about populations in general but about populations of people,
this behavior is not an everyday phenomenon. These ancient and deeply rooted
programs of collective action (very much like many other “natural” drivers)
were, on the whole, squeezed out or suppressed by more recent cultural layers.
These, as well as all other deeply rooted processes, for that matter, burst out,
from time to time, in their primitive forms (hence such definitions as “beastly”
cruel, “zoological” anti-Semitism, etc.). They motivate what is called everyday
anti-Semitism, crop up in jokes and slips of the tongue; they find their ways to
art and state politics. If and when social upheavals squash the civilizational nor-
mative-axiological and institutional superstructure these pre-civilization forces
may burst out. 
Russian Jewry was exposed to the greatest extent to practically all possible
forms of derailment: “Beat up the Yids!”, struggle against “rootless cosmopoli-
tans” and international Zionism and imposed social reformatting. In old Russia,
Jews were a people. Due to pogroms, the Holocaust, wars and state policies, the
Jews who survived World War II were no longer a people, not even a “dispersed
people.” They lost their religion, their language, their compact settlements and
traditions. This was a huge, but not the last, step toward assimilation.
It is highly important from the theoretical and practical points to decide
which sociological term should be chosen to define the community described at
the everyday and literature level as “Russian Jewry.” The word “tribe” used in
the 19th century is outdated. I have demonstrated that the Jews in Russia are nei-
ther a “people,” nor a “nationality”—they have no constituents of a nation. “Eth-
nicity,” “sub-ethnicity,” and an “ethnic group” are hardly applicable since there
is too little ethnicity in what distinguishes Jews from the Russian majority. The
term “minority” merely separates the group at hand from a certain “majority.”
At the same time, we know (our knowledge supported by the results of our
studies) that many of the Jews living in Russia identify or started identifying as
belonging to the “Jewish people,” while people of other nationalities define them
as “nation.” This contradicts the old norm, according to which the word “Jew”
meant “nationality” as registered in passports and questionnaires as well as the
existing accounts in the questionnaires of population censuses and the official
publications based on their results. The Jewish Autonomous Region registered in
the Constitution as one of the subjects of the Russian Federation presupposes that
there is a corresponding national subject. 
It is not my intention to deprive the Russian Jews of the right to look at them-
selves as the people of the Covenant with God. I do not address Jews, either indi-
vidually or as a community; I address anthropologists, sociologists and demog-
raphers. I point to the fact that Jewry as a phenomenon has not disappeared from
Russian society, which is confirmed not only by those who speak of themselves
as Russians but also by those who define themselves as Jews. Our experts should
give their due to the community that plays an important role in many spheres of
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life precisely thanks to their special qualities that avoid the common definition
of “people,” “nation,” etc.
Sociological qualification of this phenomenon should better be left alone.
Here I will limit myself to pointing to some common features of the contemporary
Jewish diaspora. This category of people who live in different countries of the
world, who build up their identities—the only one, the main or one of several—on
their conviction that they are tied by kinship and blood to the people that once lived
in Palestine/Israel. They had their own faith, language and statehood, were unjust-
ly driven away from their land, were persecuted when living in exile as a dispersed
people, and finally returned to their land. The conviction that the Jews are united
by a common fate harmonizes with their conviction shared by their surrounding
that because of the uniqueness of their souls and minds, they fell into the category
of persecuted, as well as and highly successful in the countries where they live.
Jews scattered across many countries are at different stages of assimilations,
loss of ties and blending with local societies and at different stages of preserva-
tion, restoration and development of their community and cultural-social
specifics.9
The Echo Effect
Today, the Jewry of Russia thinks of itself as a result of several completed
and unfolding historical processes.
Group discussions and individual interviews with those who think of them-
selves as Jews showed that they had practically no information about how and
when Jews had appeared in Russia and Ukraine and vague ideas about the Pale
of Settlement and life in shtetlekh. Strange as it may seem, pogroms about which
I have written above and the genocide of the Civil War time are vaguely remem-
bered. The city pogroms of the turn of the 20th century are remembered better,
albeit inadequately; the same can be said about the Holocaust. The memory of
the wild outburst of post-war anti-Semitism is clearer but deliberately sup-
pressed.
This is a direct echo of exclusion of these subjects from public discourse and
family memory. Assimilation includes the disconnected translation of family
reminiscences, one of the most important identity factors. Written and oral dis-
cussions of these subjects were banned for political reasons and excluded from
school programs, literature, art and the media. These measures discouraged the
Jews of older generations from telling their children and grandchildren about
their personal tragic experience (and that of their relatives) as Jews. It was wiser
not to talk about this. And they never talked.
I have already written that assimilation of the turn of the 20th century was
developing mainly among those Jews who, having detached themselves from the
places of compact settlement, found themselves in big cities of the Russian
Empire. These relatively few groups regularly found themselves amid intensive
and rapidly changing waves. One of them was a wave of assimilation per se as
a consciously accepted and value-justified abandonment of the Jewish tradition,
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faith, language, customs for the values seen as a duty and heroism. This time
marked the emergence of a pattern of conscience, education and behavior that is
still alive among the Jews. The Jew who demonstrates a lot of vigor when mov-
ing away from specifically Jewish characteristics to acquire the features of the
majority to became a “true” Muscovite, Leningrader, a Soviet man, that is a
Russian, is much more respected in the Jewish milieu. To be more Russian than
the Russians, to be less Jewish than the Jews can be appreciated among these
Jews as the highest achievement of a Jew.
This was common for assimilation unfolding among many ethnic groups in
the zones of intensive contacts: the capitals of empires and the cities of the
emerging American or Australian societies. The Jewish variant had certain
specifics: universalist views and principles were formulated on the basis of cer-
tain principles of Judaism and the Rabbinical tradition, combined with certain
Christian dogmas. These newly formulated views and principles served the foun-
dation of ideologies and political doctrines (socialism and communism being the
pertinent example) and of everyday ethics and practice. They served the axio-
logical reason of the abandonment of the traditions, features and manners per-
ceived as Jewish, that is, narrow nationalist/confessional for the sake of maxi-
mally wide traditions, features and manners marked as “common to all
mankind,” “common to all people” or “class” (“proletarian”). 
Waves of assimilation alternated with waves of revival of national and/or
religious identity. The same urban Jewish elites (they were elite when compared
with the Jewish population of the shtetlekh) started producing the ideas of liber-
ation of the Jewish people as one of the peoples of the Russian Empire and/or
liberated mankind. The ideas of Zionism were taking shape at the same time:
they substantiated the right of the Jews to restore their autonomy and the state-
hood either on the equal rights with other peoples, or on the predominant rights
of unjustly discriminated people or on the exclusive rights of the chosen people.
The elements and the developed forms of these ideas are invariably present in the
minds of the contemporary Russian Jewry. This was confirmed by different stud-
ies, including those in which I was personally involved.
Aliyah and Emigration
The tragic events of the Shoah, the Catastrophe and the world war as well as
the anti-Semitic campaigns of the late 1940s moved the Russian/Soviet Jewry
into the dramatic epoch of the Aliyah.
According to our studies, today’s Jews interpret resettlement as the main
event of the Jewish past per se. These reminiscences simultaneously include the
unexpectedly meaningful idea of Israel as a homeland for some of them and the
idea about Jews citizens of the world, for others. Those involved in our studies
recalled how the Soviet/Russian Jews had suddenly realized that they differed
from the rest of Soviet citizens. They acquired a chance to finally break away and
become free on the other side of the Iron Curtain. They also spoke of the sud-
denly worsened relations with the country, which they had been prepared to call
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their Motherland. Everyday life of those who were packing and those contem-
plating departure was filled with threats of anti-Semitism, refusals, repressions
against those who protested against refusals. Friendly relations with neighbors
and colleagues were severed, familiar jobs were lost—this affected the migrants
and, to a certain extent, those who remained. These memories are still very much alive.
Jewish emigration perfectly fit the logic of the hegemon as a population and
the aim of assimilation, namely, Jews as an alien element should either adjust to
the new milieu or disappear. The latter was achieved either by liquidation, expul-
sion or, as in the case discussed above, by not preventing the emigration. 
Historians have pointed out that the outflow of Jews who lived for centuries
in Russia and the neighboring countries, on the whole, followed anti-Semitic
outbursts. Statistically, the desire to return to the historical homeland was not the
main driving force. In other words, the factor of expulsion (“push-factor”) was
much stronger than the factor of attraction (“pull factor”).
It should be said that in Soviet conditions, the ideology of resettlement, mak-
ing Aliyah, drew big numbers of Soviet Jews into the universalist humanitarian
ideas of struggle for freedom against the Soviet repressive political regime. This
idea united them with the dissident movement outside the prison walls while
Jewish activist prisoners joined the ranks of all other repressed supporters of
freedom and independence of other peoples and nationalities of the USSR
(nationalists in Soviet terminology). This is one of the links with assimilation.
On the other hand, the policy of the Soviet leaders that allowed Jewish (and
only Jewish) emigration made Jews the “chosen people,” Soviet style. They
were put into a very special situation which, at a certain point, separated them
from their allies mentioned above and undermined the foundations of universal-
ism of their ideas of the world.10 In some cases, this was a hint at ongoing dis-
similation, that is, restoration of Jewish specifics or their creation from scratch
and consolidation of Jewish identity.
The Soviet leaders, though ready to let Jews emigrate, were not ready to
officially confirm this: they did not want to capitulate to the “Zionists” and the
West, who sided with them, to accept the fact that many in the Soviet Union did
not want to live under Soviet power. No Soviet leader wanted to make freedom
of emigration a norm; every time, potential emigrants had to present weighty
reasons to get a permission. Every permission was an act of humanity and a
response to the request of relatives living in Israel in full conformity with the
international humanitarian norm of reunification of families. The norm was
observed even if everybody knew that the majority of the “requests of relatives”
were fictional. 
Assimilation that took, in particular, the form of liberating the hegemonic
population from at least part of the hindering minority strongly affected the dom-
inant population. Russian Germans followed the Jews to demand and receive the
right to repatriation. The Iron Curtain was breached. The changes that inundated
the Soviet system in the late 1980s had been accumulating for a long time. The
freedom to leave Soviet power in its East European variants was the first free-
dom wrung from the Soviet regime that controlled the Soviet peoples and the
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peoples of the socialist camp. Time has shown that the form of spatial control
shattered by Jewish emigration was the key element of the political structure of
the hegemon. Its erosion started by the Aliyah undermined in the shortest, by his-
torical measures, times and destroyed the Soviet political structure.
The Inner Time of Assimilation
Some of our respondents said more or less openly that their road to Jewish-
ness had been a long one: “Having retired, I started reading and visiting the syn-
agogue and thus realized that I was Jewish”; “You ask why—let me tell you that
understanding of who you are comes with age. It takes time”; “Today I know that
I am Jewish. I never thought about this before. My Dad is Russian so I am prob-
ably Russian too”; “I was nobody, today I know that I am a Jew”; “When we mar-
ried she married me as a Tatar and I married her as a Russian woman. We never
thought about this. Later we discovered this—both of us”; “Having grown older
he realized the he was Jewish, that’s that. He is not bothered whether he was cir-
cumcised or not, whether he obeys Jewish customs or not.”
Our studies suggested that three factors were responsible for “acquisition of
Jewishness” and Jewish identity not at birth but at a later age. 
The Tolerant Milieu as a Factor
The first and the most important of the three factors was a social and politi-
cal atmosphere in Russia that was tolerant of Jews.
Some people spoke of this in moderate terms; others were highly enthusias-
tic: “Today there is no state anti-Semitism, though it can be detected in everyday
life. People are no longer afraid of being Jews”; “I can say only one thing about
Putin—for some reason he is not an anti-Semite and this explains everything”;
“Well, this is something out of the ordinary. Hanukah in the Kremlin! Sometimes
I think—this is too much; this will not end well. So far the Jews use it and they
are right.”
Part of the younger generation find this atmosphere (an absence of anti-
Semitism) absolutely normal. They say: “Today, there is a fashion for Jews”;
“This became fashionable. People try to register as Jews. They search for Jew-
ish ancestors among their great- and grand-mothers. Sometimes they just invent
them”; “I love being Jewish.”
People explain that today, Jewishness brings certain rewards: “Today despite
numerous programs for the young people the younger generation is convinced
that is it is ‘cool’ to be a Jew since it opens many doors. There are many possi-
bilities starting with employment and ending with travels”; “I was going to
Moscow; the police checked documents everywhere. I carried a letter to the chief
rabbi of Russia. I was the only person saluted by the policeman. It seems that
today Jewishness is an advantage. Nobody will dare to harm you”; “Even if you
apply for a U.S. visa you stand more chances as a member of a Jewish organi-
zation than a common man.”
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There is another highly important observation: many, if not all believe that
weakened or disappeared anti-Semitism as a state policy in Russia is an excep-
tional or even ad hoc and temporal phenomenon that has not come to stay. Jews
are not euphoric at all.
Israel as a Factor
I have already written that the vectors of the processes unfolding in the
assimilated Russian Jewish elite at the turn of the 20th century were repeated
half a century later, at the end of the 20th century, in different historical circum-
stances, in the form of the processes that engulfed the Soviet/Russian Jewry. One
of the most important trends of the time (which unfolded into a powerful
process) was reversed assimilation of a new Jewish identity on the basis of recre-
ated nation-forming elements: religion, traditions, language and ties with the
Land. 
The Jews acquired an interest in Jewish history and Israel,11 and started
observing traditions and studying Judaism and Hebrew. The majority joined the
process as the first step toward repatriation. Many of those who joined the
process had no repatriation plans; they wanted to build up a new identity with a
high level of Jewish self-awareness.
The friendly relations between Russia and Israel contributed a lot to the sit-
uation described above. The studies carried out by the Levada-Center among the
population of Russia as a whole showed that the leaders of Russia steered the
political course of the country toward friendly relations with Israel and it was
approved by mass consciousness. At the same time, mass consciousness pushed
away and blocked out the former anti-Israeli positions of the Soviet Union and
their political and ideological justification; today, they do not crop up in the dis-
course.
It seems that the Russian public as a whole positively assesses Israel not as
a “Jewish state”; it is a country in which Russian is understood; it is seen as a
cultured and successful country with good healthcare and many tourist attrac-
tions, the visa-free regime is highly appreciated.
Russian Jews perceive Israel differently, yet an absence of animosity toward
Israel in mass consciousness or even positive attitude toward it makes it easier
for the Jews to formulate their own outlook on Israel. 
The Jews can be proud of Israel’s successes in different fields; the fact that
this no longer contradicts state policies and propaganda (as it did in the Soviet
Union) helps develop Jewish identity in a way unlike its traditional form of
opposition to the milieu..
Assimilation Reverse as a Factor
Two different groups are involved in the process of recovering the Jewish
roots: adults who experienced the primary and secondary socialization as “com-
mon Soviet people” alloyed with Jewishness. An awareness by these Jews of
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their (vaguely understood) specificity created a level of minimal exclusiveness,
a short distance from the common (for those around him) norm that betrayed
itself as a higher level of sagacity, efficiency, adaptability or other achievements
in the profession one shared with others. Today, these people much more ener-
getically deepen their difference from others, intensify their communication with
Jews and join Jewish communities at synagogues. 
The second group consists of children, teenagers and young people involved
in the Jewish tradition at the early stages of socialization. Their perception dif-
fers greatly from that of their parents. As Soviet or post-Soviet Jews, their par-
ents, even if deeply immersed in “Jewish life,” look at it from their inner Soviet
“self.” Young people look at the same from their inner Jewish “self.” 
Many of those who had tried as young people to conceal from others and, in
some cases, from themselves their Jewishness arrived as adults to a new attitude
to their national-cultural definition in the context of the changed attitude to Jews
in the Russian Federation.
Changed personal situations can be described as another variant of the same;
they might be indirectly related to the macro-processes unfolding in society and
in the world. Emigration of children to Israel is one of the most frequent causes
of change. In other cases, Jewish identity was recovered due to changes in per-
sonal life, such as resignation or retirement, that is, escaping close social control.
The above can be summarized as acquisition of freedom. It was for this rea-
son that the Jewish movement first for the freedom of emigration and, later, for
the freedom to demonstrate their identities corresponds, on the whole, with the
vector of movement of certain strata of Russian society for a much wider sphere
of personal and social freedoms in their country. Those who want to be immersed
to a great extent or even completely in the Jewish tradition (while remaining in
Russia) move away from secular political and social problems.
Three Types of the Assimilated
The studies carried out by the Levada-Center suggested conventional classi-
fication of the Jewish types in Russia depending on the real assimilation/dissim-
ilation level; today the following values are important, to different degrees, for
Russian Jews:
(1) specific (particular) Jewish values and their symbols;
(2) universalist values common to all mankind and corresponding symbols;
(3) specific (particular) Russian values and their symbols.
There are no ideal types that correspond to one of these orientations; all of
them are combinations of these vectors.
The Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Jewry mainly oriented at universalist
values (in Soviet time they might be presented as Soviet or Communist or impe-
rial if the Soviet Union was an empire). Today, this orientation is gradually
assuming the forms of common European and internationally recognized values.
Within this orientation, the values and symbols of exact knowledge of (Euro-
pean) science and technology are, likewise, seen as universalist. In the past, they
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served the road marks for the secularized Jews wishing to find a worthy place in
Soviet/post-Soviet life.
There is no and cannot be a single orientation. The post-Soviet Jews differ
by the relative share of “Jewishness” or “Russian” in their basic “universal”/
“common to all mankind” orientations.
Assimilation betrayed itself (and continues to do so) in deliberate derogation
of the presence of the symbols of Jewishness in everyday life of man, family or
a group, as compared with the elements of the Russian. Dissimilation, that is,
return to Jewishness means that this correlation moves in the opposite direction.
In extreme cases, which are the most illustrative for this trend, people push the
Jewish component to the center, subordinate to it the universalist component and
reduce to the greatest extent the Russian. The opposite trend concentrates at its
inclusion into Russian culture (high or base) and the maximally possible refusal
of Jewish identity. 
Today, the Russian Jewry is represented by those who did not reject their
Russian identification and did not leave Russia. The majority stayed behind for
many reasons of everyday or material nature or determined by philosophical and
cultural considerations. (Sometimes assimilation in Europe and dissimilation in
Israel are even more obvious).
Jewry in Fashion
I have already written that the younger generation looks at life in Russia from
inside their Jewish “selves.” They attended Jewish schools, they know Hebrew (to
a certain extent); the Jewish traditions, bans and injunctions are neither an oblig-
ation nor exotics. They differ from the younger generation of the communities in
Israel or the United States due to their involvement in another, external culture.
In Russia, they differ from non-Jewish young men of the same age by their vast
knowledge of the possibilities offered by various organizations operating in Israel
and international Jewish organizations: they can travel free to Israel, rely on all
types of privileges, study in Israel, etc. which raises their status among their non-
Jewish friends. Jewishness is perceived as a value not only in their own circle but
also outside it. Today, Jews are in fashion; this is one of the favorite formulas of
young Russian participants in group discussions. Their parents, like all other Jews
of their generation, rejoiced if they avoided negative discrimination.
The Russian Jews think of the last twenty years as exceptional, with no ana-
logues in the country’s past. Never before have anti-Jewish manifestations been
so weak or suppressed, never before has the “Jewish life” was equally flourish-
ing for Jews and in its other forms open for the entire population of Russia.
The latter is an element of ongoing assimilation. I have already written that
assimilation presupposes changes in the assimilating majority. Its responses to
the presence of an alien element in its space are varied: either the level of alien-
ation should be suppressed, or the cultural/symbolic elements brought by the
minority should not be perceived as alien. In the last century, Russia passed sev-
eral stages of habitualization of Jewishness in the public sphere of Russian cities.
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Jews figure prominently in the media and art. This is perceived as a special
talent confirmed by higher results and achievements on the scales by which they
are compared to members of the majority; they can be explained by diligence,
discipline and purposefulness, the qualities created by acute rivalry. This is a nec-
essary yet insufficient condition. Their views and approaches slightly, yet mean-
ingfully shifted against the standard allow them to discover or construct, out of
available cultural elements, in cultural contexts (including science and art) all
sorts of combinations the possibility of which previously remained undetected.
This creates new meanings. The result, however, is not “Jewish” but European
science, not “Jewish” poetry and painting but Russian poetry and painting. This
makes assimilation mutual. 
Our experience has told us that the noted measure of marginality with respect
to mainland culture and the associated feature in its approach to it, which makes
it possible to configure new meanings that are of value and interest for a dominant
society, are characteristic of representatives of the first two, sometimes three gen-
erations, who left the Jewish cultural environment proper and immersed them-
selves in the environment of European (in our case, Russian) culture. They
become famous scientists, businessmen, artists, composers, performers, and stars
in many other fields of the recently embraced culture of the majority rather than
in their own culture.
Elements of Jewish/Judaic heritage combined with the experience of any
measure/form of discrimination create the above-mentioned measure of margin-
ality/specificity. It should be said that this effect betrays itself in the second or
third generation of those who left their ethnic and confessional milieus. In Rus-
sia, these are people with German or Armenian roots; in America, they might be
of Chinese and Korean origin. As I have said above, it is highly important to find
a definition of the social type, which cherishes its ties with the people of its ori-
gin to the same extent as ties with the people to which it now belongs. As every-
day definition it is not enough to bring together ethnonyms to get a new one—a
“Russian Jew” or a “Russified German.” Sociology and anthropology need a
concept and a term that describes it.
Continued Assimilation
Our studies have told us that Jewish assimilation continues today. In small
towns, we met people who habitually responded to the context in which Jews
lived and the Jewish question discussed by trying to escape these conversations
in general and as applied to them in particular. They defined their identity as
Russian or, if you like, a Russian Jew. They deemed it necessary to point out: I
am not a Zionist, I am internationalist. They shared the suspicious typical of the
Soviet epoch and their negative attitude to Israel as an “artificial state,” Hebrew
as an “artificial tongue,” and Yiddish as a “jargon” that should be better pushed
aside and forgotten. Russian was their native tongue, and they were proud of
their impeccable knowledge of the Russian language and Russian culture. At the
verbal level, they boasted of their rejection of Jewish traditions: I love pork!
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They, however, had their share of Jewish vanity and boasted that, being Jews,
they knew and understood Russian culture better than common Russians. They
did not, therefore, completely reject their Jewishness, yet they said that their
children would not think of themselves as Jews. There was not a shadow of
regret when they said this: the life of their children would be much better than
theirs. 
The majority answered the question about their motherland with Russia;
some of them pointed to the places in the Soviet Union/Russia where they were
born as their “smaller motherland.” In rare cases, they spoke of Israel: Russia is
my motherland, Israel is my fatherland. 
“The Jewish Question”
In every detailed discussion, we asked the respondents one and the same
question What is the “Jewish Question”? It turned out that many, the younger of
them in particulare, had never heard this word combination. In this sense, we can
say that there is no “Jewish Question” in Russia.12 
Some respondents tried to explain this term in their own way:
—I think that this the right, probably not the right but the possibility for the
Jews to be Jews.
—Jews in any society have the right to profess or not to profess their religion,
observe or not to observe their traditions. To be or not to be a religious Jew and
remain part of the secular Jewish community, to be free from society and
power…
—This is the right of the Jew to be a Jew.
—I think yes, that’s right. The right of the Jews to be Jews.
These answers confirm that today in Russia, there is no “Jewish Question”
in its traditional interpretation. This does not mean, however, that the Jews think
that their life in Russia is free of all problems: “I think that all Jews keep in mind,
in one form or another form, the dictum ‘beware of persecution’.”
Thirty Years Ago
Our polls included the questions intended to find out how people assessed
the changes of the last 30 years in the life of Jews. In view of the special objec-
tives of this particular investigation, we paid special attention to the current per-
ception in the Jewish community of these three decades in the history of Russia:
“There were periods when people were afraid of admitting their Jewishness.
Later came the time, today for example, when they are not scared…”
As could be expected, some of the respondents associated this time (the late
1980s) with outcrops of state anti-Semitism. “The year 1989 was very hard for
me: they told me that I had relatives abroad (my dad had told me that we had
nobody abroad); in the place where I worked they said: ‘Well, what are you doing
here!’ and removed me from my post to a lower position”; “Well, I should say that
everything was far from perfect. Well, when you tried to enter the university they
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looked at Point 5; many were pushed away”; “In Soviet times, many concealed
their Jewishness, otherwise good jobs and the naval academy were out of reach.”
Many people spoke of everyday anti-Semitism: “The attitude to Jews was
far from positive. We were keenly aware of this. We lived in a communal flat; our
neighbors attacked us and even knocked out our door because there were ‘Yids
behind it’.”
Jews responded with assimilation to state and everyday anti-Semitism. Some
of them tried to conceal their Jewish roots: “I had a chief Konstantin Aleksan-
drovich. I knew that this was not his true name. When I entered his office, I
invariably addressed him as Konstantin Abramovich…”
Assimilation went further than that. Our respondents told us that Russians
preferred to Russify Jewish names of those with whom they closely communi-
cated. “I used to work with David Isakovich Shekhtman whom all his colleagues
called Dmitry Ivanovich. For some reason…”
The respondents said that 30 years ago, Jews were at a loss and very
scared—this is how the atmosphere of the later stage of the Soviet Union is
accessed today. A certain part of these concerns can be related to their Jewish-
ness and the discomfort it created; the other, with the crisis of the late 1980s—
early 1990s. It should be said that the respondents did not detach the fate of the
Jews from the fate of all Russians. This means that the last thirty years are seen
not only as flourishing of the life of Jews but a much more complicate picture.
Contemporary Situation Assessed
Our studies have allowed us to conclude that many people admitted that anti-
Semitism had weakened and the situation for the Jews improved. (There are
those who prefer marginal opinions: There was no anti-Semitism 30 years ago or
anti-Semitism was real in the past, it is real today and will survive in future). It
is highly important to note than my elderly respondents find the current situation
much worse than 30 years ago. Why? Because life has become much harder for
all than it was in the Soviet Union.
Other are of a different opinion: “The year 1989 was equally hard for old-
age pensioners and the younger generation. I mean the problems we had to cope
with: shops were empty; the same can be said about the 1990s… It is much bet-
ter in 2019. Pensions are big enough; we can cope more or less.”
There were opposite opinions: “Here is a smiling young man in 1989. Pere-
stroika is at its first stage and he is still dreaming about something. He looks at
the world and thinks that life will finally be settled, everything will change, etc.
In 2019 he looks at the world with different expression in his eyes…”
Let me say this again: these examples, no matter how different, do not sep-
arate the Jews from the rest of the country’s population; in this context, Jewish
identity was irrelevant.
This period was marked by a high popularity of small genres of mass cul-
ture—variety shows and bard songs created by highly assimilated Jews aware of
their assimilation and of their special Soviet Jewishness. Let us discuss the coop-
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eration between Arkadiy Raykin and Mikhail Zhvanetsky. It should be said that
the public practically never discussed the Jewish origins of Raykin, its idol.13 In
fact, his Jewishness as an element of his talent allowed him to demonstrate a
very special approach to fairly common phenomena to reveal their satirical ele-
ments. Mikhail Zhvanetsky wrote the texts of the most popular of Raykin’s
items. We can say the same about his talent yet Zhvanetsky did not conceal the
Jewish (Odessa) roots of his humor. This explains his popularity with the Sovi-
et and post-Soviet audience.
Two other Jews—Aleksandr Galich and Vladimir Vysotsky—demonstrated
by their poetry what their level and their variant of assimilation to mainstream
Russian culture can offer to the intellectual audience, how it discovers the recent
history and explains the souls of common Soviet people. 
Vysotsky who was highly popular in the widest possible social circles was
never, as far as we can judge, perceived as a Jew. Even if the Jewish theme was
present in his songs, many of them were jokes yet there is another and much more
interesting example. I mean the “Ballad of Childhood” [6], full of reminiscences
about life in a communal flat in Moscow during the Great Patriotic War. To my
mind, this is one of his best creations [4], brimming with realities of the time and
place. The names of those involved in the dialogue belonged to real people:
And sunlight beamed in three rays,
sifted through the cracks in the roof—
On Evdokim Kyrillich
and Guisya Moiseyevna
She to him: “How are those sons of yours?”
“Missing in action.
Hey Guisya, we’ve suffered,
we are all one family.
You’ve suffered, and that means
that you all have been Russified.
Mine—missing in action,
Yours—guiltlessly lost their freedom.
What is highly important in the above are the two parallel tragedies very typ-
ical of the time and the country—his sons “missing in actiony”and her sons
“guiltlessly lost their freedom”—is Vysotsky’s invention. He did this to allow the
Russian who addressed the obviously Jewish neighbor in the name of all Rus-
sians to give all Jews the right to be considered nearly Russian (Russified). 
Vysotsky was fully aware of the importance of this gesture as well of his
belonging to the Jewish minority and to the great Russian-Soviet people. He
looks at the Russians as a suffering people and insists that the Soviet-Russian
Jews have the right to count themselves its part. They paid for this right with suf-
fering caused by unjust repression from the Russian-Soviet power. Hence the
question: Should the permission to look at themselves as “Russified” (this term,
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in fact, was practically never applied to Jews) be interpreted as an invitation from
Russians (assimilation created by the hegemon) or as the hopes and dreams of
Jews (who strove to assimilation) finally realized? The text suggests both vari-
ants which makes it poetically complete. 
Any interpretation, any position that the poet occupies, any solution is anoth-
er variant of complete assimilation as he sees it—through a far from simple lens;
he transforms his personal approach into universally Russian and applies it to the
Soviet-Russian-Jewry with which he identifies.
This is Not the End
The comparison of the lives of Jews 30 years ago and today produced an
obvious result—their position today is much more comfortable than in the late
1980s. More than that. It became obvious that the respondents compared not so
much the living conditions of Jews there and now but looked at different condi-
tions and changes in the lives of the population during perestroika and now.
Some 30 years ago, there were hopes that life would improve and fears that
everything would be lost. Today, there are no such hopes or fears. These were not
specifically Jewish hopes and fears; they were joys and despondence that spread
across the country,  which Jews shared. (This means that the habitual anti-Semit-
ic thesis—the Jews know how to find the best jobs and live better than the oth-
ers—is no longer valid. Today, it has been changed into—Jews live like all oth-
ers and their lifestyle is indistinguishable.)
Today, a young Jew is described in the following terms: “He is relaxed, he
is much freer, he has traveled and has seen the world, that is, he is very differ-
ent from a young Jew thirty years ago.” In 2019, “a twenty-year old girl is much
more modern. She is open, she reads a lot, she studies, she uses gadgets, she is
open about her Jewish roots. She knows how to defend Jewish values.” 
This speaks of the dissimilation trend. In some cases, respondents were
drawing contemporary Jews wearing payot. For them, it meant that today Jews
do not fear to demonstrate their identity. Payot point to a religious Jews and dis-
similation. In fact, this image was used mostly by those who had no chance to
see real religious Jews. It seems that they borrowed this sign of Jewishness from
anti-Semitic caricatures, that is, accepted, like in many other discussed cases, an
impression of non-Jews. This speaks of a high level of assimilation very typical today.
Our studies have also revealed that this partly reproduces the specifically
Soviet Jewish type of the 1960s when the acute phase of state anti-Semitism had
passed leaving deep traces in national memory. Our investigation revealed that
assimilation was going on: the typically Jewish features of culture and behavior
by which Jews had been identified and discriminated against in the period of
active anti-Semitism in Russia were lost or abandoned. 
Our investigation shed light on the trends in recovering Jewish identity; the
process became possible in the form of evolution from the Soviet man who
denied any national identity to a Jew fully aware of his unique Jewish identity. 
As could be expected, people associated their gradually emerging identity
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either with the formal criteria of kinship or subjective self-consciousness or self-
attribution. We have established that many people—encouraged by domestic
policy that suppressed anti-Semitism, foreign policy that maintains friendly rela-
tions with Israel and Israel itself, by contacts with relatives and friends living
there and much more active Jewish life in cities stirred up by revived Jewish-
ness— started looking for Jewish roots and seeking more knowledge about all
sorts of Jewish subjects.
The respondents that arrived at the revival of their Jewishness as adults and inter-
preted this as their duty pointed out that this was not simple yet they drew a program:
To be Jewish means work that never ends, it is part of the image; self-per-
fection is an absolute must; self-identification is also important.
Yes, we should improve ourselves, upgrade our self-identification, popularize
our history, language, culture, traditions, etc. This means that we should work—
the community and each of us should pour their efforts into the common cause.
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Notes
1 This investigation was supervised by Mikhail Chlenov. Contributions of the respondents
in our focus-groups are italicized. 
2 To a great extent my analysis relies on the same theoretical-methodological foundations
that are being consistently developed by the experts of the Levada-Center, therefore the
main conclusions coincide in many respects. See, for example, the generalized article [2].
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Idem see bibliography of works on the subject by VTsIOM researchers (until 2003) and
the Levada-Center including the present author.
3 Relationships between Jews and other peoples and nationalities of the Russian Federation
are not discussed here due to their specifics.
4 Russians rarely refer to Jews as “people”; the generalizing definitions if used in general
are limited to “nation” (the most frequent) as well as “tribe,” “the Seed” and others that
tie the defined community with certain natural, inborn principles and qualities. These def-
initions have no spatial characteristics.
5 What is said here and further about the correlation of themselves as a “people” with its
own “land,” was probably typical, to the same extent for all other peoples of Europe, on
whose lands Jews were settling compactly or were dispersed. Probably, on other conti-
nents the “land” issue was of a different importance for autochthonous populations. 
6 In the ussian Empire there were other spatial aspects of discrimination of Jews or
Yehudim: a synagogue should be separated from a Christian church in the same street by
100 sazhens. See [3].
7 Synonyms—bias to irony, sense of humor or, vice versa, sadness, etc.
8 Specialists of the Levada-Center, in particular Lev Gudkov, have discussed in detail, the
different nature of anti-Semitism aimed at the “traditional Jews” living in small settle-
ments and at highly assimilated members of the Jewish intelligentsia who lived in big
cities. See, for example, [2].
9 Some of what is said here is related to the Jews who live in Israel, yet the nature and the
highly complicated ties inside its population differ radically from the contacts among the
“Jews of dispersion.” It seems that it is methodologically correct to include Israel in this
picture as an object of reference for the “Jews of dispersion,” not as one of this category.
10 It should be said that there were people in the Jewish movements for the freedom of immi-
gration to Israel or any other country who insisted that the right to leave/enter should
belong to all citizens of the Soviet Union. There were other people, one of them Natan
Sharansky, who insisted on a different interpretation: human rights and freedoms in con-
formity with these demands related to any state of the world.
11 The first outburst of interest of Soviet/Russian Jews in Israel and a feeling of an emotion-
al ties with it happened in 1948; the second, in 1967. The highly impressive victory in the
Six-Day War reversed part of the assimilatory trends in Soviet Jewry that had taken the
form of highly ironic attitude to Israel and its army.
12 Nobody can say that this will not repeat itself. Ilya Ilf and Evgeniy Petrov [5] in the novel
they wrote in 1931 offered a convincing formula “There are Jews but no question” as said
by one of the characters. Two decades later the campaign of denouncing “Zionist con-
spiracy,” etc. began unfolding in the USSR. 
13 He also said that “a certain party official in Leningrad could not leave me alone”; once
somebody from the audience called him a Yid and he immediately left the stage.
Translated by Valentina Levina 
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Crisis of the Union State 
of Russia and Belarus
Andrey SUzDALTSEV
Abstract. The author has analyzed the current crisis of the Union State
of Russia and Belarus and identified the main problems and obstacles on
the road of further development of this integration project, defined the
stages of the crisis and assessed possible scenarios of its settlement. He
has pointed at the mistakes made by the sides in the early 21st century
when the Union State had been still a project which cropped up in the
crises of 2008 and 2014. The author sees the roots of the crisis in the sub-
stitution of economic and political integration by their interests, which,
even if balanced, could not and did not guarantee further development of
the integration project. Russia’s extensive aid in money and resources that
has been going on for years means that there is no real economic integra-
tion: Russia’s subsidies have replaced an alliance of two economics. At the
beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Minsk refused to sup-
port Moscow’s military strategy which in an absence of common foreign
policy destroyed the balance of interests, and the very foundations, for that
matter, of the Union State. Russia wants to reformat the allied relations to
revive economic integration while the Belarusian leader is clinging to the
system of subsidies that his country has been using throughout the 20-
year-long history of the Union State. The crisis between Russia and
Belarus has not yet reached its peak.
Keywords: Union State of Russia and Belarus, Russian-Belarusian inte-
gration, Aleksandr Lukashenko, balance of national interests, Russian-
Belarusian crisis.
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On December 8, 2019, the Union State of the Russian Federation and the
Republic of Belarus entered its third decade. The Union Treaty signed twenty
years ago created the only post-Soviet object of political integration—the Union
State of Russia and Belarus. However, over the past two decades, a full-fledged
union entity did not arise. After what looked as the first steps toward unification
of social legislation of the Union State made in the early 2000s the development
of the Union State has been stalling. 
Stagnation
Today, the Union State as a relic of the 1990s has neither a state emblem, nor
a flag, nor executive and legislative powers, nor recognized borders, nor a finan-
cial and taxation system. The functions of institutes set up in the first years of the
21st century are very limited hence their insignificant impact on integration, its
course and development. In 2010, the project lost its economic component that
was transferred to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). After two decades of
stagnation, the Union State missed its chance to become a subject of international
law; it remains a negotiation platform of sorts on which Russia’s financial and
resource assistance to Belarusian economy are regularly discussed.
Even though by the end of the second decade of the new century the countries
had not arrived at fruitful allied relationships, the project survived. Since 2018, the
future of the Union State has been attracting the gradually increasing attention of
Russian and international public due to the approaching presidential elections of
2024 in Russia. The political and expert communities of the European Union and
the United States have been actively discussing a possibility that the Union State
can serve a “platform” of the next presidential term of President Putin. 
Formally, the subject of Russian-Belarusian integration was stirred up in
2018 by Moscow’s attempt to rectify the Union State, stimulate (“deepen”) eco-
nomic integration and do away with one-sided dependency. Russia’s aid to
Belarusian economy was steadily increasing from the early 2000s to top the fig-
ure of $100 billion [27].
According to my calculations, by January 1, 2019, the total volume of sub-
sidies and preferences in the form of Russian energy fuel supplies and other types
of Russia’s economic assistance to Belarus amounted to $126 billion. The IMF,
in its turn, calculated that between 2005 and 2015, the Republic of Belarus had
received about $106 billion from the Russian budget, that is, practically $10 bil-
lion every year (20% of the republic’s GDP or 50% of its budget) [24]. In view
of the fact that throughout these years the Russian-Belarusian integration was
supported by Russia’s money, we can say that the volumes of subsidies are with-
out precedence in the history of international relations. 
The Belarusian leaders deny the fact of subsidies from the Russian budget
and consider the present status of the Union State the most optimal for their state.
On March 1, 2019, speaking at a press conference, Aleksandr Lukashenko said:
“You have no idea about our problems. Do not accuse us of sponging. We have
never been your boarders and will never be. When our people hear such accusa-
tions, I do not want unions of any sort” [15].
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The Problem of Reorganization of the Union State
When Vladimir Putin was elected to his presidential term (March 2018-
2024), the issue of Russian-Belarusian integration and its stagnation came to the
fore. At first, Moscow was convinced that the problems of rectification should
and could be settled by talks. In September 2018, on the eve of one of his meet-
ings with Lukashenko, Putin said that they had “to synchronize our watches” on
certain issues [22]. 
The Belarusian leaders who in the last 20 years learned to look at Russia’s
subsidies as a routine or even a tradition painfully reacted to the intention of their
Russian colleagues to optimize the financial and resource relations within the
Union State. Lukashenko preferred to save the status quo including the Union
Treaty that in twenty years had lost much of its adequacy. On the eve of his meet-
ing with Putin, the Belarusian president said: “Any revision of the treaty will
destroy everything that has been achieved so far” [14]. He said that “the presi-
dents decided that the treaty should not be revised and that they should instead
work out a document, materials or a program of further integration of Belarus
and Russia within the Union Treaty. We have identified the frames, points, road
signs, and flags within which we intend to stay, leaving out everything that can-
not be realized today” [14].
In view of the fact that the Belarusian concept relied on access to Russia’s
maximally cheap energy fuels and Russia’s market, all attempts by Moscow
since 2018 to put an end to the Union State’s dependence principle were inter-
preted in the Belarusian and, later, European media as Moscow’s infringement
on the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus. 
In particular, on December 14, 2018, speaking in Minsk to Russian journal-
ists, Lukashenko accused the Russian leaders of trying to use the prices of fuel
supplied from Russia to his country as a leverage to incorporate Belarus in Rus-
sia. “Some of them say in so many words: we are not ready to incorporate your
six regions in Russia, and that’s that. They could have said the same in simpler
terms: here is our oil, now you should destroy your country and join Russia. How
will this look in our country and in your country, for that matter? What will the
international community say when a country is incorporated in another country
by unseemly means?” [16].
Meanwhile, the EU and the U.S. interpreted as a “threat to the sovereignty”
of the Republic of Belarus the prospect that Putin, whose presidential term “will
end in 2024 … could bypass these restrictions by creating a new nation through
a union with Belarus to appear as the head of the united Russian-Belarusian
power—the Union State” [3]. 
Systemic Errors
In the early 21st century, the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State of
Belarus and Russia that formed the foundation of the Union State (1999) was
presented to the peoples of both countries and the world public as a logical con-
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clusion of both countries’ consistent economic and political drawing closer
together. Four years earlier (1995-1999), the two neighbors with the common
Soviet past were steadily moving by stages (the stages of a single customs zone
(1995), Community of the RF and the RB (1996) and the Union of RF and RB
(1997) to the Union State that appeared in 1999). This fast movement through
consecutive stages of a supra-national alliance can be explained by the need to
legitimize the system of support of Belarusian economy with money and
resources at the expense of the Russian budget described, for propaganda pur-
poses, as economic integration.
The economic stage of integration came to a halt at the common customs
zone. Practically immediately, it became a channel of smuggling from Europe to
Russia via Belarus alcohol, cigarettes, chicken leg quarters, expensive electron-
ics and furniture under cover of The Esambaev World Welfare Fund and Torgek-
sport set up for the purpose [7]. By 1999, when Russia had to restore customs
points at its border with Belarus, economic integration between the two countries
was discontinued. From that time on, the fast-developing system of budgetary
subsidies replaced economic integration and revealed the fact that the economic
systems of the two countries were different and that, therefore, no integration
was possible without cardinal structural reforms of Belarusian economy. 
It was expected that by the end of the 20th century the political stage of the
actively promoted Russian-Belarusian integration project would change the par-
asitical format and create “from above” with the help of the structures of the
Union State a common market and, later, an economic union with common cur-
rency. While holding forth about the need of integration, its “architects” ignored
the fact that it was incompatible with authoritarian regime. More than that, the
Union State stagnated because Moscow and Minsk had different ideas of inte-
gration and its goals.
The Crisis and Its Cause
At first integration meant the balance of interests of the two countries that
took into account the political and economic situation in the world, in the region
and in the states-founders of the Union State at the turn of the century.
In the early 21st century, Russia looked at the allied relations as a chance to
preserve military-strategic stability in the western sector, to ensure secure transit
of Russian energy fuels to European market and to halt continued disintegration
of the post-Soviet space. Moscow that needed the Belarusian statehood as a
buffer between Russia and NATO (Poland) was ready to support the republic
with money and resources. It was expected that allied relations would lay the
foundation of the two countries’ coordinated foreign policy.
Belarus initially saw in allied relations with the Russian Federation the way
of gaining unlimited access to Russian energy and the financial support market
that were supposed to provide economical stability for its authoritarian political regime.
It was expected that the Union State (that, as it turned out, after 20 years had
remained at the stage of declarations) would serve a political screen for this high-
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ly complicated political and economic balance of interests of the two countries
with a common past yet different sizes, economic potentials and economic sys-
tems. The balance of interests of the two countries, in fact, did not presuppose
integration as a natural and objectively developing process. From the very begin-
ning, its future depended on the political will of the presidents, the main defi-
ciency of the Russian-Belarusian project.
Contradictions Are Piling Up
The first decade of the 21st century turned out to be highly favorable for
Belarusian economy. On the one hand, Belarus relied on the Union Treaty to
prosper on Russian money and resources (up to $10 billion in certain years) and,
on the other, to exploit the union balance of interests to practically ignore inte-
gration. In fact, under the slogan of integration with Russia, Minsk extracted
from its budget a geopolitical rent.
To preserve the balance of interests as the cornerstone of the Union State,
the Belarusian leaders were expected to consolidate, as much as they could, their
allied status in military-strategic respect and support the RF on the international
arena by coordinating its foreign policy with Russia’s. It turned out, however,
that allied foreign policy failed to materialize while the common positions of the
Union State founders on foreign policy issues were limited to concerted voting
at the UN GA the decisions of which were just recommended measures.
At first, the relations between the two states were purely political due to the
huge gap between their sizes and economic potentials. However, the “integration
from above” formula looked realistic. 
It was expected that the balance of interests as a compromise between the
two neighboring countries tied together by deep-rooted historical, cultural, eco-
nomic, and political relations would create, sometime in future, a political foun-
dation of their full-scale integration. This was explained by the logic of the
widening and partly inherited from the Soviet times economic contacts and
mutual understanding between the ruling circles expected to gradually lead the
two countries to the eventual solution of the strategic task—a political union
between the two countries in the format of a Union State resting on the practi-
cally united and deeply integrated economy. (It seems that finally the sides
would have arrived at a maximally soft confederation). The Union Treaty of
1999 was seen as a roadmap of sorts of the transfer/evolution of the initial bal-
ance of interests of the two countries into a real integration project. The suc-
cessful experience of the European Union and Russia’s positive image in Belarus
inherited from the Soviet times (when seen from Russia, Belarus looked the clos-
est state) served the project’s cornerstone.
It turned out, however, that the roadmap was mission impossible of sorts.
Moscow missed an important factor, viz., the provincial “anti-Moscow” senti-
ments typical of the Belarusian establishment which rejected the market reforms
carried out in the early 1990s in the Russian Federation; certain segments of
Belarusian society nurtured at the same time deep anti-Russian instincts.
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Moscow, likewise, missed the fact that in the wake of 1991 Belarusians began to
see Russia as a loser, the country that lost the Cold War and was pushed to the
periphery of the contemporary world. As could be expected, independence
inspired a fast growth of nationalist sentiments and an emergence of the author-
itarian regime of Lukashenko who wanted ideological expansion and cheap
resources rather than integration. At first, these trends slowed down the process
of rapprochement between the two countries while Belarusian nationalism and
authoritarianism blocked integration with Russia.
From the very beginning, anti-Russian and anti-integration trends in the
republic’s domestic policies not only shed doubts on the future of the Union State
as a real integration project; they allowed Minsk to balance between the West and
Moscow on the international arena. The Belarusian leaders demonstrated their
skills on the domestic political field where the administration of Lukashenko
combined declarations praising integration with another anti-Russian propagan-
da campaign linked to another bout of aggravation of the bilateral relations. In
the mid-term perspective, this finally split the Belarusian society by geopolitical
preferences. At the same time, this foreign policy course allowed Minsk to move
away from real integration with Russia in economy and foreign policy. The
Union State lost its foundation created, as had been imagined, by the balance of
interests of its founders while everything that the Russian leaders had done to
stimulate integration failed completely.
The gap between the national interests of the two countries and the tasks of
real integration made crises between their leaders inevitable. Conflicts accompa-
nied by public scandals followed one another practically throughout the entire
history of the Union State. On the one hand, they discredited the idea of integra-
tion between Russia and Belarus, but on the other, increased Lukashenko’s
authority in the West where he was seen as a consistent fighter for Belarusian
sovereignty. 
The conflicts were mostly stirred up by Minsk that continued to insist on the
old conditions of energy fuels supplies or demand even more favorable ones, to
secure access to the Russian market and bargain for further economic conces-
sions, preferences, grants, and subsidies. Not infrequently Lukashenko deliber-
ately fanned scandals by emotional statements about the Russian leaders, Russia
as a state and Russian people.
The Socio-Economic Crisis of the Union State
Economic problems and contradictions that were steadily piling up through-
out the history of the Union State proved to be resistant to the efforts of govern-
ments or even presidents to settle them. After 2011-2012, when the level of Rus-
sia’s annual support in money and resources reached the total sum of $10 billion
(later it dropped to $6-7 billion), it turned out that Russian subsidies had done
nothing good to Belarusian economy and the standards of living of its popula-
tion. In the last decade, its GDP remains within the $55-60 billion ($77.8 billion
in 2014) [5] while production assets are at the Soviet technological level of the 1980s.
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In the second decade of the 21st century, Belarus registered a gradual drop
of its exports to Russia despite the unhampered access for Belarusian products
to the Russian market. It had a negative impact on the popular assessment of
Lukashenko’s economic policies and on the prospects of further integration with
the Russian Federation.
The negative trade balance between the two countries within the Union State
became a tradition and continued to grow. In particular, in 2016 it was compar-
atively small—$4.7 billion. In 2017, it increased by 33.9% (to reach the figure
of $6.3 billion). The year 2018 registered a drop of $3 billion against the previ-
ous year to minus $9.7 billion [6]. Belarus has entered a period of deindustrial-
ization: very much like Ukraine, it is gradually slipping from the status of an
industrial-agrarian to an agrarian state.
Its semi-state economy (Andranik Migranyan has written that in 2011 state
enterprises were responsible for nearly 70% of GDP [18], the state sector pro-
duced up to 87% of products) that for over 20 years functioned on Russian ener-
gy fuels it was getting for preferential prices was stagnating. The oligarchs from
the “closest circle” of President Lukashenko acquired more weight in the coun-
try’s economy. 
The standards of living dropped against the early 2000s. According to the
experts of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of
Belarus, the share of those who negatively assessed their material status dropped
from 34.2% in 2002 to 19.1% in 2008 only to increase to 30.2% in 2016 [25]
probably under the pressure of the effects of the 2011 socio-economic crisis.
The living standards that remained for a long time much lower than in Rus-
sia, as well as the widening export of workforce (up to 1 million in 2018) to the
Russian Federation [2]), made people feel relatively disenchanted about the
prospects of integration. In this context, Belarus came close to what is called
“Ukrainian syndrome,” one of the main factors behind the Ukrainian crisis. 
The “Ukrainian syndrome” in Belarus has so far defied exact sociological
identifications. It is a “sudden transfer” in the minds of common people from
many years of expectation of higher living standards due to more active eco-
nomic ties with Russia and its support to disillusionment in it as the main spon-
sor of their statehood and the guarantor of the steadily improving living stan-
dards. In these conditions, the political classes of East European countries start
looking for sponsors (Belarus saw China in this role) instead of analyzing in
earnest their own national socio-economic models. They accuse Russian Feder-
ation of unwillingness to pour more money and resources into Belarus and inten-
sify anti-Russian propaganda, which stimulates a geopolitical turn to the West.
The ruling establishment escaped responsibility for its failed social and eco-
nomic policy and for privatization of the lion’s share of Russia’s economic assis-
tance. On the whole, the “Ukrainian syndrome” served the social foundation of
the coup d’état on the Maidan in Kiev.
It should be said that the model of mixed economy with an obvious presence
of the state [18] that Lukashenko built in Belarus throughout the years of its
independence runs from one crisis into another. The country’s leaders, however,
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look not so much for possible variants of structural reforms but for all sorts of
pretexts to increase Russia’s support. This destroyed the strategic balance on
which, as had been expected, the Union State should have been functioning.
The Broken Balance
At the frequent and regular summits, the Russian leaders that have been sup-
porting Belarus for nearly a quarter of a century invariably suggested that the
Union State should be transformed into a real union of two states. On the one
hand, the Belarusian part of the balance was gradually growing increasingly bur-
densome. The Russian political class, the expert community and internal opposi-
tion started paying more attention to the steadily growing subsidies to Belarusian
economy against the background of stagnating integration. On the other hand,
the Russian shoulder, so to speak, of the strategic balance between the two states
was steadily shortening while the national interests of the Russian Federation in
the Union State were not supported and, therefore, not realized. This affected
first of all the military-strategic aims of Russia at the West European sector, the
problem of transit and international positions of the founders of the Union State.
After the Georgian-Ossetian war of 2008, Russia launched a wide-scale
modernization of its armed forces which, as could be expected, changed the role
of Belarus in Russia’s defense strategy. The rearmament of the Russian Aero-
space Forces and commissioning of the S-400 air defense system removed from
the agenda the problem of approach time from Poland across Belarus. Increased
attention to the military group in the Kaliningrad Region that protected Belarus
and Russia in the west and modernization of the Navy changed the situation in
the western sector. 
The Minsk contradictory policy in the military sphere and balancing on the
international arena undermined confidence in Lukashenko as Commander-in-
Chief of the allied army which lowered the prospects of Russia’s involvement in
the modernization of the Belarusian armed forces. Regular joint military exer-
cises reveal the lowering battle-worthiness of the Belarusian army and degrada-
tion of its technical equipment. 
Lukashenko’s unexpected refusal, contrary to the preliminary agreement of
October 2015 to station a base of Russian Aerospace Forces at Bobruisk, marked
a “point of no return” in the military-strategic cooperation between the two coun-
tries. The level of Moscow’s confidence in Minsk dropped even lower; the Russ-
ian Federation lost a lot of its previous interest in coordinating its military poli-
cy with the Republic of Belarus. The made the Military Doctrine of the Union
State of 2017 (endorsed by the Supreme State Council of the Union State on
26.12.01, No. 8) [21] a mere declaration no longer perceived as a serious argu-
ment in favor of continued economic aid. 
On November 6, 2018, at a meeting with American analysts, President of
Belarus gave the following answer to the question about the military-strategic
relations with the Russian Federation: “Our army can effectively oppose, if need-
ed, an aggression or conflict on the territory of Belarus. Today, I see no reasons
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to invite any state, including Russia, to our territory, to fulfil our functions. This
was why we resolutely opposed stationing, let alone setting an air base on our
territory. The approach time of any type of aircrafts from the territory of Russia,
if this is needed at all, is from 3 to 5 minutes. Any base here is useless; it will
attract a possible aggressor; there is no need to move an air base to the frontline”
[17]. 
By the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the problem of Russian
transit across East European countries lost some of its former urgency. The
attempts of East European countries to complicate land and air transit provoked
Russia to respond with partly symmetrical measures: a network of bypassing gas
pipelines is nearing completion while the capacities of oil and LNG terminals in
Russian ports are steadily increasing. 
The Georgian-Ossetian war of August 2008 complicated the foreign policy
situation in which Russia badly needed support from its CSTO allies and the
Union State. Minsk, however, moved away from Russia when the conflict was
still going on; it refused to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia; later, it joined the European Eastern Partnership program, refused to recog-
nize reunification of Crimea with Russia, sided with Kiev that wanted to exter-
minate the “fighters” of Donbass [12]. In October 2018, Lukashenko raised the
relationships with the Poroshenko Administration to even a higher level. Minsk
supplies the Armed Forces of Ukraine (including the units stationed along the
demarcation line with the armed units of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s
Republics) with oil products [8]. 
The co-founders of the Union State organize regular consultations at the for-
eign ministries level on foreign policy issues and coordination of their policy in
international organizations frequently with inefficient results. In particular, on
July 9, 2017, the Belarusian parliamentary delegation at the OSCE Parliamen-
tary Assembly held in Minsk supported the so-called Minsk Declaration in
which Russia was branded as an “aggressor” that had “occupied” part of the
Ukrainian territory. At the same session, Lukashenko formulated his internation-
al initiative (not coordinated with Moscow) to hold in Minsk a European sum-
mit Helsinki-2. 
Today, the Belarusian political class and expert community are convinced
that everything that the leaders of Belarus are doing on the world arena contrary
to the interests of Russia, its status ally, indicates that the Republic of Belarus is
a sovereign and independent state. Minsk has moved away from Moscow; this
undermined integration and trust between the countries’ leaders.
By the end of 2018, Moscow specified its main claims to Minsk. On Decem-
ber 25 in particular, Vice Premier of Russia Anton Siluanov pointed out that
Moscow “was no longer prepared to distribute gifts in the form of subsidies
without getting anything in return. Russia invariably fulfilled its obligations in
the form of camouflaged subsidies and direct credits while Russia’s neighbor
and ally prefers one-sided gains. We say: it is impossible to be self-centered and
to expect one-sided favors. You are our neighbor, our ally in the Union State, but
recently confidence was lost” [26]. 
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As a result, the Russian part (military-strategic, transit and international
issues) became considerably devalued; the balance on which the Union State had
been set up was tipped which made a crisis of allied relationships inevitable. By
2018, the Russian establishment as well as a considerable part of Russian soci-
ety, had concluded that the allied relations needed reorganization which meant
serious changes in the present parasitical format of the Union State and return to
the sources of the integration project—the Treaty on the Union State and eco-
nomic integration.
The “Grey Schemes” in Allied Relationships
At all times, Belarusian leaders did not hesitate, and do not hesitate today to
rely on all sorts of “grey schemes” to extract even more money from their pref-
erential economic relations with Russia. In December 2018, Siluanov formulat-
ed several claims to the Belarusian leaders who had organized wide-scale smug-
gling across the Russian border of European “sanctioned” and Ukrainian food-
stuffs. He pointed out that Minsk consistently refused to pay export dues on the
oil products refined out of “union” oil and exported to the world markets. The
vice premier mentioned the smuggling of “low quality cigarettes” to the Russian
Federation, expressed his doubts about the Belarusian customs and invited to
tune up exchange of relevant data [26].
The “grey schemes’ within the Russian-Belarusian economic cooperation
are an indirect indication that Minsk is no longer satisfied with the large-scale
system of subsidies set up and functioning under the cover of the Union State for
the simple reason that Russian money and resources play the role of primary
accumulation of capital in the Republic of Belarus. In the second decade of the
21st century, “grey privatization” there had been completed which allowed the local
oligarchs to occupy the main role in the republic’s economy on a par with the state.
Conflicts that regularly sprang up around the Belarusian “grey schemes”
were gradually destroying the confidence between the ruling circles on both
sides of the border and fanned a crisis in the Russian-Belarusian integration pro-
ject. Combined with the disagreements on the international arena, the “grey
schemes” became Moscow’s most important argument in favor of reformatting
the allied relations with Minsk. 
The Non-Existing Allied Foreign Policy
If the states-founders of the Union State want to save it, they should radical-
ly change the integrational format so that to restore the balance of interests. The
Belarusian side looks at military-strategic cooperation and interaction with Rus-
sia on the international arena through the prism of its sovereignty and indepen-
dence, that is why the above task is difficult. For Russia it means that it must pay
more and receive the same, that is, no guarantees.
I have already written that the foreign political course of the Republic of
Belarus excludes stationing Russian air bases on its territory or recognition of
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independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, reintegration of Crimea and sup-
port of Russia’s military-technical aid to Syria, etc. Foreign Minister of Belarus
Vladimir Makey and Lukashenko did a lot to improve, to an extent, the image of
their country in the West. On October 18, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State
Aaron Wess Mitchell said that “today it is the national sovereignty and territori-
al integrity of frontier states like Ukraine, Georgia, and even Belarus, that offer
the surest bulwark against Russian neo-imperialism” [28], which meant Wash-
ington’s direct support of Belarus in the crisis with Moscow.
He confirmed that the United States interprets the rejection by Minsk of
Russia’s attempts to renew and reformat the allied relations as an opposition to
Moscow’s pressure and a natural element of the architecture of confrontation
between the West and Russia after 2014. Lukashenko went even further—he
asked Washington for support: “We are convinced that security of the entire con-
tinent depends on cohesion of its countries and preservation of the United States’
military-political role in European affairs. This is not an exaggeration. Without
America, we will not solve any problem here including the Ukrainian conflict”
[20]. On October 26, 2018, the President of Belarus offered the President of
Ukraine his service of an “honest broker” between Kiev and Moscow. On Octo-
ber 31, he promised Mitchell that “Belarusians will be your most reliable, hon-
orable and sincere partners. If we agree, if Belarusians promise you something,
even contrary to their interests, we will keep our word” [10]. 
While talking about allied relations with the Russian Federation, the Repub-
lic of Belarus is pursuing its own foreign policy course unrelated, to the greatest
extent, to Russia’s priorities. This means that economic integration, that is,
“deepening” the processes that connect the economies of both countries is the
only remedy for the Union State. This might revive and consolidate the relations
between Russia and Belarus and, at a certain stage, remove the problem of Russ-
ian subsidies.
The Problem of Maintaining the Subsidy System
Russia’s financial and resource support of Belarus as an indicator of stag-
nating economic integration was and remains the most important factor that, on
the one hand, is steadily destroying the Union State and, on the other, stimulates
reorganization of relations. 
Minsk was greatly concerned with the latest rhetoric and actions of the Russ-
ian leaders that speak of Moscow’s intention to abandon the subsidies in the near
future. In fact, the Belarusian leaders painfully reacted to the problem of Russia’s
assistance with money and resources. In the past, Minsk was holding forth about
its invaluable services to Moscow that should be compensated for with subsidies.
Starting with 2018, the Belarusian expert community and the country’s leaders
deny even the fact of Russian subsidies and preferences: “Contrary to the opin-
ions and conclusions made by certain analysts, Belarus never pleaded with Rus-
sia for subsidies or preferences. This is a lie and a wrong interpretation of the
agenda. In Sochi [September 21, 2018—A. S.], our delegation was not a beggar” [9].
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At the fifth Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions in October 2018,
Speaker of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Belarus Mikhail Myas-
nikovich deemed it necessary to revive the subject of economic dependence:
“This interpretation is harmful both for Belarus and Russia and is not objective.”
He argued that Belarus “is not building up its external debt” (“Since these oper-
ations are open, the uninformed public might imagine that Belarus is increasing
its debt burden from year to year”) [19] while “it is refinancing” its debts. He
spoke of Russia’s subsidies as credits and pushed aside the fact that the Belaru-
sian side enjoys preferences while importing Russian oil and gas for domestic
Russian prices and exporting its products to Russia for market prices. The
Belarusian media habitually interpreted these economic subsidies from the Russ-
ian budget as Moscow’s permanent and unconditional obligations to Minsk.
On December 19, at his press conference, President Putin used the term
“subsidies” when talking about the natural Russian gas supplied by pipelines; he
pointed out that they mirrored the specifics of bilateral economic relations:
“First, Belarus has the lowest prices among our foreign partners—$127 per 1,000
[cubic meters], whereas the price for Europe is $200. The difference in return on
sales to Europe and Belarus for Gazprom is four-fold. The weighted average gas
price in Russia is $70 per 1,000 cubic meters, and the gas subsidy depends on the
location. Smolensk enjoys the largest gas price subsidies. Smolensk consumes
around 2 billion cubic meters of gas, whereas we sell to Belarus 20 billion. If we
fully subsidize the Belarusian economy that means that Russia  subsidizes gas for
the whole country” [23].
The Republic of Belarus when getting a regular annual credit to service the
earlier credits from the Finance Ministry of the RF (in September 2018, Russia
had agreed on a credit of $600 million to be issued in 2019 that was never issued)
habitually does not repay the earlier credits—it is accumulating them. It can be
assumed that the Belarusian leadership expects that in the future Moscow will
annul the debts of Belarus as “the only ally.”
“The Point of No Return”
In 2018-2019, the crisis of the Union State was unfolding amid the unusual-
ly warm relations between Moscow and Minsk interrupted from time to time by
emotional outbursts of the president of Belarus or by another scandal. Mikhail
Babich, Ambassador of Russia to the Republic of Belarus and Special Represen-
tative of the Russian President in the RB, was recalled after speaking out about
the main problems in the relationships within the Union State. This said a lot
about the true positions of Minsk on the issue of putting an end to the dependent
format of the Union State and echoed at the next Russian-Belarusian summit.
The St. Petersburg meeting of two presidents on July 18, 2019 summed up
their year-long discussion on how to get the Union State out of stagnation. By
July 18, the working group set up in December 2018 and headed by Maksim Ore-
shkin, RF Minister for Economic Development, and the Belarusian group pre-
sented a partially agreed Program of the Realization of the Union State Treaty of
1999 (further, the Program). 
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A week before the St. Petersburg summit, President Lukashenko deemed it
necessary to say that it was Russia “that slows down integration” and that “today
there is nothing to discuss” [11]. On July 18, 2019, he refused to sign any docu-
ments and argued that all complicated problems between Russia and Belarus
should be first settled: “I would like to say the following. I think that Vladimir
Vladimirovich will agree. In December, our Union Treaty [December 8—A. S.]
will be 20 years old. I believe we cannot leave any unsolved issue behind by that
time. What achievements are we going to talk about as we will celebrate the 20th
anniversary? There will be nothing for us to say if we fail to settle all the issues
and do not sign the program shaping the strategy of our joint actions. Therefore,
I suggest that we decide all the issues by that date and approve a program that
will determine the strategy of our actions and remove current problems within
the framework of the High State Council or any way we agree” [13]. 
In this way, Minsk outlined the limits of a dialogue: it was prepared to sit at
the negotiating table to discuss the Program if Russia resolved before December
8 certain “current problems.” From the summer of 2018, Lukashenko has been
trying to impose on the Russian leaders so-called obligations including “com-
pensation” (about $10-11 billion) for the tax maneuver in oil extraction in Rus-
sia and the breakdown at the Druzhba transit oil pipeline (August-May 2019). He
also expected a credit of $600 million and $200 million of the last tranche of an
earlier credit paid to the Belarusian Finance Ministry. Minsk demanded that the
price on Russian natural gas should be lowered from $127 per 1 thousand cubic
meters (2019) to $70 per 1 thousand cubic meters (as is paid by the Smolensk
Region), and that the sanitary control for meat and milk products that Belarus
sells to Russia should be abandoned (the Russian Sanitary Control Service iden-
tified part of these products as produced in the EU and Ukraine and, therefore,
banned in the Russian Federation). 
The total cost of the “current problems” is tens of billions dollars to be paid
from the Russian budget. 
In 2019, Belarus agreed to sign the Program on the following conditions:
Russia should extend all compensations and subsidies and agree on new prefer-
ential gas prices according to its political timetable. In 2020, Lukashenko plans
to become president for the sixth time, the country is expected to adopt a new
variant of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. 
To pass these highly important political tests with flying colors, Lukashenko
needs exhaustive financial and resource support from Russia symbolized by the
commissioned first block of the Belarusian nuclear power plant built by the JSC
AtomStroyExport (subsidiary of Rosatom State Corporation) on the Russian
credit of $10 billion. In anticipation, Minsk demanded that the credit agreement
on construction of the atomic power plant should be revised it its favor [1]. 
By the end 2019—early 2020, tension between the founder-states had
become unbearable because, first, reorganization of the relations between the
allies was not started; there were doubts that the Program of “deepening” the
Russian-Belarusian integration would be realized even if signed.
Second, the economic problems in the RB during the election period require
that its leaders should find and present to the public within the maximally short
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time resources (of which Russia is the only source) needed to legitimize
Lukashenko’s sixth presidential term. The election timetable will force Minsk to
intensify its talks with Moscow that includes stronger information pressure on
the Russian leadership.
Third, when commissioned, the republic’s and the region’s biggest nuclear
object—the Belarusian nuclear power plant (2019-2020)—will radically change
the political situation not only between Russia and Belarus but also their rela-
tions with the neighboring Baltic states and Poland. Since Belarus is determined
to continue its balancing trick between the EU and Russia, the nuclear power
plant might become a small change in the dialogue between Moscow and Brus-
sels or between Minsk and Warsaw, Minsk and Vilnius.
Fourth, we should bear in mind that the EU and the United States have
increased their attention to the relations between Russia and Belarus. In Novem-
ber 2018, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, published
a report entitled Civil Society Under Russia’s Threat: Building Resilience in
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova [4] which identified the status of Belarus, as well
as that of Ukraine and Moldova, as the most vulnerable to Russia’s pressure (sup-
ported by a direct analogy with the reunification of Crimea with Russia). The
commissioned Belarusian nuclear power plant is negatively assessed as another
factor of stronger dependence on Russia. 
These factors might stir up negative responses, which might freeze the Russ-
ian-Belarusian integration project.
This means that the Union State approached its 20th anniversary with high-
ly unsatisfactory results that, however, could be improved if its leaders had
enough political will to do this. On the other hand, this fact might exacerbate the
relations between the two states which might draw the most interested external
players—the U.S., Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine—into the crisis. 
In view of the very low level of ability of the Belarusian leaders to reach any
agreement, Russia will have to address, at a certain stage, the public of both coun-
tries. European experience has demonstrated that to become successful, integration
should suit the interests of millions of citizens.
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The Stalin Prizes of Architect Ivan Zholtovsky
(1940-1953)
Olga SHURYGINA
Abstract. This article presents the first study of the Stalin Prize for
Architecture. It focuses on a specific episode: the 1950 award of this prize
to one of the best known architects of his time, Ivan Zholtovsky (1867-
1959). The author draws on archive materials to show the ambivalent atti-
tude to Zholtovsky on the part of his colleagues—architects and members of
the Committee on Stalin Prizes for Literature and Arts. The documents cited
make it possible to trace the metamorphoses of the assessments of
Zholtovsky’s works in 1940-1953, the period when Stalin Prizes, the high-
est government honor, were awarded, and to understand whether
Zholtovsky’s Stalin Prize was an unbiased assessment of the master’s cre-
ative merit or an instance of political struggle.
Keywords: Ivan Zholtovsky, Stalin Prize, architecture, struggle against
cosmopolitanism.
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On March 8, 1950, a list was published of the winners of the Stalin Prize
“for outstanding work in the field of arts and literature for 1949.” Among the
winners was Ivan Zholtovsky (1867-1959) [20], a prominent architect. At first
glance, his biography and creative legacy are well known. Early publications
about him appeared during his lifetime [2; 4; 41; 37]. Thus, 1955 saw the publi-
cation of what is to this day the definitive work devoted to Zholtovsky [42]. In
recent years, interest in the architect’s life, notably in connection with his 150th
birthday anniversary, has been growing, as witnessed by the appearance of dis-
sertations and biographical articles about him [10; 12; 14; 7; 18; 29; 30; 16; 19; 28].
However, the paradox is that in most instances (even if the texts are critical),
they contain a general description of his life, while many important details and
issues are left out. Biographers invariably note the award of the highest govern-
ment prize, but its circumstances have still not been revealed. Art scholar Anas-
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tasia Firsova merely mentions the award [10, p. 74]. Architecture historian Selim
Khan-Magomedov, who touched on the episode, wrote about its importance:
“For the first time in the 20th century, the Stalin Prize was awarded for a work
of architecture without any official or careerist considerations” [12, p. 217]. His
colleague Dmitry Khmelnitsky, on the contrary, described the award of the prize
to Zholtovsky as a political act [13, pp. 270-271]. However, his account of the
award was scarcely more detailed. He just mentioned that Zholtovsky’s col-
leagues, builders of the Moscow metro, were also among the winners. 
The authors of these works drew mainly on sources in the public domain
(contemporary periodicals, etc.). Khan-Magomedov openly told the reader that
he would “repeatedly quote Oshchepkov’s album as an important source of data”
[12, p. 27]. Archive documents were invoked much less frequently and they were
confined to the Zholtovsky stock of the Russian State Archive of Literature and
Arts (RSALA) and the stock at the Shchusev State Museum of Architecture.
Although the history of the awarding of Stalin Prizes has often been the topic
of historical and art history publications, awards in the field of architecture were
never specifically studied (unlike the awards for literature, fine arts or cinema
[40; 11; 3; 35; 36]). In general, works about the prizes were just overviews [32;
1]. Part of the reason is that “a large part of the stocks of the Stalin Prize Com-
mittee (personal files and other personal documents) are classified” [39, p. 315].
This is the first investigation into the Stalin Prize for architecture. With
access to the primary sources that were out of reach of architecture historians and
Zholtovsky’s biographers, I will try to sort out whether this high award was an
unbiased assessment of his creative achievements or an act of political struggle. 
The Stalin Prize was instituted under the resolution of the Council of Peo-
ple’s Commissars in December 1939 to mark Joseph Stalin’s 60th birthday. Each
year representatives of science and art were awarded 16 prizes in recognition of
their major scientific, cultural, engineering- and organizational-technical contri-
bution. The prize was awarded by the government, while the candidates were
nominated by the government’s Committee for Stalin Prizes in the Field of Sci-
ence, Military Knowledge and Invention and the government’s Committee for
Stalin prizes in the Field of Literature and Arts specially set up for the purpose.
They were to accept the works nominated for the Prize by October 15 and sub-
mit their proposals to the Council of People’s Commissars not later than Decem-
ber 1. 
The Prize was awarded not for the recipient’s entire work record but for spe-
cific achievements. Only new works completed in the year of the award were
accepted. Because the Prize was seen as a material incentive, the recipients were
mainly young or middle-aged. The number and monetary value of prizes were
changed more than once. They were financed out of Stalin’s royalties for the pub-
lication of his works in and outside the country. Three First Class prizes (100,000
rubles each) and five Second Class prizes (50,000 rubles each) were given each
award season. Rulings of the Council of People’s Commissars (later, the Coun-
cil of Ministers) on the award of Prizes in 1941-1952 were published in the press.
In March 1953, following the Leader’s death, the official source of financing for
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the Prize fund was abolished and no prizes were awarded after 1954 (for more
details see, for example, [32]).
In 1950, the Architecture nomination for the First-Class Prize was awarded
to the husband-and-wife duo Grigory Zakharov and Zinaida Chernysheva for
architectural décor of Moscow Metro’s Kurskaya Koltsevaya station. The Sec-
ond-Class Prize was shared by Leonid Polyakov for the design of Kaluzhskaya
(now Oktyabrskaya Koltsevaya station) and Ivan Zholtovsky “for the architec-
ture of residential building at 11 Kaluzhskaya Street” in Moscow. The Third-
Class Prize went to Aleksey Miminoshvili for residential building at 3 Marti
Street in Tbilisi, Victor Andreyev for administrative building at 11 Gorky Street
in Moscow, the team led by Zinovy Rosenfeld and Arnold Suris for residential
building at 4/10 Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Street in Moscow and Evgeny Rybitsky
for residential building at 46-48 Chkalov Street in Moscow [20, p. 2] (the latter,
incidentally, was stripped of his laureate title in 1955 [21, p. 1]).
According to archive materials, the awarding of the prize to Zholtovsky was
preceded by a dramatic episode in which new candidatures cropped up and were
rejected, members of the Stalin Prize Committee made sharp statements, and a
peculiar mechanism was revealed of selecting and promoting nominees for the
top government award. I have used the documents from the funds of the Coun-
cil of People’s Commissars of the USSR at the State Archive of the Russian Fed-
eration (SA RF, stock Ð-5446), the Committee for Stalin Prizes in the Field of
Literature and Arts and its visual arts and architecture section at the RSALA
(stock 2073). The latter contains transcripts and minutes of the plenary sessions
of the Committee and meetings of its sections, records of voting results, lists and
personal files of the candidates, letters from the nominating organizations,
abstracts and reviews of the nominated works of art and literature. Practically all
the documents requested from the archive storage rooms had empty order sheets.
This means that none of my colleagues have looked at them. 
At the SA RF, I studied the case of “The award of Stalin Prizes for out-
standing works in the field of literature and arts for 1949” [34], which contains
information on how Zholtovsky’s candidature appeared on the list. It begins with
the minutes of the final plenary session of the relevant Committee of January 18,
1950. The placings in the Architecture nomination were as follows: First Class
to the Zakharov-Chernysheva tandem and the team led by Yakov Belopolsky
“for the architecture of the monuments to the Soviet Army soldiers who died in
the battles against fascism in Berlin”; and Second Class to L. Polyakov. The
Committee chairman, author Aleksandr Fadeyev, wrote to Stalin that “those who
failed to gain the majority of votes or were not, for one reason or other, on the
list voted on but came to the attention of the Committee during the discussion”
formed an Additional List. It included the above-mentioned Andreyev and
Miminoshvili [34, pp. 122, 128, 80]. Zholtovsky’s name is not on any of the lists.
On February 11 of that same year, the Council of Ministers of the USSR
issued Ruling No. 564 instituting the Stalin Prize Third Class (25,000 rubles);
pursuant to this ruling, six section and two plenary sessions of the Committee’s
special session were held [33, p. 74]. In the nomination that concerns us here, the
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placings were as follows: Miminoshvili (28 votes), Andreyev (27 votes), Rosen-
feld and Suris (24 votes), Rybitsky (17 votes), and Zholtovsky at the bottom of
the top five (17 votes). The minutes of the session were sent to Stalin and, on
February 18, to Lazar Kaganovich. In the latter’s copy there was a cross in black
ink next to Zholtovsky’s name. On February 22, the joint list of the candidates of
all the Classes left the offices of Stalin and Kaganovich; in it there was also a
mark next to Zholtovsky’s name but not next to any other names [34, pp. 65, 76,
72, 57, 49].
It was still unclear what events took place between February 22 and March
7 (the date when the Committee’s final decision was signed and published) that
led to the award of the Prize Second Class to Zholtovsky. The documents give no
answer to this question. To fill that gap, I turned to the materials of the Commit-
tee’s stock in the field of literature and arts, which enabled me to reconstruct the
chronology of the events starting from the fall of 1949.
The story behind the architect's promotion to the top of the list emerges from
the minutes of the general meeting of the creative staff of the Academician
Zholtovsky’s Architectural Workshop-School of Architecture of November 30,
1949 (chairman Boris Lazarev, Secretary Pyotr Skokan, attended by 30 mem-
bers). The secretary of the workshop’s party cell Georgy Sevan told those pre-
sent that “the Board of the Moscow Branch of the Soviet Architects’ Union
[MOSSA—O. S.], yielding to the pressure of the All-Union Board of the Soviet
Architects’ Union on November 29, repealed its earlier decision on nominating
for the Stalin Prize the residential building of the Administrative Directorate of
the Council of Ministers of the USSR at 11 Kaluzhskaya Street in Moscow
designed by Academician of Architecture I. V. Zholtovsky.” This announcement,
if one is to believe the minutes, was met with a stormy reaction of those present.
Among the speakers were chairman of the MOSSA section Vsevolod Voskre-
sensky, deputy chief of the Workshop-School Grigory Tarasevich, Nikolay
Sukoyan, Georgy Lebedev, Vladimir Kuybishev, and Georgy Minervin. As a
result, the meeting voted unanimously to nominate the candidature of its chief for
the Stalin Prize. On December 1, a letter to that effect was sent to the Stalin Prize
Committee. It was signed by Tarasevich, Sevan, Voskresensky, and the local
trade union chairman P. Batrakov [25, file 34, pp. 18, 17]. Zholtovsky was also
backed by the Committee members: President of the USSR Academy of Arts
Aleksandr Gerasimov, Academicians Igor Grabar and Vera Mukhina, arts schol-
ar Vladimir Kemenov and sculptor Yuozas Mikenas [23, file 39, p. 62].
On December 28,1949, a plenary session of the Prizes Committee discussed
the candidatures for architecture prizes. Head of the visual arts and architecture
section Grabar told those present that between December 2 and 28, his section
“held 8 meetings, and went to see the works put up for nomination on the spot.
The section discussed the works. Recommendations were worked out” [23, file
35, pp. 179-193, 186]. The works were sent for expert examination to the USSR
Academy of Arts and for the opinion of the state bodies for control of architec-
ture: The Ministry of Urban Construction, The Council of Ministers Directorate
for Architectural Affairs and, for facilities located in Moscow, to the Architec-
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tural Affairs Directorate of the Moscow City Executive Committee. The Section
took into account their opinions and the results of expert examination in making
its recommendations. 
Zholtovsky’s project was among those recommended for Prize Second-
Class. The inclusion of this nominee elicited this notable comment from
Fadeyev, who headed the Committee: he said that Zholtovsky “had not been put
forward at all, but there is strong support for him.” Grabar took the floor to say
that “there is no unanimous opinion on the Zholtovsky Building we saw on
Kaluzhskaya Street,” and that “the majority of the Section members are against
[the nomination]” [23, file 35, pp. 187, 189]. The minutes have a transcript of the
following exchange: 
Fadeyev: We should cut the list of candidates for the Second Prize. There are
too many of them… Is anyone for nominating Zholtovsky’s house? ... Does any-
one insist on Zholtovsky’s house? 
Voices from the floor: No, we don’t.
Fadeyev: Does anyone support any candidatures rejected by the Section? 
Khrennikov: Zholtovsky’s house leaves a pleasant impression.
Fadeyev: No, it does not make an impression. 
Goldenweiser A.V.: A very good impression inside but on the outside it is a
barracks [23, file 35, pp. 189, 191-192]. 
Zoltovsky’s name was not mentioned at either the January 11, 16, or 19, 1950
meetings of which the minutes reached the archives. On February 15, the Com-
mittee plenum discussed the candidatures for the Third Prize in connection with
the government decision to institute such a prize. Much of the time was devoted to
an exchange of opinions on the architect’s candidature [23, file 36, pp. 49-74, 104-
110, 164-168, 196-206]. The majority of those present still had a negative attitude
to the candidature despite the fact that Fadeyev made it clear to those present that
the country’s top leadership had a particularity for this nominee. “Before we dis-
cuss the architecture candidatures, I would like to inform you that there is an inter-
est in the government in the issues of housing construction. I was summoned and
asked about the Zholtovsky residential building and about its merits and short-
comings. We have been asked to think about this issue and perhaps give some tips
so that these matters could be encouraged. We are not suggesting that it should be
encouraged even if it is bad, just because it is a residential building, but see if you
can find some achievements that need to be encouraged [my emphasis—O. S.]
because we are interested in the development of this construction.” And further:
“We have to revisit the issue of the Zholtovsky house. We did not like the appear-
ance (looks like a barracks, no balconies, doesn’t fit into this thoroughfare). What
does it look like inside? People said that the long hallways are not aired, that the
kitchen is unhappily positioned and so forth. Still, perhaps we can think again?
When I was summoned I was told… it sometimes happens that when a person was
criticized in the past, it may haunt him. We should set it aside. We should get real:
is it a good or bad house to live in?” [23, file 36, pp. 196, 198-199].
It is clear from the minutes that composers Tikhon Khrennikov and Aleksan-
dr Goldenweiser took the most favorable stand on Zholtovsky’s candidature.
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Grabar and Kemenov were ambivalent, hinting, after Fadeyev, that the architect
had “support.” But his colleagues were adamant. Arkady Mordvinov said: “The
building provoked a big discussion among architects. The building’s plan met with
harsh criticism... Concerning the façade, it was said that the image of a residential
house has not been found, some said it was a beautiful barracks. Other comrades
considered the house in terms of details: excellent cornices. Some positive features
were noted; they said in terms of artistry, it should be put up for the Prize, while
others said the image of a residential house has not been captured. It is still a debat-
able work.” The chief architect of Moscow, Aleksandr Vlasov, was equally cate-
gorical: “In terms of artistry, the house has nothing in common with Russian art as
far as the façade is concerned. This house tries to look like an Italian palazzo, but
it does not have a single balcony on the main façade. This strips the building of the
elements that are so natural for a residential building, for the sake of an abstract,
purely aesthetic task. That is why this building is not characteristic of Moscow. The
creator misconceives the image of a residential house” [23, file 36, pp. 199, 202].
The writer Sergey Mikhalkov also spoke out against Zholtovsky: “I like
Rosenfeld’s building very much and I don’t like Zholtovsky’s building at all. I
looked at it from the outside and from the inside. From the outside, it is a large
barracks and from the inside, it is a very tasteless arrangement of the rooms. I
think it has nothing in common with comfortable flats in which people live and
must live in comfort, and the solution offered by Zholtovsky with all these
strange roosters and hens in the rooms. It feels like the museum of toys in Leon-
tiyevsky Lane” [23, file 36, p. 203]. We see a recurring comparison of
Zholtovsky’s house with a barracks, stressing that the look lacks color. 
During the course of the discussion, it was decided—not without some pres-
sure from Fadeyev—to nominate five candidates for four prizes: “Andreyev—an
administrative building, Miminoshvili—residential house in Tbilisi, Rosenfeld
and Suris—residential house on Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Street, Rybitsky—resi-
dential house on Chkalov Street and Zholtovsky—residential house on B.
Kaluzhskaya Street” [23, file 36, p. 206]. The minutes of the final meeting on
February 16 show that Rybitsky and Zholtovsky each won 17 votes, placing
fourth and fifth respectively [23, file 38, pp. 29, 36, 37].
In addition to the closed sessions of the Committee, Zholtovsky’s work was
discussed in the trade press, where assessment of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzh-
skaya drifted from sharply negative to moderately positive and finally glowing.
In February 1949, it was discussed, along with other residential buildings, at the
Central Architect’s House. The journal Arkhitektura i stroitl’stvo (Architecture
and Construction) declared that “the work is in irreconcilable contradiction to the
practice of the majority of Soviet architects who stand on the positions of Social-
ist Realism… Zholtovsky has compromised the truthful image of a residential
house” [8]. The newspaper Sovetskoye iskusstvo (Soviet Art) wrote: “Residents’
comfort has been sacrificed for the sake of a beautiful cornice … Zholtovsky
compromised the truthful image of a residential house” [31].
Such behavior of fellow architects can be explained if one turns to the ideo-
logical and political context of the late 1940s. Since it has been described in
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detail in the book by D. Khmelnitsky [13, pp. 263-274], I will confine myself to
a general remark: Zholtovsky was caught between the millstones of the notori-
ous “struggle against cosmopolitanism,” the scorching publications being part of
the campaign to discredit him [9]. Khmelnitsky draws attention to the biased and
partisan character of the assessments, which were disguised as professional cri-
tique but in reality expressed the Leader’s will. The minutes of the Stalin Prize
Committee, while confirming the overall thesis about the token role of that body
in the making of decisions on awards, reveal the phases of the change from
“minus” to “plus.” Characteristically, even after the Prize had been awarded and
the assessment of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya had been reversed, Ya.
Kornfeld couched his essay about Zholtovsky in a way that stressed his contro-
versial overall record while praising the specific work ([15]; see also [6; 5; 17;
27; 38]).
But was the nomination that was crowned with the award the only one in
Zholtovsky’s biography? I found the answer to this question in the materials of
the Stalin Prize Committee fund at the RSALA. It turns out that he was nomi-
nated more than once—in 1940, 1943-1945 (award of prizes was suspended in
1943-1945 and the winners for these years were not announced until 1946), 1947
and 1953. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the materials who nominated
Zholtovsky for the Prize in 1940. I found only a letter of recommendation dated
January 15, 1941, signed by the director of the Moscow Architecture Institute,
Mikhail Ostapenko, in support of an earlier nominated candidate. Attached to the
document were a copy of Lunacharsky’s famous note to Lenin recommending
Zholtovsky (1918), the architect’s autobiography and a personal file from the
personnel department [25, file 2, pp. 94-96, 97-100].
Apparently, the nomination for the 1940 prize was based on the totality of
earlier works. At any rate, we find a similar formula in the documents filed in the
1943 competition. On January 31, 1944, the Presidium of the Soviet Architects’
Union at a meeting chaired by Karo Alabyan discussed the candidates in the
Architecture competition. The meeting was attended by Academicians Aleksey
Shchusev, Boris Iofan, Lev Rudnev, Sergey Chernyshev, and Corresponding
Members David Arkin and Viacheslav Shkvarikov. It was decided to nominate
Zholtovsky and Viktor Vesnin “for outstanding services and many years of fruit-
ful activity in the field of architecture.” The relevant documents were sent to the
Committee on January 31 and February 2, 1944. On February 28, 1945 the
Board of the Soviet Architects’ Union confirmed its recent choice, and the doc-
uments dated March 25, 1946, added Shchusev’s candidature to the two earlier
approved candidates [25, file 14, pp. 119, 121-122, 121, 120]. However, the
Committee did not discuss Zholtovsky’s candidature either in 1940, or in 1945,
or in 1946.
In 1947, on the occasion of Zholtovsky’s 80th birthday, he was again nomi-
nated for the Prize in accordance with the “jubilee” formula “for many years of
outstanding activity.” The nominators, as before, were the Architects’ Union in
the person of Alabyan and the Council of the Moscow Architecture Institute in
the persons of Ivan Rylsky and Viktor Kokorin [25, file 23, pp. 138-142]. This
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time around, refusal to consider Zholtovsky’s candidacy was motivated and for-
malized: “The candidature was not considered because the prize for many years
of activity does not exist” [23, file 29, p. 60]. The lesson was apparently learned
and the 1949 prize nomination indicated a concrete house, the residential build-
ing of the USSR Council of Ministers’ Administrative Directorate at 11, Bol-
shaya Kaluzhskaya Street.
It is worth noting that the successful nomination encouraged his well-wish-
ers to make another try. The next nomination took place in January 1954. This
time it was for the residential building of the Administrative Directorate of the
USSR Interior Ministry on Smolenskaya Square (then Chkalovsky Street), which
was described as “an architectural work marked by a high level of craftsmanship,
manifested in the composition of the building as a whole and especially the tower
part, in the elaboration of architectural art details as well as in the inner layout of
dwelling and service spaces” [26, file 12, p. 144]. The initiators were the Archi-
tects’ Union and its Moscow Branch. 
Unlike the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya, the circumstances of the build-
ing of the house on Smolenskaya Square were confusing. What is known is that
on October 31, 1944, at the suggestion of the Chief of the Main Directorate of
Military-Industrial Construction under the Council of People’s Commissars of
the USSR Andrey Prokofiev, the Chief of the Central Directorate of Military
Design (Voyenproekt) Movshovich, sent a proposal to Zholtovsky to rework an
earlier design of the building at 13, Smolenskaya Square to house the staff of
Glavvoyenstroy [23, file 165, p. 32]. Thus, initially the building was to be admin-
istrative, not residential. Acceptance of the building by the government commis-
sion was to be piecemeal, and the construction and finishing work was complet-
ed in the summer of 1953 [26, file 12, p. 146]. The documents I have examined
have no indication as to when the building changed hands and its function was
changed. 
However, it was not these metamorphoses that triggered the discussion that
flared up at the Visual Arts and Architecture Section of the Prizes Committee.
The attendees were practically the same, with the exception of Fadeyev, who was
absent, and the Secretary of the Board of the Architects’ Union G. Zakharov, who
joined the proceedings. Member of the Section, Vlasov, addressing the meeting
on March 23, 1954 said: “The house on Kaluzhskaya and the house on Smolen-
skaya were started simultaneously, they have the same layout, the same sections
and the same architecture with the exception of some details. In one house, Ivan
Vladislavovich, because of the great length of the building, chose another cor-
nice, otherwise the houses are the same. It would be embarrassing if we put it to
the vote and it is voted down.” After hearing these remarks those present started
to discuss whether Zholtovsky could be awarded the prize, as an exception, not
for a concrete project but for the totality of his works. Mordvinov objected,
reminding them of the failed past attempts to award the Stalin Prize on the same
grounds [24, file 31, p. 141].
On March 29, 1954, because the architect’s name was not on the list of can-
didates for the Prize, the Moscow Branch of the Architects’ Union, represented
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by deputy chairman of its Board, N. Kurochkin, again asked the Committee to
put Zholtovsky on the list of candidates as designer of the house on Smolenskaya
Square and “on the basis of the entire record of his creative, scientific and ped-
agogical activities” [26, file 12, p. 145]. The next session of the Visual Arts and
Architecture Section on April 2 decided, after all, to nominate the candidate.
Kemenov provided the background for it: “We may ask the Government, con-
sidering his age, as an exception, to give the prize without waiting for the end of
construction. Such a precedent exists; the authors of high-rise buildings were
awarded prizes for the designs. This is the only correct way. I think this palace
[Trade Union House] is very interesting, and also the hippodrome which is very
impressive. Or we can put forward one or two prefab buildings which would be
easy to defend” [24, file 31, pp. 285-286; 26, file 12, pp. 137-138].
The final documents read in part: “Because the architectural solution of the
residential building on Smolenskaya Square is merely a variant of the solution
of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya for which Zholtovsky has already been
awarded the Prize Second Class, the Committee deems it possible to nominate it
for the Prize. Noting the great services of Zholtovsky to Soviet architecture, the
Committee has decided to award him the Prize, as an exception, for the archi-
tectural projects: Trade Union building on Krymskaya Embankment, the struc-
tures of the Moscow Hippodrome currently under construction, projects of pre-
fabricated panel residential house and the design of the Gorny sanatorium in
Yalta” [24, file 35, p. 101; 26, file 12, p. 134]. The Visual Arts and Architecture
Section recommended putting these three works in the ballot for Prize Second
Class. Zholtovsky’s candidature won 51 votes out of 54, of which 38 votes were
cast for the First Prize, 11 for the Second and 2 for the Third Prize [24, file 35,
p. 111; file 35, p. 112; file 39, p. 101; 26, file 12, p. 134]. Thus, the architect was
submitted as a candidate for Stalin Prize First Class on the strength of a new for-
mula [24, file 34, pp. 34, 65].
Thus, officially, Zholtovsky was awarded a Stalin Prize First Class in 1954.
The text of the ruling was written [24, file 34, pp. 53-80; 32, pp. 633-650, 641],
but it remained unfinished, like the ruling on prizes for 1952-1953 (prizes for
these years were combined).
Having studied the archival documents, I have come to the following con-
clusions. Zholtovsky was repeatedly nominated for the Prize, which looks quite
natural considering his special status in the architectural hierarchy: by the time
of his first nomination (1940), he was established as the chief theoretician and
practitioner of architecture. What made the situation unusual was the age of the
nominee (he turned 83 in 1950), as well as the fact that he was nominated on the
strength of his record accumulated since the early 1930s. It was only in 1949 that
he was nominated according to the rules, i.e., for a concrete creative achieve-
ment. (Incidentally, A. Shchusev, Zholtovsky’s colleague and almost a coeval
(1873-1949), was awarded four Stalin Prizes (1941, 1946, 1948, 1952), see
[33]).
In Khmelnitsky’s opinion, awarding the prize to Zholtovsky shortly after
a brief period of baiting was Stalin’s way of mocking his minions who were
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ready to berate or praise anyone on his directions. The documents on the 1949
prize do not contradict this assessment. The “debates,” which were full of innu-
endo, add shades to the colorful canvas. The political nature of the verdict is
clear from the remarks of Fadeyev and other Committee members. Repeated
attempts to honor the grand old man of architecture by awarding him the Stal-
in Prize on the strength of his total record indicate that Zholtovsky had little
chance of getting the prize without support in the top echelons of power. A
probable reflection of such support was the correctly formulated application
for the 1949 Prize and the lifting of persecution. However, it has proved impos-
sible to identify the concrete individuals and the mechanism that supported the
architect’s candidature. It cannot be ruled out that behind-the-scene agreements
were not reflected in any documents or materials. One thing is clear: the unex-
pected lenience toward Zholtovsky fit into the scenario of another episode of
intra-party struggle.
Another telltale event occurred after the Prize was awarded: a USSR Coun-
cil of Ministers ruling, signed by Stalin on September 5, 1951, included
Zholtovsky’s Workshop-School in the Architectural Planning Directorate of
Moscow as a Study and Design Organization First Category financed out of the
government budget. It was charged with “designing buildings and structures in
Moscow as well as creative and production education, in the design and con-
struction process, of highly skilled masters of architecture” [22, p. 13]. As a con-
sequence, when nominating Zholtovsky for the 1953 Prize, the Committee mem-
bers (including his peers) were more favorably disposed toward his candidature.
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Leo Tolstoy and Non-Resistance to Evil 
by Violence: The History and Critique 
of the “Innocent Victim” Argument
Konstantin TROITSKIY
Abstract. In this article I defend the non-violence position, assert the
immutability of the absolute ban on violence and demonstrate that Leo Tol-
stoy’s criticism of the “innocent victim” argument is valid and relevant. The
article describes the first appearance of the “innocent victim” argument in
Tolstoy’s novel Anna Karenina, critically analyses the subsequent modifica-
tions of this argument by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Vladimir Solovyov, Ivan
Ilyin and Anatoly Lunacharsky and sums up Tolstoy’s objections to the argu-
ment. In addition to describing the historical context of the discussion about
non-violence, the article offers a critical analysis of the structure of the argu-
ment. The “innocent victim” argument has a number of flaws that concern
both its idea, internal structure, and practical orientation. As a result of these
defects this argument should be regarded as immoral. The structure of the
“innocent victim” argument aimed at refuting the idea of non-resistance to
evil by violence, is not unique and occurs in other ethical discussions that
took place in Tolstoy’s lifetime and after his death. The popularity and con-
stant recurrence of attempts to justify violence makes the task aimed at
researching history and criticizing the “innocent victim” argument important
and relevant.
Keywords: Leo Tolstoy, non-violence, non-resistance to evil by vio-
lence, morality, ethics, the “innocent victim” argument.
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Introduction
Ethical discussions of non-violence at scientific conferences as well as argu-
ments about non-resistance in daily life frequently lead to the discussion of one
and the same imaginary “case.” At a certain stage in the conversation, those who
object to the thesis that the moral ban on violence is absolute often challenge the
adherent of non-violence to conduct a mental experiment in which the champion
of an absolute ban sees a “villain” threatening violence toward an “innocent vic-
tim.” It is assumed that the “villain” can only be stopped by killing him. Ending
the description of the experiment, the party that maintains that there is no
absolute ban on violence asks triumphantly whether the champion of the ban
would passively observe or implore the “villain” who is in the process of maim-
ing and killing “the innocent victim.” 
Thus, the classical version of the argument describes a situation in which the
“villain” or “group of villains” (for example, “robbers” or “drunks”) threatens to
commit terrible violence against an “innocent victim” (for example, “a helpless
virgin” or “a child”). Before presenting the argument, the question is asked: what
would he/she do if the only way to prevent the terrible act of violence were to
kill “the villain”? Following some other Russian scholars, let us call it the “inno-
cent victim” argument (see, for example, [3; 8]). The underlying scheme of the
“innocent victim” argument is not unique, it is used in other arguments aimed at
dismantling other absolute bans, for example, a ban on lying and torture. A sim-
ilar scheme is examined by Immanuel Kant in his famous essay On a Supposed
Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, and much later under the “tick-
ing bomb” scenario. Variations consisted in a change of the initial conditions of
the imaginary situation, that is, the type of action indicated by the presenter of
the argument as being “necessary” to stop the villain’s evil designs. The aim of
the variations was to prove that the moral ban on lying and torture is not absolute. 
The popularity and constant recurrence of attempts to justify violence and
lying, usually accompanied by attempts to elevate them to the position of ordi-
nary practice, makes the task of investigating the history of and, most impor-
tantly, refuting the “innocent victim” argument and criticizing the underlying
scheme particularly relevant and important. 
Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin,  and Lunacharsky vs. Leo Tolstoy
The remarks of Konstantin Levin in Anna Karenina, the most autobiograph-
ical of Tolstoy’s novels, anticipate his teaching on non-resistance to evil by vio-
lence, with the objections raised by Sergey Koznyshev, Levin’s brother, being the
first presentation to a large audience of the “innocent victim” argument. It hap-
pens in the final part of the novel, the part that barely got past the censors. In it
Levin learns that Vronsky intends to go to Serbia to fight against the Turks,
which triggers an argument in which Koznyshev, unlike Levin, approves of his
intention. 
Koznyshev frowned at Katavasov’s words and said something different.
‘The question shouldn’t be put that way. There is no declaration of war here, but
simply the expression of human, Christian feeling. They’re killing our brothers, of
the same blood, of the same religion. Well, suppose they weren’t even our brothers,
our co-religionists, but simply children, women, old men; indignation is aroused, and
the Russian people run to help stop these horrors. Imagine yourself going down the
street and seeing some drunk beating a woman or a child, I don’t think you’d start
asking whether war had or had not been declared on the man, but would fall upon
him and protect the victim.’
‘But I wouldn’t kill him,’ said Levin.
‘Yes, you would.’
‘I don’t know. If I saw it, I would yield to my immediate feeling, but I can’t say
beforehand. And there is not and cannot be such an immediate feeling about the
oppression of the Slavs’ [11, pp. 387-388; 12, p. 541].
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who was reading Tolstoy’s novel as it was being seri-
alized in the issues of the Russky vestnik (Russian Herald) journal, reacted angri-
ly to the above-quoted extract in a lengthy entry in his diary. Dostoyevsky
believed that the argument was presented “with the intent of winding it up with
Levin’s victory,” and that Koznyshev’s “drunken man” argument was not very
convincing: “he speaks nonsense, since who, when helping a woman beaten by
drunken men, is going to kill them?” [1, p. 259; 2, p. 808]. Dostoyevsky needed
a justification for the war that was starting and to construct the argument in a
way that would “wind up” with the necessity to kill. To this end, he cited descrip-
tions of Turkish atrocities with regard to the Slavs. These were more cruel than
in the drunks examples, and besides, for Dostoyevsky the Turks were “them”
and not “us,” the Slavs, for whom he had more sympathy even if they were drunk
and violent. On the basis of these accounts Dostoyevsky constructed an imagi-
nary situation of the blinding of a child: 
This means that he does not know how he would act! And yet he is a suscepti-
ble man, and as such he is afraid to kill… the Turk. Let us imagine the following
scene: Levin stands still with a rifle and bayonet, and two steps from him a Turk is
voluptuously getting ready to pierce the eyes of an infant whom he holds in his arms.
The seven-year-old little sister of the boy screams and like an insane person rushes
to tear her brother away from the Turk. And here stands Levin in doubt, wavering:
‘I don’t know what to do. I feel nothing. I am the people myself. No immediate
sentiment for the oppression of the Slavs exists or can exist’ [1, p. 261; 2, p. 809].
And in the same diary entry, Dostoyevsky, describing the Turks as “blood-
suckers,” “a deceitful and vile nation,” and “tyrants,” called for disarming them
so that instead of committing atrocities “they will be manufacturing and selling
morning-gowns and soap—even as our Kazan Tartars” [1, pp. 262-263; 2, pp.
810-811]. Thus, Dostoyevsky was one of the first Russian writers to link the
imaginary case on violence with regard to an “innocent victim” with testimony
on atrocities of some representatives of a nation, and proceed on that basis to
berate that nation ending up with a call to use violence against a whole people. 
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Twenty years after Dostoyevsky made this diary entry Vladimir Solovyov,
who in his youth was himself planning to go to the Russo-Turkish war, devel-
oped his argument in his work Three Conversations about War, Progress and the
End of World History. Here we are talking about a tradition since Solovyov’s
ideas are probably closely linked with Dostoyevsky’s version of the argument, as
witnessed by the context and the details of his variation of the “innocent victim”
argument. 
In Three Conversations, the Prince (a follower of Tolstoy) argues with Mr. Z.,
whom Solovyov uses as his mouthpiece. Mr. Z., challenging the Prince, suggests
imagining a situation in which a murder is necessary. Which elicits the following
reaction from the Prince. “This is something quite unintelligible. But I think I
guess what you mean: you refer to that famous case in which a father sees in a
lonely place a blackguardly ruffian trying to assault his innocent (and, to enhance
the effect, it is added, his ‘little’) daughter. The father, unable to protect her in any
other way, kills the offender. I have heard this argument at least a thousand times.”
To this Mr. Z. responds: “What is really remarkable is not that you have heard it
a thousand times, but the fact that nobody has ever heard from any one of those
holding your view a sensible, or even only plausible, answer to this simple argu-
ment.” The Prince then points out that the argument is unrealistic and that it fails
to justify the war. Mr. Z. then weakens his argument: “Let us take not a father but
a childless moralist before whose eyes some feeble being, strange and unfamiliar
to him, is being fiercely assaulted by a hefty villain.” And he asks the question:
“Would you suggest that the moralist should fold his arms and preach the glory of
virtue while the fiendish beast is torturing his victim?” [9, pp. 653-654; 10].
Through his character, Mr. Z., Solovyov promptly decided to cast aside
ungrounded hopes for God, considering the facts of villainy in the world and
responsibility to the imaginary “victim.” At that point, the General joins the con-
versation, telling the story of the atrocities he had seen being committed by a unit
of Bashi-Bazouks: “One scene will remain forever vivid in my memory. A poor
woman lay there on the ground, her head and shoulders securely bound to the
cart’s axle, so that she could not move her head. She bore no burns, no wounds.
But on her distorted face was stamped a ghastly terror—she had evidently died
of sheer horror. And before her dead, staring eyes was a high pole, firmly fixed
in the ground, and to it was tied the poor little naked body of a baby—her son,
most likely—a blackened, scorched little corpse, with protruding eyes. Nearby
also was a grating in which lay the dead ashes of a fire” [9, p. 661; 10].
The General describes how he and his Cossacks made short shrift of the
Bashi-Bazouks with relish and without mercy, to the approval of all the partici-
pants in the conversation with the exception of the confused Prince. It has to be
noted that while Dostoyevsky tried to justify the escalating Russo-Turkish war,
perhaps sincerely believing that the Russian army, about which he had heard
“nothing but the most humane acts,” was “an army of gentlemen” [1, pp. 262-
263; 2, pp. p. 810-811], Solovyov admitted that some Cossacks were veritable
brigands.” Having said that, for him the point was that the Bashi-Bazouks were
brigands “of quite a different sort” [9, pp. 664-665; 10]. 
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In Solovyov’s reasoning, criticism of the teaching on non-resistance to evil by
violence invoking the recent Russo-Turkish war, is not only central to the “first
conversation” out of three, but is a prologue to his visions of the future, notably his
description of an allegedly imminent apocalyptic war. Unlike Dostoyevsky’s diary
entry, the “innocent victim” argument is adduced not only as an instrument of jus-
tifying the Russo-Turkish war, which Solovyov considers to be a minor passing
episode, but as an attempt to mobilize those he identifies with the “forces of good”
against those he appoints to be “the forces of evil” in a future apocalyptic world
war. And, like Dostoyevsky, he distinguishes “the good” from “the evil” in accor-
dance with discriminatory criteria of national and religious affiliation. 
Ivan Ilyin, in his 1925 book On Resistance to Evil by Force, also made an
attempt to justify violence by invoking the “innocent victim” argument. By his
book he tried not only to justify the violence of the Whites toward the Reds and
vindicate the meaningless catastrophe of the Civil War, not only to support the
pockets of the bloody conflict, but to kindle a new massacre. Criticizing Tol-
stoy’s teaching, Ilyin modifies the child example to make it sound as follows:
“This is precisely why a moralist of this type, if he is consistent, will during his
life find himself in monstrous situations. Indeed, what will be his answer to him-
self and to God if, witnessing a raging crowd abusing a child and being armed,
he chooses to dissuade the villains by appealing to the obvious and to love and,
after allowing the evil act to take place, to live with a sense of being morally
impeccable?” [6, p. 93]. Right off, one should point out two things in this ver-
sion: (1) Ilyin writes not about one “villain” but about “villains,” even an anony-
mous crowd; (2) unlike Solovyov, he no longer pretends to see this situation as
something exceptional. 
A year before Ilyin, a similar attack was launched on Tolstoy’s teaching on
non-resistance to evil by violence by Аnatoly Lunacharsky, in his case to jus-
tify the violence perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. With Ilyin and Lunacharsky, the
attack strategies coincide down to the tiniest detail, except that Lunacharsky’s
“innocent victim” argument casts the Whites as “villains.” In an attempt to jus-
tify “Red Terror” Lunacharsky recalls precisely the child episode from Three
Conversations. He is undeterred by the fact that by that time Solovyov’s works
had been banned and removed from the Soviet libraries as “counter-revolution-
ary and anti-art literature.” Indeed, this was done by the agency which
Lunacharsky himself headed up (see [28]). 
Lunacharsky ranges himself with Solovyov in the idea and tactics of criti-
cizing Tolstoy’s teaching on non-resistance to evil by violence and in his wish to
justify violence. He writes: “Vladimir Solovyov asked Tolstoy, what will you do
when you see a child being tortured? We say: how can one be indifferent when
humanity has risen up for the final battle to wrest itself, in its countless millions
and the future generations, from the horror of untruth which you, Tolstoy fol-
lowers, yourselves condemn? Can one, if the struggle has begun, get in the way
and say, stop struggling, why struggle?” [7].
Lunacharsky’s demagoguery leaps out at you and his elaboration of Solovy-
ov’s thoughts highlights the anti-moral and anti-humane potential of the “inno-
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cent victim” argument, whatever its modifications. Lunacharsky, like Solovyov,
does not hesitate to move from the lonely figure of the “villain” and the “inno-
cent victim” to declaring a huge number of real people to be “villains” and the
future generations to be “innocent victims.” In the narrative of Dostoyevsky,
Solovyov, Ilyin and Lunacharsky, and of some contemporaries, invocation of the
sufferings of a child, a girl or any other person is merely a trigger, a weapon
against the absolute moral ban on violence. In their works, booklets and speech-
es, the imagined argument played the role of an instrument to justify the mass
madness of war and brutalization of groups of people on national, religious,
social or class grounds.
Dostoyevsky used the argument to try to prove the necessity of the escalat-
ing war between the Russian and Ottoman empires, Solovyov to bolster a
“moral” sanction of the past war and imaginary future apocalyptic wars, Ilyin
and Lunacharsky who supported opposite sides in the Civil War, as a sanction of
the past slaughter and a future bloody confrontation. For all of them the imagi-
nary situation of “the villain” and “the innocent victim” was a weapon to pull
down the edifice of non-resistance to evil by violence to promote their diverging
and sometimes directly opposite ideas of who are the “villains” and who are the
“innocent victims,” and how to order the good world they sought to achieve, not
stopping short of mass murder. To use Ilyin’s expression with which Dos-
toyevsky, Solovyov and Lunacharsky would probably have agreed, if a Tolstoy
follower in this imaginary situation sacrifices “his righteousness” and “perpe-
trates an evil deed” through resisting “by violence” then “if he understands and
recognizes this higher idea then it needs to be formulated… And if it is formu-
lated what will remain of the notorious ‘non-resistance’ doctrine?” [6, pp. 93-94].
In other words, Tolstoy’s opponents were looking for a formula that would
accomplish the impossible and justify the base and inhuman system of coercion,
violence and murder in the name of this or that “higher” goal, while the “inno-
cent victim” served as an instrument and an important part of this monstrous for-
mula. A real, and most importantly, moral alternative to the above positions of
Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin, and Lunacharsky was put forward by Tolstoy who
maintained that the moral ban on violence was absolute, which in his case was
necessarily linked with a ban on dehumanization of the individual and any social,
religious, national, class or other group. 
Leo Tolstoy’s counter-arguments
Thus, Leo Tolstoy did not only initiate a discussion around the “innocent
victim” argument in his novel Anna Karenina, but later noted that the main argu-
ment to justify violence boils down to the “imaginary robber, who injures and
kills innocent people before your eyes” [26, p. 212; 27, p. 127]. Tolstoy was
aware of Solovyov’s wish to justify violence, including the death penalty, and he
knew Dostoyevsky’s above-quoted diary note. Thus, in an 1882 letter to Tolstoy,
the young revolutionary-minded journalist Mikhail Engelgardt, who shared the
views on violence with the conservative and anti-revolutionary Dostoevsky,
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wrote about the diary note of the latter. Tolstoy replied to Engelgardt: “What
Dostoyevsky writes and what I find repugnant I heard from monks and metro-
politans, namely, that making war is allowed, that it is defense—laying down
one’s life for brothers—and I always replied: to shield with one’s body, expos-
ing oneself, yes, but to shoot at people from a rifle is not defending but killing”
[23, p. 114].
The self-sacrifice motive and a commitment to changing the inhumane
scheme will be considered below, in the meantime, it has to be noted that each
time he faced the “innocent victim” argument which was advanced frequently by
various people Tolstoy categorically refused to accept it as refutation of the
absolute nature of the ban on violence. He believed that attempts to contemplate
an exception to this ban were wrong in themselves and entailed irreparable con-
sequences since an exception becomes the rule of action that does not end vio-
lence but maintains and strengthens it.
Tolstoy refuted the “innocent victim” argument in his correspondence, liter-
ary, journalistic and philosophical writings. A detailed philosophical critique of
the “innocent victim” argument is contained in Tolstoy’s letter presumably writ-
ten in January 1888 to the social-revolutionary Mikhail Chernavsky [24], and in
a January 1896 letter to the American writer Ernest Crosby [22]. Pointing to a
possible link between these two events, in that same year (1888) Tolstoy wrote
about his intention to write a story about “a murderer who was horrified of non-
resistance” [13, p. 583], which would be a literary criticism of the “innocent vic-
tim” argument. Since then Tolstoy expressed the same intention in his diary
notes during many years, until in 1904 he finished the story The Forged Coupon,
in which one story line implements this plan. 
In The Forged Coupon, the character by the name of Semyon commits sev-
eral gruesome cold-blooded murders that form a chain of cause-and-effect acts
which starts with a quarrel with his father and the forging of a coupon by an
indebted high-school student who until last remains totally ignorant of the con-
sequences of his lie. Semyon’s last victim, a woman living the life of an ascetic,
by her dying words stirs up his dormant conscience. In prison and then in a hard
labor camp, the brutal murderer drastically changes his life becoming a repen-
tant sinner who does not only renounce violence himself, but by his acts, humil-
ity and conviction changes for the better people from various social strata. At the
end of the story, Semyon brings about a reconciliation between a high-school
student and his father [15].
The message Tolstoy wanted to bring home to his reader was that a lie told
by a child can set in motion a circle of violence. That he who has committed an
evil deed may have previously been a victim. That a “brigand” can be formed by
the violence and callousness of the people around him. That one cannot under-
stand an evil deed outside a broader perspective and he who has committed an
evil deed may become a virtuous person, but not as a result of violence towards
him, but through an attempt to persuade and instill “horror of non-resistance.” 
Tolstoy builds his philosophical criticism of the “innocent victim” argument
encountered in many letters, notes and articles around a group of interconnected
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counter-arguments; among them I distinguish four main counter-arguments
which I tentatively call empirical, structural, consequential, and anti-epistemo-
logical. 
What I call an empirical counter-argument consists in recognizing that
encountering the “innocent victim” situation in real life is highly unlikely. In a
letter to Chernavsky, Tolstoy writes: “Justifications of this kind always assume
the imaginary robber who has nothing human about him, who kills and tortures
innocents, and this imaginary beast who seems to be constantly in the process of
killing innocents provides grounds for the reasoning of all abusers about the need
for violence; yet such a robber is the most exceptional, rare and even impossible
case. Many people can live hundreds of years, as I have lived 60, never encoun-
tering a fictional robber in the act of committing his crime” [24, pp. 143-144]. In
a letter to Crosby, Tolstoy writes: “No one has yet seen the imaginary robber with
the imaginary child” [22, p. 21].
Thus Tolstoy stresses that encountering such an imaginary concatenation of
events is not only problematical, but criticizes the possibility of encountering in
real life an imaginary “robber” who possesses, in the imposed fictional situation,
incompatible characteristics. Thus, “the robber,” who has some human features,
is reduced by the “innocent victim” argument to having nothing human and exist-
ing solely by abusing innocent people. 
In the Introduction to the Biography of a Garrison, Tolstoy elaborates this
idea: “Having lived seventy-five years, I have never, except in discussions,
encountered that fantastic brigand, who, before my eyes desired to kill or violate
a child, but that perpetually I did and do see not one but millions of brigands
using violence towards children and women and men and old people and all the
labourers in the name of the recognized right of violence over one’s fellow” [14,
p. 98; 17]. Thereby Tolstoy asserts not equality, but the fundamental difference
between real brigands and the imaginary “brigand” and refers to numerous facts
of the use of violence that are vastly different from the scheme of the “innocent
victim” argument.
Tolstoy stresses that behind real violence stands not the “brigand” of the
argument but those who in this argument put themselves in the position of “the
third participant” who defends the “innocent victim,” however, this leads them
not so much to protection as to violence, including violence toward innocent peo-
ple. Tolstoy sees the way out of the situation of self-perpetuating violence in total
rejection of violence which can never be justified regardless of what brigand and
in defense of what “innocence” uses it. Tolstoy writes: “One should endeavor to
replace violence by persuasion. That this may become possible it is necessary
first of all to renounce the right of coercion” [14, p. 98; 17]. 
Tolstoy also notes that the “innocent victim” argument does not reflect or
generalize reality, but distorts and deforms it by imposing a certain scheme con-
structed not from understanding reality but from personal immersion in violence
and inability or reluctance to imagine a world without violence. In his work
Neizbezhniy perevorot (Inevitable Upheaval), Tolstoy, addressing the Russian
elite of the time, notes that many of its members who put forward this argument
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show no signs of disapproving the violence perpetrated by Russia’s state appa-
ratus while being extremely concerned about the attitude to an imaginary child.
This attitude, Tolstoy writes, shows that in reality “these people who seek to jus-
tify violence, are concerned not about an imaginary child, but about their own
fate, their whole life which is based on violence” [16, p. 92]. 
What can be described as a structural counter-argument is contained in
the same letter to Chernavsky and is repeated in Tolstoy’s other works forming
the main thrust of the criticism of violence. Tolstoy asserts, on the one hand,
unconditional acceptance of responsibility for everything, including evil done by
“villains,” and on the other hand, maintains that it is impossible in principle to
conquer violence by violence. He writes: “When discussing real life and not fic-
tion, we see something quite different: we see people and even ourselves per-
forming the cruelest of deeds, first, not alone, like the imaginary robber, but
always in association with other people, and not because we are beasts who have
nothing human about them, but because we are steeped in delusions and temp-
tations” [24, p. 144]. Tolstoy’s message is that in real life there can never be an
impartial observer (third participant in the “innocent victim” argument) separate
from the others. Every person is from the start involved in the world of violence
and is linked with those who perpetrate violence, and is often involved in it,
therefore a moral deed consists in accepting responsibility not only for saving
“the victim” but for preserving the life of “the villain.” Thereby Tolstoy points
to yet another structural flaw of the “innocent victim” argument, viz. restricting
the space of the event to three figures (villain, innocent victim, observer), stress-
ing the need to bring in a broader perspective which would do away with the
schematic fiction and put into question the right to use any kind of violence. 
Tolstoy demonstrates the feebleness and falsehood of the “innocent victim”
argument in a letter to Engelgardt in an attempt to make the young revolutionary
change his thinking about violence. In the letter, Tolstoy slightly modifies the
imaginary situation of the argument presenting a mother who “whips her child
to death.” Thus the mother of the “innocent victim” becomes the “villain” and
Tolstoy asks: “Does it make sense to use violence with regard to the mother who
whips her child? If a mother whips her child, then what is it that gives me pain
and that I consider to be evil? The fact that the child feels pain or the fact that
the mother, instead of the joy of love experiences the torment of anger?” Tolstoy
offers a non-violent answer to both questions. “I think there is evil in both. One
person cannot do evil. Evil is disunion of people. So if I want to act it is only for
the purpose of putting an end to disunity and restoring communication between
mother and child” [23, p. 114]. Thus Tolstoy offers a perspective totally strange
to the consciousness that is used to violence, a perspective in which the very use
of the “innocent victim” argument, which imposes an inhuman choice, is not a
solution, but a serious problem, which can only be solved through an absolute
renunciation of violence expressed in his call “you shall not kill anyone” and
through love. Tolstoy demonstrates that the “villain,” depersonalized in the argu-
ment in order to transpose a fictional scheme to real life and to arbitrarily appoint
a “villain,” becomes a person with his/her own problems and probably misfor-
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tunes; a person who may happen to be a mother, a relative of the victim or, elab-
orating Tolstoy’s idea, a relative of the person who is rashly asked to answer an
amoral question. And what if one puts in the place of the imaginary and imper-
sonal “villain” the father of the one who is faced with the question of killing a
“villain?” Or the father of someone who tries to smuggle in this argument?
Would the critic of non-violence just as readily accept even an imaginary murder
of his father as an answer? Would he be able to bring himself to say that it is
moral to kill one’s father, even in an imaginary situation and in order to save an
innocent victim? Would not such a person become convinced that the argument
is inhuman and hopelessly immoral?
In what can be tentatively described as a consequentialist argument, Tolstoy
looks at the gruesome consequences of adopting and following the imaginary
“innocent victim” situation. In a letter to one of his émigré followers, Tolstoy
writes: “One cannot tolerate the slightest compromise in an idea. A compromise
inevitably occurs in practice, all the more reason not to tolerate compromises in
theory. If I want to draw a line close to the mathematical straight line I should not
allow for a second that a straight line can be anything but the shortest distance
between two points” [25]. Elsewhere Tolstoy notes that if a person, who is orient-
ed towards non-resistance to evil by violence, suddenly encounters a situation
which reminds to this person that of the “robber-villain,” the chances are that he
would treat “the robber in a different way than he who has all his life been seething
with anger against a robber without ever seeing one” [24, p. 144]. Thereby Tolstoy
points to the dangerous consequences of asserting even a hypothetical right to vio-
lence because it brings evil into life by the mere fact of preparing for a possible use
of violence, introduces a predisposition for violence and impedes the establishment
of a non-violent attitude to the people around one. In a real situation, which would
remind a person who has accepted the argument of the imaginary situation, he
would more readily agree to use violence and would be less able to resolve the con-
flict without using violence than someone who has not, from the outset, contem-
plated using violence. In other words, those who accept and pursue the “innocent
victim” argument usually seek to form a certain attitude, character and worldview
which include, presuppose and allow for the use of violence. 
Furthermore, those who uphold the “innocent victim” argument sometimes
say that violence towards the robber who is predisposed to violence is merely a
reaction to his inhuman intention and a forced prevention of a hideous evil deed,
but Tolstoy argues that in reality the person who has accepted the argument is
proactively predisposed to violence and seeks to place within the argument
involving violent life situations that are inevitably unique, unclear and different
from the scheme. In other words, the “innocent victim” argument, if accepted,
may start serving as a scheme from which violence is actively introduced into the
world and in accordance with which the surrounding world is organized and
built. The above-cited arguments of Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin, and
Lunacharsky who pursue it not so much to justify violence perpetrated in the past
as to promote violent and military actions in the future are vivid examples of this
monstrous unfolding of the argument.
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What I call Tolstoy’s anti-epistemological counter-argument is his con-
tention that it is impossible to subordinate morality to cognition and to derive a
moral act from cognitive schemes. It would be wrong, however, to say that Tol-
stoy had opted to renounce value judgments and passively accept injustice. The
second half of Tolstoy’s life demonstrates that he exposed and struggled against
everything he perceived to be evil. However, he considered violence to be the
key manifestation of evil and he saw the gravest mistake in using violence to
fight violence, including attempts to justify violence. Tolstoy repeatedly assert-
ed that there is no transition from the cognitive schemes that distinguish and
introduce criteria of good and evil to the justification of violence which is the
main manifestation of evil. For a moral person, morality does not depend on cog-
nitive schemes that seek to separate justified from unjustified violence, but vice
versa, cognitive schemes depend on morality whose essence is renunciation of
any violence.
Another aspect of the anti-epistemological argument is that cognition and
the ability to predict another’s actions are relative. Tolstoy points out that in real-
ity one person can never know for sure what a real and not imaginary situation
will end up with. He writes: “Apologies for violence used against one’s neigh-
bor in defense of another neighbor from greater violence are always untrustwor-
thy, because when force is used against one who has not yet carried out his evil
intent, I can never know which would be greater—the evil of my act of violence
or of the act I want to prevent.” Tolstoy reflects on the example with the ruffian:
“I see that a man I know to be a ruffian is pursuing a young girl, I have a gun in
my hand—I kill the ruffian and save the girl. But the death or the wounding of
the ruffian has positively taken place, while what would have happened if this
had not been I cannot know” [18, p. 29; 19, p. 15]. 
In the letter to Crosby, Tolstoy again puts into question the limited and false
perspective set by the “innocent victim” argument. Tolstoy elaborates his
thought spreading the uncertainty situation from the active or passive partici-
pants in the situation to include the incalculable consequences if the violent
scheme is used in real life. He writes: “If a non-Christian does not recognize
God, and does not consider the meaning of life to consist in the fulfilment of
God’s will, it is only calculation, that is, the consideration as to what is more
profitable for him and for all men, the continuation of the robber’s life or that of
the child, which guides the choice of his acts. But to decide this, he must know
what will become of the child which he saves, and what would become of the
robber if he did not kill him. But that he cannot know. And so, if he is a non-
Christian, he has not rational foundation for saving the child through the death
of the robber” [22, p. 19]. In this way, Tolstoy opens a truly moral perspective
fundamentally different from that which deifies cognition, asserting that moral
responsibility is unlimited and the ban on violence is absolute while admitting
the limitations and imperfections of cognition. 
Elsewhere Tolstoy shifts the emphasis still more to stress that one can only
be sure of one’s own, and not another man’s act, which is why it is so important
not to allow the evil of violence in the name of some good ends: “A rogue has
SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. 51, No. 2, 2020106
raised his knife over his victim. I have a pistol in my hand and kill him. But I do
not know, and cannot possibly know, whether the purpose of the raised knife
would have been implemented. The rogue may not have carried out his evil
intention, whereas I certainly commit my evil deed. Therefore, the only thing that
a person can and must do in this and similar instances is what he must always do
in all possible circumstances: he must do what he believes he ought to do before
God and before his own conscience. A man’s conscience may demand that he
sacrifice his own life but not that of another person” [20, pp. 206-207; 21]. 
Solovyov, for example, considers the above argument unconvincing because
the imaginary situation does not envisage such a development since it posits only
two possible scenarios: either the observer (the third participant) kills the villain
or the villain kills the innocent victim. But the point is that Tolstoy seeks to bring
the imaginary situation closer to the real one, on the one hand, and on the other
hand to the moral situation where a truly moral choice is possible. Instead of the
“observer,” Tolstoy introduces a moral subject who is unable to and must not try
to make judgments for the other, to act for him or try to impose his will on him.
The above extract is directly connected with Tolstoy’s appeal that follows:
“Understand that the assumption that a man may organize the lives of others is a
crude superstition that people have only accepted because of its antiquity” [20,
p. 210; 21]. It is important to note that Tolstoy speaks about “organizing” the
lives of others at one’s discretion, which always involves coercion. And of course
he does not deny, but on the contrary, urges people to help and do good to others
and to try by words and non-violent actions to prevent what is perceived as evil.
Here morality sets limits to cognition and will, which must not be based on and
use violence. All this leads Tolstoy to change the conditions of the imaginary sit-
uation and propose his version of the deed which transcends the “active” (killing
the villain) versus “passive” (allowing evil to be done) dichotomy imposed by
the “innocent victim” argument. 
Tolstoy’s version is self-sacrifice, that is, taking the place of the victim. He
writes in the much-quoted passage of the Life Path collection: “If I see that a per-
son intends to kill someone, the best thing I can do is try to help the victim by:
putting myself in his place, or by trying to save him by getting him to safety, or
by hiding him, or by trying to ward off the blow—much the same way that I
would risk my life trying to save a person from fire or drowning” [26, pp. 222-
223; 27, p. 133]. Moreover, Tolstoy’s above-quoted letter to Chernavsky has a
sentence that looks at the imaginary situation from a different angle. He writes:
“Speaking about love, no examples of villains can justify the murder of another
person, and would lead only to the simplest and inevitable conclusion that fol-
lows from love,—that a person would shield another with his body, give her own
life rather than taking the life of another person” [24, p. 142]. Tolstoy rises to a
fundamental philosophical-ethical level reinterpreting and thus changing the
imaginary situation. In this extract, the word “the other” used in the singular
refers equally to the villain and to the victim. The new situation no longer has
clearly assigned roles with predetermined behaviors, it is open-ended and has a
real tragic collision in which the moral task is to try to save the Other without
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resorting to the killing of the Other. Tolstoy (wittingly or unwittingly) moves
from the cognitive level where the “villain” and the “innocent victim” and what
will be and even what ought to be are clearly indicated, to the fundamental moral
level of I and the Other. At this level it is unknown whether the Other is initial-
ly bad or good, there is no “third participant” (“the judge and savior”) and the I
is defined via responsibility for the Other who is not cognitively categorized.
Conclusion
The “innocent victim” argument derives moral significance from the
premise that violence is evil since it is violence in its hideous form that threat-
ens the “victim,” but the answer imposed by the argument (agreeing to a mur-
der) refutes the premise. Accepting the argument leads not to the criticism of vio-
lence, but on the contrary, includes it in individual, social and political practices
by gradating violence on a scale of inevitably different people into “acceptable”
and “unacceptable” forms. This gradation stems from the desire to categorize
people into “good” (“innocent victims”), with regard to whom violence is con-
demned, and “bad” (“villains”) with regard to whom violence is not only
allowed but is required in certain situations. He who accepts the argument deems
himself to be the “judge-savior” who decides who is “good” and who is “bad”
and claims the right to use violence toward the latter. As Abdusalam Guseynov
writes, in this case “the argument for violence boils down to presenting oneself
as the bulwark of good and the opposite side as absolute evil incarnate” [5, p.
516]. Another prerequisite of the argument is asserting the need to combat vio-
lence epitomized by the imaginary “villain,” but in terms of its conclusion and
intent the argument is actually aimed at combating non-violence which a true
adherent of the absolute ban on violence upholds. In other words, the conclusion
the argument propounds destroys the prerequisites from which it acquires moral
significance. This is immoralism, which neither upholds nor ignores morality,
but deliberately destroys it. 
The “innocent victim” argument distorts time, protagonists and the relations
among them, which are not derived from reality, but are introduced according to
predetermined, limited and fixed roles of “villain” and “victim” whose behavior
is predetermined. Thereby characteristics of the past or extra-temporal schema-
tized reality are imposed on the future, which is never pre-determined and can-
not be predicted with absolute accuracy. As a result, the argument does not con-
tain a real moral choice made under conditions of uncertainty since it precedes
and not follows the assignment of roles. The argument is so constructed as to
leave no room for observing the “thou shalt not kill” commandment because
either the “third participant” intervenes and kills “the villain” or the “villain”
kills the “innocent victim.” The figures are like constants in a soulless and mer-
ciless equation. The argument is called upon not to lead man out of the circle of
violence, but to bring him into it, not to humanize the relations among people,
but to dehumanize “the villain,” not to liberate but to put man into shackles of
necessity. If the “innocent victim” argument proves anything it is the fact that
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one can construct an argument in which moral choice is impossible, but coercion
to such a choice, even in an imaginary situation (coercion is implied in the very
question of the “innocent victim” argument) is morally admissible, which is fur-
ther proof of the argument’s immoralism. 
Tolstoy countered any principle that allows coercion, which is a kind of vio-
lence, with the principle of non-resistance to evil by violence, the principle that
has one fundamental difference: it negates violence not only as a means toward
achieving any ideal, but also as a means of self-assertion. He writes: “The princi-
ple of non-resistance is not a principle of coercion but of concord and love, and
therefore it cannot be made coercively binding upon men. The principle of non-
resistance to evil by violence, which consists in the substitution of persuasion for
brute force, can be only accepted voluntarily” [14, p. 98; 17]. In other words, he
is referring to the key difference which applies also to the participants in the dis-
cussion on violence and non-violence. Thus, he who allows “justified” violence
allows it, under certain conditions, to be used toward his interlocutor while he
who upholds an absolute ban on violence recognizes that he cannot force his inter-
locutor to even follow the principle of non-violence thus recognizing that under
no conditions can he treat a person as not being a human being. The aim of the
champion of an absolute ban on violence is to create a situation when coercion is
impossible, thus creating a growth point for the social spread of the idea of non-
violence and for ending violence. This perspective has tremendous importance for
philosophical thought and social practice, which, in spite of its long history, is
only beginning to be widely recognized and applied (see, for example, [4]).
He who is presented with an imaginary villain-and-innocent-victim situation
is invited to identify himself with the third participant (“observer” or “judge-sav-
ior”). If somebody is offered the predetermined role of “the third participant”
such a person may control the argument, but control is exercised not through
consent to amoral identification and an illusory choice of one or other manner of
killing, but through immediate renunciation of any murder, a refusal to shed
one’s uniqueness and unlimited responsibility for the life of any Other and a
refusal to assume the predetermined role of “the third participant” and accept the
immoral argument. The true choice is not about a choice between two proposed
ways of killing, but about the possibility of not accepting the argument aimed at
stripping a person of his/her subjectivity, unlimited responsibility and a non-vio-
lence position. 
Organizing life without violence calls for an abrupt rejection of the “inno-
cent victim” argument examined above, for an absolute ban on violence and
recognition of non-violence as the essence of any moral act and an abiding ele-
ment of a moral decision.
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The Logic of Ivan Goncharov’s Creative Work:
Stating the Problem
Vladimir Melnik
Abstract. This article deals with the logic of the evolution of Gon-
charov’s creative work and the main idea he had worked out by the late
1830s and early 1840s and subsequently developed in his trilogy of novels
(A Common Story, Oblomov and The Precipice). It has to do with the prob-
lem of the preservation of the modern man’s religious consciousness in the
context of a dramatic turn in history and mankind’s parting with “infantile
faith” and myth-and-poetic consciousness against the background of rapid
development of science. The sources and reasons are considered of Gon-
charov’s profound interest in the development of science and technology,
especially astronomical discoveries. Goncharov determined the object of his
artistic inquiry while still a student, when he studied Dante’s Divine Come-
dy. The logic of the evolution of the trilogy of novels shows that all three
novels were conceived at one and the same time as parts of a single whole.
The novelist’s historical optimism springs from his notion that scientific and
technological progress, far from being at odds with God’s Providence for
humanity, on the contrary, contributes to its realization. This proposition is
based on the idea of “beauty” as a self-sufficient power with which God had
imbued human nature.
Keywords: Ivan Goncharov, science, religion, crisis, trilogy, Dante,
logic of creative work.
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In my opinion, to reveal the logic of a writer’s creative work, one has to
define and analyze the development of the main idea that guided him throughout
his life. For all the diversity of the themes, motifs, images and poetic devices in
various works of a major writer, across a multitude of specific tasks, his/her work
always has a “core” idea which forms the unique content of his/her world. The
uniqueness of the writer’s perception of life and human nature is manifested in
the choice and handling of this main idea. While the study of specific aspects of
artistic work gives insights into the main focus of the writer’s work, sooner or
later it is necessary to generalize in order to see the author’s work as a whole and
reveal the logic of his/her evolution. The generalization is never final, reflecting
as it does the current state of studies of a given writer. 
The relevance of the question of creative evolution varies for different writ-
ers. In the case of Ivan Goncharov, in spite of the rapid development of Gon-
charov studies in the past three decades and thorough treatment of particular
problems, with a focus, among other things, on cultural studies, the essential
philological problems of his legacy remain unsolved and present a research chal-
lenge. These problems include, above all, the periodization of his work, explain-
ing why the thirty-year-old author conceived of the three novels (A Common
Story, Oblomov and The Precipice) simultaneously in the 1840s, determining the
artistic nature of his trilogy as a single whole and identifying the philosophical
and other sources of his work. The question of the logic of the novelist’s creative
evolution has never been raised before, and yet it is only at first glance that his
was a path typical of a 19th-century Russian realist, starting with translations and
early verses and ending with “senile” essays generally thought to be weak 
[47, pp. 299-300].
It has to be said for fairness sake that of late, attempts have been made to
capture the underlying links between the writer’s novels and explain the phe-
nomenon of the somewhat unusual trilogy of novels1 (cf. [44; 32, pp. 31-34; 30, 
pp. 280-284; 6; 4; 5]). Quite a few works have been devoted to the search for
recurring motifs and characteristics of the protagonists in Goncharov’s trilogy
[50; 27; 7; 8]. However, they fail to identify the main idea that guided the young
Goncharov. And yet he had determined the main direction of his evolution for
many years ahead and conceived simultaneously not of one, but three novels, the
last of which was only published in 1869.
This article will consider not so much Goncharov’s attempts to describe his
ideal (cf. [34, pp. 45-108; 31]), as the idea that stands behind it (although the bor-
derline between the two concepts is tenuous).
Goncharov was one of the few Russian writers who gravitated toward con-
ceptual thinking and completeness of the artistic picture of the world. The epic
sweep of his thought, his predilection for the genre of the big novel—all this
stemmed from his need to formulate the idea that adequately expressed the dom-
inant spiritual and moral features of his epoch. The author of Oblomov is known
for his sweeping generalizations. Valentin Nedzvetsky has rightly noted that “a
fundamental feature of Goncharov’s realist typification is the ever-growing wish
not only to take a broad and summary view of diverse and transient social details,
but to trace them to ‘basic’ and ‘root,’ ‘tribal’ foundations of life as a whole—in
Russia and world” [37, p. 66]. However, this feature tells us nothing about the
idea that guided Goncharov in his work. And yet the breadth of artistic typifica-
tion stemmed from the scope of Goncharov’s philosophical thought as he tried
to give a systemic answer to what he thought to be the pivotal question of the
time, i.e., how to preserve the religious foundation of life in the face of a dra-
matic change of history and humanity’s emergence from “infancy.” 
Traditionally, the religious idea has been associated exclusively with The
Precipice (1869), which, of course, has been categorized as an “anti-nihilistic
novel.” But in Goncharov’s work, the anti-nihilistic idea manifests itself not
through opposition to nihilism (this is largely beside the point) but through oppo-
sition to the progressive cooling and indifference toward religion under new his-
torical conditions when the 19th-century man’s consciousness changes: while
not rejecting religion, he loses the seriousness, depth and immediacy of the reli-
gious experience. Goncharov wrote about the cooling of society’s attitude to reli-
gion in An Uncommon Story: 
Man, life and science—all are in a position of discord, struggle against each
other: work, i.e., struggle, is going on with a vengeance, and no one knows the out-
come of this struggle. The phenomenon is here, we live at the center of this whirl-
wind, at the moment of a fierce clash, and we can neither see nor predict its end!
But a prolonged wait turns into fatigue, into indifference. This is the enemy to
be fought: indifference. But there is no possibility, and no means by which to fight.
There is neither a moral nor a material weapon against it! It does not argue, or resist
or object, it keeps silent and merely sinks lower and lower below zero, like mercury
in a thermometer. The thousand-year-old papacy fell because of indifference before
our eyes! [25, p. 272].
It is commonly thought that Goncharov first depicted the clash between the
traditional religious worldview and the positivist philosophy of the late 1860s in
the novel The Precipice [31, pp. 76-114]. However, he noticed the influence of
the burgeoning natural sciences on the change of traditional religious and moral
values much earlier, back in the 1830s.
He wrote in his article (1876) “The Intent, Tasks and Ideas of the Novel The
Precipice”: “In our time… human society is emerging from childhood and is
noticeably becoming more mature… science, crafts and industry are making
serious strides” [13, pp. 210-211]. In wobbly minds, it triggered an epidemic of
the loss of “infantile faith”—not only in miracles, in the supernatural in general,
but also in the ideal. This process was reflected already in his first novel, A Com-
mon Story (1847), which portrayed for the first time a proponent of the positivist
philosophy in the character of Pyotr Ivanovich Aduyev. He is not a nihilist, but
he epitomizes the stifling “indifference” toward ideals and religion in life.
Goncharov imbues with broader meaning the clash of two philosophies of
life, as represented by the Aduyev uncle and nephew, a clash that is already evi-
dent in The Frigate Pallada and The Precipice. The artist turns his gaze to more
than just a specific conflict of the time, an attitude noted by Vissarion Belinvsky
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in a letter to Vasily Botkin (March 17, 1847): “I am sure you will like this story
very much. And how it will benefit society! What a crushing blow it will deal to
romanticism, dreaminess, sentimentality, and provincialism!” [3, p. 352]. He was
referring to a global conflict, a thousand-year-old cleavage occurring before the
eyes of Goncharov’s 19th century contemporaries. The novelist was able to feel
the tragedy of his time, with consequences beyond conjecture. In his mind,
human history was divided into two unequal parts: from the patriarchal “golden
age” to the modern times in which something new was being born: something
based on a rational perception of life and a scientific worldview. 
Goncharov was acutely aware of this historic cleavage at a time when Russ-
ian society was still unaware of the scale of what was taking place. Contempo-
rary literature was focused on the pressing issues of the day (serfdom, emanci-
pation of women, press freedom, etc.). Goncharov did not ignore the sharp con-
flicts of his time, but he presented them in his works in a calmer and more objec-
tive tone (some spoke about his “indifference”) because he saw and portrayed
them from an angle which was not noticed by others but was very important to
him in the light of the millennial change of history. This tone was dictated by his
perception of the historical dimension of events, as expressed, for example, in the
following passage from Oblomov: “Though at the house of the widow Pshen-
itzyn, in Vyborg, days and nights passed peacefully without any sudden violent
changes in its monotonous existence, and though the four seasons followed each
other as regularly as ever, life did not stand still, but was constantly undergoing
a change; but the change was slow and gradual as are the geological changes of
our planet: in one place a mountain slowly crumbled away, in another the sea was
washing up silt or receding from the shores and forming new land” [17, p. 374;
21, p. 368].
According to Goncharov, “sentiments” were banished from personal and
social consciousness because, owing to the rapid development of science and
society, “the childishness of faith” had been lost. This idea was best expressed in
the unsent letter to the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov after reading his book
Lectures in Divine Humanity. The aging Goncharov wrote: “Yes, human society
cannot live by the results obtained by Positivism… you say (and all of us too)…
that one must turn to religion... one must turn to a different authority from which
arrogant brains have fled, the universal authority. But how? The sense of infan-
tile faith cannot be given back to a grown-up society: the foundations of some
Biblical tales and mythological fables of the Greek and other mythologies (not to
speak of the latest science) have undermined faith in miracles and the developed
human society has cast aside everything called metaphysical, mystical and super-
natural” [20, pp. 348-349].
To prove that Goncharov’s main idea was the same from the 1840s until the
end of his creative path, let us quote a seldom noticed passage from A Common
Story. Characteristically, Goncharov uses the same vocabulary as in his letter to
Vladimir Solovyov, probably written in 1881-1882. Let us recall that Alexander
Aduyev, disappointed in Petersburg, returns to his family estate of Grachi, walks
into a church and muses:
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‘So long as the vital forces of man are at their height,’ thought Alexander, ‘so
long as his desires and passions have free play, he lives the life of the senses, fleeing
the soothing, profound and solemn contemplation to which religion leads us. He
turns to it for consolation with exhausted, fading powers, vanished hopes and the
burden of years.’
Gradually the sight of so many familiar objects aroused reminiscences in
Alexander’s soul. He passed in review his childhood and youth up to his departure
for Petersburg, remembered how, as a child, he had repeated the prayers after his
mother, how she had told him of the guardian angel who watches over the human
soul, ever warring against the Evil One, how, pointing to the stars, she had told him
that they were the eyes of God’s angels who looked down at the earth and counted
the good and bad deeds of human beings, and that the dwellers in heaven weep when
the account shows more evil than good deeds and rejoice when the good exceeds the
evil. Pointing to the blue distance of the horizon she used to tell him it was Zion...
Alexander emerged from these reminiscences with a sigh.
‘If only I could still believe all that!’ he thought. ‘The infantile faith has been
lost [my italics—V. M.). What new, true things have I learned? None. I have found
doubts, interpretations, theories... and am still further than before from the truth.
What’s the good of this dissension, this philosophizing! My God! When the warmth
of faith no longer warms the heart, how can one be happy?’ [15, pp. 443-444; 24, 
pp. 388-389].
Aduyev’s meditations are autobiographical: Goncharov perceived the loss of
“infantile faith” as a personal as well as a social drama. His sentiments erupted
most strikingly in his letter to Anatoly Koni of June 30, 1886: “I look with ten-
derness at the old men and women broken in spirit and crushed by life who nes-
tle against the wall in a church or in their tiny rooms under an icon lamp, bear-
ing their cross quietly and without a murmur—they see life and high above life,
only the cross and the Gospel, it alone they believe in and hope for. Why are we
not like this? ‘They are foolish. They are blessed,’ say wise men and thinkers.
No, they are the people to whom is open what is hidden from the wise and rea-
sonable. Theirs is the kingdom of heaven and they will be called God’s chil-
dren!” [25, p. 499]. Let us note that throughout his life, Goncharov, as a Christ-
ian, never lost his ultimate link with “infantile faith” although he studiously hid
it from other people, preferring to talk about other aspects of modern religious
consciousness. The last time he portrayed a bearer of “infantile faith” was in the
character of sexton Yegor in the story Fish Soup (Ukha), written several weeks
before his death [33].
The writer touches on the same problem in The Frigate Pallada (1855-
1858), where the question of the end of a thousand-year history of the dominance
of “myth” and “faith,” on the one hand, and the beginning of a new (scientific-
industrial) era of human history are seen from a cultural-civilizational perspec-
tive. Goncharov tentatively divides human history into two periods: “myth-poet-
ic” (“childhood”) and “cultural-civilization” or “creative” (“emergence from
childhood”). 
This historiosophy is mentioned in the first chapter of Pallada in which the
writer explains the motive of his sudden decision to go on a voyage around the
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world: “Everything seemed mysterious and fantastic in the enchanted distance:
fortunate people went and returned telling enticing tales, but deaf to the wonders
of the world, giving childish explanations for the secrets of the earth [my ital-
ics—V. M.]. But then came a man, a wise one and a poet, and he threw light into
the secret recesses. He went with a directional compass, a spade, a drawing com-
pass, a measuring line [with a heart full of faith in the Creator and love for His
cosmos]. He brought life, reason, and experience into the stony desert, the dark-
ness of the forest, and with a clear head showed the way to thousands who came
after him. ‘The Cosmos!’ More urgently than before I yearned to look with my
living eyes to the living cosmos. ‘Trustingly,’ I thought, ‘I would hold the hand
of such a wise man, like a child to a grown-up, I would listen to him attentively,
and if I understood him to the extent that a child understands a grown-up, I would
be rich even with such scant explanation’” [16, p. 10; 19, pp. 5-6].
In his book, Goncharov observes simultaneously all the historical epochs
from the ancient “golden age” (idyllic life on Lycian Islands, “sleepy” Japan,
etc.) to the modern developed state (England, Americans in various parts of the
world), which leads him again and again back to his pet idea of a turn in millen-
nial history occurring before the eyes of his contemporaries. However, owing to
the special genre of The Frigate Pallada, which makes it necessary to describe
the journey, the problem of the crisis of religious consciousness is not treated as
explicitly as in A Common Story or in The Precipice. But instead, it gives the fin-
ishing touches to the historiosophic argument in favor of Goncharov’s optimistic
view of the new stage in human history. The novelist’s historical optimism
springs from his conviction that scientific and technological progress, far from
contradicting God’s Providence for humanity, contributes to its realization. He
elaborates the philosophy of history in the spirit of the Russian Silver Age
philosophers who see man as a co-worker of the Creator Who commanded man
to “plant the earth” and “turn the desert into a garden.” 
The book’s optimistic tone is due to the fact that, unlike in his novels, here
Goncharov speaks not about man, but about mankind. The problem of the loss of
“infantile faith,” “ideals” and “sentiments,” of the primary, “maternal” basis of
existence (which comes back with a vengeance in Oblomov) is touched upon
indirectly in The Frigate although it is not stricken off the agenda (the portrayal
of “civilizational excesses in London). On the other hand, the important idea that
tops the architecture of Goncharov’s reflections on “man and God” gains con-
creteness. It is the idea of “God’s Providence” for man and for mankind, of the
ultimate goals of historical activity within man’s intellectual reach, the idea that
mankind is called upon to perform an important mission: “to plant Beauty” in
God’s Garden and fulfill himself as a co-worker and co-Creator of God or, to use
Goncharov’s words, “to return the fruits grown from the seeds that once were
given to him.”
In his travelogue, Goncharov shows the awakening of humanity to ennobling
activity, to the enhancement of the Earth and of the human soul. Speaking about
the opening up of Siberia by the Russian people Goncharov elaborates this idea,
attaining the level of religious philosophy: “And when such a region is ready, set-
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tled, and of cultural standing—a region formerly obscure, unknown, but now
standing before the astonished world, asking to have a name and rights, then one
searches for the pioneers who erected this edifice... They are the same people who,
in one corner of the Earth, raised their voice against Negro slave trade and in
another taught the aborigines of the Aleutian and Kuril Islands to live and to pray
to God, who imagined and created Siberia, settled and educated it, and now want
to return to the Creator the fruits grown from the seeds that once were given them”
[16, pp. 677-678; 19, p. 597]. That is why the theme of missionaries civilizing the
world looms large in the book. A broad picture is unfolded before us of the chang-
ing world, of ever-spreading Christianity and its external, European (Christian)
civilization because, according to Goncharov, “there is no civilization other than
the Christian one, all the other religions give mankind nothing but gloom, dark-
ness, ignorance and confusion” [13, p. 71]. During his journey, Goncharov sensed
more acutely than ever the unity of Christianity and civilization, of culture. 
In depicting states and peoples at various stages of civilizational develop-
ment, Goncharov is confident that mankind as a whole will inevitably “awaken
from its slumber” and “grow up” to leave behind the era of “mythology.” He is
interested not only in geography, but also in the philosophy of the Cosmos as
understood by Alexander von Humboldt (by that time, Goncharov had certainly
read the first two or three volumes of Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen
Weltbeschreibung—the first volume was published in 1845).2  Perhaps Hum-
boldt, who commanded unassailable authority in world science, was “the sage
and poet” whom Goncharov would have liked to take by the hand and follow in
cognizing the world. But the Cosmos reveals not so much Goncharov’s undoubt-
ed love of astronomy as his philosophy of life which for him is based on religion
and a heart “full of faith in the Creator and love for His universe.” Let us recall
that “when Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle speak of the heaven as a κόσμος, they
do not have in mind the immediate spectacle of the night sky, but an all-embrac-
ing order of things, of which the celestial motions offer only the most conspicu-
ous and most noble manifestation” [26, pp. 223-224]. Setting forth contempo-
rary ideas of “the Cosmos” is one of the most important spiritual and philosoph-
ical objectives of the author of The Frigate Pallada, which draws on the whole
diversity of the author’s observations. The word “cosmos” here is put in an earth-
ly context: the traveler wants, following Humboldt, to fathom the unity, univer-
sal interconnection of the elements of his native planet’s “cosmos,” to see it as a
whole and become conscious of the unity of the historical processes taking place.
This was accomplished in The Frigate Pallada, all of whose parts are joined by
the image of the author and by the constantly promoted historiosophic idea of
which the starting point is “faith in the Creator and love of His universe.” 
Goncharov in many of his works juxtaposes two global epochs in mankind’s
development and refers to this juxtaposition in his letters and articles, his reflec-
tions evoking sometimes hyper-optimistic and sometimes dramatic tones. The
spread of the themes and problems the writer touches upon is extremely wide,
covering philosophy, history, esthetics, morality, science, religion, psychology,
society, etc. He even considers genre systems in literature from this perspective.
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Thus, in his article “The Intent, Tasks and Ideas of the Novel The Precipice,” he
wrote: “European literatures have emerged from childhood—such that now no
one would be impressed not only by some idyll, sonnet, hymn, picture or lyrical
outpouring of feelings in verse, but even a fable would not be enough to teach
the reader a lesson. All this retreats into the novel which accommodates large
episodes of life, sometimes a whole life and in which, like in a large painting,
every reader will find something close and familiar to him. That is why the novel
has become almost the only form of belles lettres into which fit not only the
works of Walter Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, Pushkin, and Gogol, but also non-
fiction writers choose this form, accessible to the broad public, in order to reach
out to the majority of readers with various topical issues or their favorite tasks—
political, social and economic” ([13, p. 211]; my italics).
The study of the main object of Goncharov’s artistic investigation shows that
he kept tabs more than other contemporary writers on the development of science
and technology and profoundly analyzed its influence on the minds and morality
of the contemporary man paying particular attention to the changes in religious
consciousness. The writer’s serious interest in science and technology owes some-
thing to his godfather Nikolay Nikolayevich Tregubov, who acted as a father for
the orphaned Goncharovs. Evgeny Lyatsky noted in his time that “although
Tregubov said he was a Freemason, his nature was hardly inclined toward mysti-
cism. On the contrary, from what we know about him he was a man of a highly
positive frame of mind who preferred the exact sciences, definite and demonstra-
tive knowledge.” Lyatsky writes that Tregubov was a “good mathematician” and
liked maths-based “applied sciences: physics, astronomy and cosmography” [29,
pp. 15, 16]. In his essay At Home, Goncharov remembered: “His education was not
confined to technical knowledge of seafaring acquired in the marine corps. He
complemented it with constant reading in all departments of knowledge, spared no
money to subscribe to journals, books and pamphlets published in the capital
cities.” Tregubov concerned himself with the education of little Vanya and tried to
pass on to him his love for technical knowledge: “His conversations about mathe-
matical and physical geography, astronomy, cosmogony in general and also sea-
faring were particularly clear and invaluable to me. He acquainted me with the map
of the starry sky, vividly explained the motion of the planets, rotation of the Earth,
all that my school mentors were unable or unwilling to do… He had some seafar-
ing instruments, a telescope, a sextant, a chronometer. Among his books were
descriptions of all the round-the-world journeys, from Cook to the latest times. 
I listened avidly to his stories and devoured travel books” [13, pp. 234, 238].
Undoubtedly, by the 1830s and 40s, Goncharov was impressed by scientific
and technological progress and throughout his life watched the ambivalent
results of social progress as well as concrete discoveries and novelties. And there
was plenty to watch. The 19th century brought more discoveries and inventions
than all the preceding centuries combined. They numbered more than 8,500, and
what discoveries they were! The power of steam was tamed to bring about an
industrial revolution and enable manual production to be replaced by industrial
production. Europe and North America were covered with a network of railways,
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and countries and continents began “to draw closer together.” In The Frigate
Pallada, Goncharov notes these changes at every step. Thus he writes: “The
parts of the world quickly come nearer to each other; from Europe to America,
one shakes hands; they say that you will be able to get there in forty-eight
hours,—pouff!—a mere joke, but a pouff in its time, alluding to the gigantic
improvements yet to come in seafaring” [16, p. 13; 19, pp. 8-9]. The writer noted
the advantage of steam over wind power. Shortly before the clash with the navies
of England and its allies he makes this observation about the sailing ships which
formed the basis of the Russian Navy: “The case rests. Sails remain the lot of lit-
tle boats and less successful enterprises; all other have adopted steam. There is
no one naval shipyard that constructs sailing ships any more; even old ones are
refitted for steam” [16, p. 26; 19, p. 21].
The 19th century saw the introduction of synthetic materials and artificial
fibers. Discoveries in the field of physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, geolo-
gy, and medicine were made one after another. Michael Faraday discovered the
electromagnetic arc, and James Maxwell launched the study of electro-magnet-
ic fields and developed the electromagnetic theory of light. Antoine Becquerel,
Pierre Curie and Maria Skłodowska-Curie, who studied radioactivity, questioned
the former concept of the law of energy preservation. In 1869, Dmitry
Mendeleyev discovered the periodic table of chemical elements. Biologists came
up with the theory of cellular structure of all organisms and the basic principles
of genetics were developed. Based on research in the physiology of the higher
nervous activity, Ivan Pavlov developed his theory of conditional reflexes. At the
same time machine-building in the true sense appears (production of machines
by machine-tools). Iron and steel replace wood everywhere. As early as 1803,
the first steam-powered automobile appears and about the same time the first
steamships, and before long humanity starts using electrical telegraph and tele-
phone. The first underground railway (“metro”) appears in 1863 and by the end
of the century there is a metro in London, Paris, New York, Budapest and other
cities.
Special mention should be made of Charles Darwin, whose works On the
Origin of Species and The Descent of Man revolutionized science. These books
treated the origin of the world and man in a different way than the Christian teach-
ing. They triggered a Europe-wide discussion, which Goncharov did not miss.
Significantly, Goncharov objectively assessed Darwin’s important discoveries.
He wrote in his article “On the Usefulness of History”: “The new science...
through Darwin and others discovered the laws of heredity of which all thinking
people had been aware all along... The same spiritual law of heredity runs through
all history” [22].3 It is notable that along with “material” heredity discovered by
the English scientist Goncharov speaks about “the spiritual law of heredity.”
Thus, the 19th century brought a dramatic change to human life. Man had
more control over space and time, and the very philosophy of life, including the
attitude to traditional religious values, was changing before people’s eyes. 
From the books Goncharov read it is clear that he was above all interested
in natural history. His personal library (of which only a small part has survived),
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now in the custody of the Book Palace in Ulyanovsk, contains books by fairly
prominent European scientists and popularizers of science in the 19th century:
Dominique Arago, John Tyndall (his books were in Dostoyevsky’s library, too),
Louis Figuier, Camille Flammarion, John Draper4 and others (cf. [38]).
Goncharov was most of all interested in discoveries in the field of astrono-
my. His library contained not only popular science, but also hard science books
on astronomy, for example, by the Italian astronomer Angelo Secchi on the Sun
surface (1870; cf. [38, p. 117]). Interestingly, the space theme is mentioned in
one of the writer’s last works, called The Month of May in Petersburg: “For the
last ten years or so he has been engaged in compiling a glossary of Oriental lan-
guages and besides is studying astronomy, having read all the authorities from
Newton, the Herschels to Flammarion and is anxious to know whether there are
inhabitants on Venus, Mars5 and other planets, what they are like, what they do,
etc.” [12, p. 426]. These latter questions were suggested to Goncharov by the
reading of Flammarion, who had published a series of wonderful popular science
books such as: Real and Imaginary Worlds (1865), The Wonders of the Heavens
(1865), the first astronomy textbook, A History of the Heavens (recreational his-
tory of astronomy, 1867) etc.
Incidentally, Goncharov’s interest in astronomy is not fortuitous: he might
have found his own thoughts about mankind’s religious crisis in Flammarion’s
works. They articulate thoughts about the religious crisis of mankind in almost
the same words as Goncharov. The question of whether there is life beyond
Earth, along with other questions, was sure to engender a crisis of religious con-
sciousness. However, scientists who had not lost their faith sought an answer to
this question that would not destroy traditional religious thinking and would rec-
oncile it with science, something the author of The Precipice gave much thought
to. Witness the following passage in his preface to the novel: “Interpretation of
religion, even negation of religion began simultaneously with religion and has
proceeded in parallel. Only ardent youth can imagine that these two parallel
streams have already merged under its feet. The arguments about it bring out
truths, benefit science, thought, philosophy, while religion retains its power over
the majority” [13, pp. 156-157]. In the introduction to his book The Plurality of
Inhabited Worlds (1862), Flammarion, like Goncharov, reflected on the contem-
porary crisis (pretty much in the style of Goncharov in A Common Story and in
his letters): “If we take a close look at the spiritual life of modern humanity we
shall see that man has lost his former faith, and with it the undisturbed peace of
mind he once enjoyed; that we live amidst a struggle of conflicting thoughts and
that the troubled humanity is searching for a philosophy that would provide a
solid religious basis for its development and the fruition of its hopes… The spir-
it of the modern mankind is riven with contradictions. Natural science, the
mighty ruler of our time that controls progress, has never been as far removed
from any philosophy as it is today. Natural sciences are led by people who deny
in the most arbitrary fashion the existence of God” [11, pp. 3-4].
Part of the reason why Goncharov was conversant with the development of
science was the fact that he had to follow all these things in his capacity as an
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official censor. He was, however, interested not only in individual discoveries
but above all in the philosophy of contemporary science and its influence on
the traditional social institutions: religion, morals and so forth. While recog-
nizing scientific and technological progress as a positive phenomenon, he was
well aware that the power of science was relative and that it by no means can-
celed out religious values although it had an influence on immature minds. He
wrote in the preface to The Precipice: “One should not sacrifice serious prac-
tical sciences to craven fears of an insignificant part of the harm that may come
from the freedom and breadth of scientific activities. Even if there are among
young scientists some whom the study of natural or exact sciences has led to
extreme materialistic and negative conclusions, etc. These convictions will
remain their personal business while their learned efforts will enrich science”
[13, p. 156].
In principle, Goncharov solved the question of whether modern science
could coexist with religion even before he wrote A Common Story. His views did
not change in any important way after this. In 1881, the above-mentioned book
by Solovyov, Lectures on Godmanhood, was published. In it Goncharov found
thoughts which he shared, prompting him to write a letter to the philosopher.
Solovyov stressed that the key feature of contemporary spiritual life was “the
wish to organize mankind outside the unconditional religious sphere,” and that
“this wish informed the entire modern civilization” [45, p. 3]. The book logical-
ly led to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to strengthen the shaken
foundations of traditional religious thought by bluntly rejecting the achieve-
ments of the natural sciences and positivism. Lectures on Godmanhood was an
attempt to marry religion and scientific empiricism to promote the Christian
ideal on Earth. In this marriage religion, although “equipped with science,” was
in the ascendant [28, p. 186].
Judging by his letter to Solovyov, Goncharov in any case agrees that religion
and science should not oppose each other. He maintains that
Faith does not mind any ‘don’t knows’ and finds everything it needs in the
boundless ocean. It has one weapon that is all-powerful for the believer, and that is
feeling.
(Human) reason has nothing but the primary knowledge required for domestic,
earthly life, i.e., the ABC of omniscience. In a very foggy, uncertain and distant per-
spective the bold pioneers of science hope some day to reach the secrets of the cos-
mos by the reliable road of science.
Contemporary science flickers with such feeble light that so far it merely gives
an idea of the depth of our ignorance. Like an air balloon it rises over the Earth sur-
face only to impotently fall back to Earth [20, p. 348].
It is interesting that Dostoyevsky described the state of contemporary sci-
ence in a similar way: “Human science is still in its infancy—actually, it is only
beginning its work” [9, pp. 191-192].
Let it be stressed that Goncharov’s worldview and his attitude to science and
religion took shape not later than in the mid-1840s and did not change in princi-
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ple, contrary to the view, prevailing among Goncharov scholars, that the writer
“veered to the right” in the 1860s-1870s. What is surprising is Goncharov’s early
religious and philosophical maturity: he was ahead of many of his contempo-
raries in his approach to the key 19th-century problem: how to live when “feel-
ings of infantile faith cannot be brought back to the adult society” [20, p. 349].
While still at Moscow University, Goncharov pondered the co-existence of
science and religious consciousness as a social problem that captured in its orbit
not recent years or decades, but a whole millennium. The foundations of Gon-
charov’s worldview began to be laid when he was at university. There, attending
the lectures of Stepan Shevyrev, he had a chance to reflect on the artistic exper-
iment of Dante Alighieri in his three-part Divine Comedy: the great Italian’s work
presented the perception of the current universe, corresponding to the latest sci-
entific achievements of the time, and expressed the author’s ideal in its architec-
tonics. Shevyrev had every reason to write: “He presents the world in accordance
with the provisions of the Cosmology of his time. His thoughts about the Earth
and the sky are not figments of his imagination or beliefs of common people, but
knowledge accepted by the scientists of his age” [44, p. 142]. Shevyrev was
undoubtedly a fan of Dante, having written a dissertation about him, which was
the first in Russia (1833-1834). However, a complete change of the attitude to
Dante’s work had occurred only a short while before. As early as 1822, profes-
sor Aleksey Merzlyakov of Moscow University wrote in his textbook about a
“faulty composition of Divine Comedy that was often at odds with common
sense” [36, p. 219]. These were echoes of pejorative references to Divine Come-
dy by representatives of Western Enlightenment, including Voltaire, who repeat-
edly criticized Dante. Mikhail Alekseyev wrote: “For Voltaire… the Middle Ages
were an epoch of the decline of intellectual activity, of darkness, prejudice and
fanaticism; not surprisingly, he considered Divine Comedy to be devoid of ‘taste’
and full of ‘fancy stuff,’ a view shared by the majority of his contemporaries” [1,
pp. 158-159].
In his student years, the future writer first thought about creating not indi-
vidual works, but a trilogy hinting at “Inferno” (Russian Ad—“hell” hinting at
Aduyev), “Purgatory” (hinting at Oblomov related to the Russian word oblomok
meaning “a chip off something,” neither inferno nor paradise) and Rai (the Russ-
ian word for “Paradise” hinting at Raisky). I already had occasion to write about
the “Dantean” architectonics of Goncharov’s trilogy of novels [32, pp. 31-34; 30,
pp. 140-144], but that was outside of the present reflections about early maturing
of the conceptual and complete picture of the world at the center of which,
according to Goncharov, is God the Creator and His relationship with man and
humankind. We are here concerned not so much with Goncharov’s personal faith
as with the foundations of his worldview; while his personal faith changed notice-
ably during the period between the 1830s and 1890s his worldview as a whole
remained unchanged and was merely supplemented with a new set of themes and
problems thrown up by Russia’s life. These themes and problems were particu-
lars in the complete picture of the Cosmos fitting neatly into this picture without
changing the principles and foundations of Goncharov’s philosophy of life.
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Going back to the essence of his artistic philosophy, let us say that the point
is not only or largely that Goncharov was just about the only person in the first
half of the 19th century who became aware of the important problem of rapid
development of science and technology, and the cleavage of world history (“the
loss of infantile faith” and precipitous “maturing” of mankind). What is impor-
tant is that he aimed to work out his “program” of action to change the con-
sciousness of his generation. Harbingers of this “program” are to be found in his
early essay Ivan Savich Podzhabrin (1842), and later in his artistic-philosophi-
cal essay Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provincial Bridegroom (1848).
Goncharov s historical optimism and his hope that humanity would survive
“the whirlwind, the moment of a fierce clash,” would overcome the historical
“precipice” and stick to its religious values are based not only on his faith in the
good God’s Providence for mankind, but also on his idea of the role of “beau-
ty” in man’s life. This idea was also conceived early on, during his time at uni-
versity, above all the lectures of Nikolay Nadezhdin who, according to Gon-
charov, was worth “a dozen professors.” It was there, studying the monuments
of ancient culture and its interpreters, above all Johann Winckelmann, that Gon-
charov became aware of the moral power and philosophical essence of plastic
harmony, symmetry and sense of proportion attaching universal meaning to
beauty and believing in its creative power. Religious consciousness, according
to Goncharov, is inseparable from unconscious and (in advanced individuals)
conscious striving for harmony and beauty. This is very evident in the novel The
Precipice, especially the character of the artist Raisky. He experiences recurrent
fits of ecstasy at the sight of  beauty, more often of the plastic kind, but at peak
moments of his spiritual life also spiritual beauty getting an inkling of the link
between his desire for harmony and beauty and the involvement of the Creator
in this wish, an understanding of His direct spiritual “guidance”: Raisky
“looked and listened with horror to the wild impulses of his animal blind nature,
himself condemned it and penned new laws, destroyed ‘the old man’ within
himself and created a new one…With a throbbing heart and quiver of pure tears,
he overheard, amidst filth and noise of passions, the quiet underground work-
ings, within his human self, of some mysterious spirit which was sometimes
drowned out by the crackling and smoke of impure fire, but did not die and
woke up again, calling him, first quietly and then louder and louder, to the dif-
ficult and never-ending work on himself, on his own statue, the ideal of man.”
Seeking to build his own “statue,” i.e., approximate the “ideal,” Raisky is guid-
ed by a sense of beauty: “He saw with a secret breath-taking horror of happi-
ness, that the work of pure genius is not destroyed by the fire of passions, but
merely pauses and once the fire is over, it moves forward, slowly and labori-
ously, but it moves…Tracing the thread of his life in his mind he recalled the
fiendish pain that tormented him when he fell, how he slowly rose again, how
gently the pure spirit woke him up nudging him to continue his endless work,
helping him to his feet, cheering and consoling him and restoring his faith in the
beauty of the truth and goodness and the strength to get up and go further and
higher” [18, pp. 553, 554].
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Here, Raisky is portrayed as a man who, in his quest for the ideal, is guided
by the Holy Spirit (the process of man being guided by the Holy Spirit is what
Goncharov describes here) and by his own need for beauty. The underlying
theme of the novel is the creation of a human “statue,” “the ideal,” “the destruc-
tion of ‘the old man’ within himself and the creation of a new one.” In that sense
The Precipice is the most passionate of Goncharov’s works directly correspond-
ing to Paradise in Dante’s Divine Comedy. Before finishing the novel, the writer
confessed in a letter to Mikhail Stasyulevich: “In my novel Raisky’s dreams,
desires and prayers end like a triumphant chord in music, with an apotheosis of
women, then Mother Russia and finally, God and Love. I… fear that my humble
pen will not endure, will not measure up to my ideals and artistic and religious
sentiments. But, God willing, my Faith will save me!” [13, p. 426].
For Goncharov, the supreme kind of beauty is spiritual beauty although even
the best of his characters, being ordinary people, seldom soar to such heights, and
more often fall and seek beauty beclouded by passions, self-deceit etc. 
Goncharov began to reflect on the concept of beauty—initially under the
influence of Nikolay Nadezhdin and then independently—as early as the 1830s
proceeding from the works of Winckelmann [34, pp. 112-117], Schiller and
Schelling. However, the works of the English thinker Anthony Shaftesbury6
probably proved to be more important for him. He was the first to articulate what
was the key idea for Goncharov, the idea that morality is inherent in human
nature, in particular, in man’s aesthetic leanings. Friedrich Schiller’s influence on
him was equally powerful. In Schiller’s opinion, “there exists in his nature only
a moral predisposition, which can be developed through the understanding, but
rather even in his sensuous rational, i.e., human nature, an aesthetical tendency
thereto” [42]. Goncharov’s abiding attention to Schiller’s interpretation of the
moral ideal was manifested, for example, in his letter to Sofia Nikitenko of
August 21, 1866: “You… look at human nature in a holy and exalted way,
Schiller-like. May God help you to carry your beliefs to the end” [13, p. 362].
The aesthetic approach to human morality was first expressed in a vivid and
almost conceptual manner in Goncharov’s Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to
a Provincial Bridegroom in the 1940s. The genre of “letters about beauty” can
be traced to Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and to Sensus
Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend
by Shaftesbury. The latter also clearly assimilated along with the principle of the
unity of morality and beauty specific ideas of plastic beauty as symmetry, pro-
portion in ancient esthetics, something Goncharov felt a particular affinity with.
In An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend Shaftes-
bury, anticipating Goncharov’s Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provin-
cial Bridegroom, writes about “the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the
turn of characters and the proportions” [43, p. 62]. In this curious work, genre-
wise (it is reminiscent of a typical “physiological essay” but is essentially a
philosophical essay in the spirit of Shaftsbury and Schiller) Goncharov tries to
tackle head-on the problems that are left between the lines in his first novel, 
A Common Story.
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The writer hopes that mankind will be able to deal with the weakening of the
religious feeling caused by the scientific and technological breakthrough, for the
religious feeling is inseparable from the quest of beauty, which is inherent in
human nature. In the above-mentioned letter to Sofia Nikitenko he notes: “This
is a lofty need characteristic only of human nature that animals do not have” 
[14, p. 316].7
Beauty is “a bridge” between the external and internal, “the biological” and
spiritual in man. Goncharov believes that spiritual beauty is connected with bod-
illy beauty. In Letters from a Metropolitan Friend... he shows that every person
has a sense of beauty although they interpret it in different ways depending on
their level of development: from vulgar “fashion” to spiritual beauty (“non-
human,” angelic). Goncharov insists that man is capable of developing and
improving and can therefore “graduate” toward a spiritual, ideal feeling of beau-
ty. 
As I have said, beginning from the 1830s Goncharov does not merely state
that religion is in a crisis, but dedicates himself to the task of working out an anti-
dote exhibiting a didactic streak. He might have said, together with Raisky:
“Though I shall not put on the frock, I can preach—sincerely and wherever I
notice falsehood, pretense and malice—in short, the lack of beauty—even
though I am sometimes ghastly myself” [18, p. 38]. In that sense the long-run-
ning dispute about the novelist’s extraordinary objectivity,8 on the one hand, and
his well-disguised didacticism, on the other, must be resolved in favor of the lat-
ter. Without a doubt, there is a strong element of unconscious and even “cre-
ative” epicureanism in Goncharov’s work, as he admitted on more than one
occasion: “Creative work is a kind of epicureanism, pleasure derived from art is
sensuous pleasure—whatever you might say, creative work is the highest irrita-
tion of the nervous system, intoxication of the brain and an intense state of the
whole organism” [14, p. 285]. And elsewhere: “With… conscious writers the
brain makes up for what the image has failed to convey—their works are often
dry, bland, and incomplete; they appeal to the reader’s brain and say little to
imagination and feeling. They persuade, teach and assure us but they do not
touch us. By contrast, when fantasy is excessive and there is less brain the mean-
ing, the idea; the picture speaks for itself and the writer often becomes aware of
the meaning with the help of some subtle interpreter, such as, for example, Belin-
sky and Dobrolyubov” [13, pp. 69-70]. 
Positioning himself largely as an absolutely “unconscious artist” (he con-
stantly turned to Belinsky’s definition), Goncharov is obviously exaggerating
here. In another place, also exaggerating, he notes: “He would also cease to be
an artist in case he distances himself from the image and takes the position of a
thinker, a highbrow or moralist and preacher” [13, pp. 211-212]. Not surprising-
ly, such utterances from Goncharov elicited this response from Ivan Turgenev:
“Incidentally, I cannot help expressing my opinion about ‘unconscious and con-
scious creative work,’ about ‘preconceived ideas and tendencies,’ about ‘the use
of objectivity, ingenuousness and naïvité,’ about all these ‘pitiful’ words [the
expression ‘pitiful words’ betrays the addressee of criticism, Zakhar in Oblomov
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speaks about ‘pitiful words’—V. M.], which, from whatever authoritative mouth
they may come, have always struck me as commonplace, rhetorical small change
which is not considered false only because too many take it to be genuine… We
have recently seen a proliferation of pen-pushers who consider themselves to be
‘unconscious authors’ and choose ‘living’ plots; and yet they are riddled through
and through with the much-maligned ‘tendency’ ” [49, pp. 309-310].
On the other hand, Goncharov was himself a thinker, a “preacher” and felt
irritated when people saw his work as nothing but “pictures”: “Some did not see
or did not want to see my images and pictures as anything but more or less vivid-
ly painted portraits, landscapes, perhaps accurate copies of mores—and nothing
more. What is there to praise?” [13, pp. 69-70]. The article “The Intent, Tasks
and Ideas of the Novel The Precipice” shows that Goncharov was a born preach-
er: “Art has a serious duty of softening and improving man… it must hold up an
unflattering mirror to him with all the stupidities, incongruities and passions,
with all the consequences, in short, it must shed light on all the depths of life, lay
bare its hidden foundations and the whole mechanism—then knowledge of how
to steer clear of all this will come with consciousness” [13, p. 212]. Nikita Prut-
skov writes in his monograph about Goncharov: “Every now and again the nov-
elist approaches the borderline beyond which the domain of art gives way to…
plain preaching. Goncharov’s entire novelistic system is marked by a unique
blend of amazing poeticism in plastic reproduction of characters and situations
and rationality of methods, devices and forms of portrayal and assessments. One
gets the impression that he wrote on inspiration but put the results of his inspira-
tions in rational poetic forms” [40, pp. 7, 224].
Goncharov began to seriously portray “incongruities” and “passions” in Ivan
Savich Podzhabrin. It seems to be a light-hearted comedy of manners readily
revealing the clichés of plots and poetics of the “natural school” (a civil servant
who rents flats and is “enjoying life”). In fact, like in Letter from a Metropolitan
Friend, he touches upon a question he feels strongly about: a person’s hankering
after beauty while having a perverted idea of it (at the lowest, “zoological” level
of spiritual development, as his name, related to the Russian word for “gills,”
suggests). Goncharov has a fascination for the image of Don Juan whom many
of his characters resemble. The image of Don Juan in Goncharov ‘s writings
should be seen not only as proof of his remarkable ability to typify and elevate
his local “types” to universal level, but also as a sign of his constant attention to
the problem of beauty and man’ ascent, through beauty, from “a pitiful creature”
to “a decent person.” There are many Don Juans in Goncharov’s works, each
with his own balance between dramatic and comical parody elements [35; 39, p.
20; 41]. Ivan Savich, like Alexander Aduyev, inhabits the “Inferno” created by
Goncharov as early as the 1840s. Yet even in Raisky the serious aspect of Don
Juanism goes hand-in-hand with a comical perception of his “search for beauty.”
Goncharov, following the design of Divine Comedy, preserves only the main
trend of which he himself had this to say in the article Better Late than Never:
“It was not until I had finished my novels and had put some distance and time
between them and myself that their hidden message, meaning and idea became
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clear to me. In vain did I wait for someone beside myself to read between the
lines and, falling in love with my characters, bring them together and see what
this whole is trying to say. But that did not happen” [13, p. 67].
Now that we know the logic of Goncharov’s creative evolution that was
already apparent in the 1830s and 1840s it is clear that “the idea” of the trilogy he
refers to was already in his mind before he wrote A Common Story. Boris Engel-
gardt realized that Goncharov’s The Frigate Pallada was also written before his
journey, having in mind a certain idea: “Even before he left Petersburg, Goncharov
knew what he would write and how.” Although the scholar refers to a more spe-
cific matter (“He conceived of the essays about his journey as a sequel to Oblo-
mov”) and reduces everything to a literary hoax (“The literary meaning of the hoax
was the struggle against Romanticism” [25, p. 16]), he was dead on regarding the
spirit of The Frigate Pallada: the book expresses Goncharov’s worldview more
broadly and more openly than any other works, so its “philosophical part” was
already in the author’s mind long before the journey and was merely fleshed out
with concrete observations. Goncharov had formed the “idea” long before, which
does not only turn his novels into a trilogy, but lends integrity and completeness to
his entire body of work. The challenge facing modern Goncharov scholars is to
read between the lines and “link all the characters in one whole.” 
Goncharov hoped that the millennial turn in history (the change of modern
man’s religious consciousness under the influence of burgeoning science) would
be overcome by the force with which the Creator invested human nature, and
that is the quest for beauty. He devoted his work to portraying man’s ascent,
through progressive “humanization,” from the “inferno” of faithlessness and
passions toward the higher, spiritual beauty of Christ. 
In my article, I have touched upon only some aspects of the whole complex
of problems facing those researching the theme indicated in the title. Revealing
the main motive force of Goncharov’s work and creative plans of the 1830s and
1840s makes one think about reassessing Goncharov as a 19th-century literary
figure and about reinterpreting many established ideas about his work.
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Notes
1 The term “trilogy” appears in Goncharov bibliography since 1927 [48], but mainly as a
summary reference to all the writer’s novels.
2 The remark in a letter to Konstantin Kavelin of March 25, 1874 to the effect that “in a rig-
orous approach even Humboldt could do with more thorough training than he had” [13, p.
464], suggests that Goncharov was familiar with the German scholar’s work, most prob-
ably with The Cosmos written in a popular style. Goncharov’s reservation was prompted
by the fact that Humboldt was a spontaneous materialist who attributed the development
of nature to its internal forces and causes, something Goncharov could not agree with
because he believed that the paths of faith and science were “parallel and infinite” and that
science could never replace faith. 
3 Goncharov’s ideas are in some ways similar to those of the poet Aleksey Tolstoy’s poem
A Message to M. N. Loginov on Darwinism (1872), in which the poet does not defend Dar-
winism, but speaks about free self-expression of science and argues that rather than jux-
taposing faith and science, they should be combined in the quest of the truth.
4 Goncharov was undoubtedly familiar with John Draper’s History of the Conflict Between
Religion and Science (1874). He probably read his History of the Intellectual Development
of Europe (1862), which was popular in Russia in the mid-1860s and was translated into
Russian (1866). Draper was a follower of the evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin and
Herbert Spencer.
5 Flammarion devoted much effort to the study of Mars and wrote a book about the condi-
tions for inhabiting it [10].
6 Although Goncharov never mentions his name he was undoubtedly familiar with Shaftes-
bury’s philosophical works as witnessed by his essay Letters from a Metropolitan Friend
to a Provincial Bridegroom.
7 This remarkable formula is a verbatim quotation from Goncharov’s contemporary Her-
mann Ulrici, a German philosopher, natural scientist and theologian whose books were
translated into Russian: “only man has the ability to intuit beauty, animals do not have
it…” (quoted from [46, p. 192]).
8 This trend was initiated by Vissarion Belinsky: “He is a poet, an artist –nothing else. He
has neither love nor hostility toward the characters he draws… he offers no moral lessons
to us or to the reader, he seems to think: he who is in distress has to answer, it is none of
my business. Of all the modern writers, he and he alone approaches the ideal of art for art’s
sake… Goncharov has nothing except talent; he is more of a poet and artist than anyone
today” [2, pp. 326-327].
Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
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“Nestor of Slavic Studies”: 
125th Birth Anniversary of Dmitry Chizhevsky
Ella zADOROzHNYUK
Abstract. I have posed myself the task to reveal the richness of Dmitry
Chizhevsky’s ideas related to Slavic cultures and the importance of their
mutual enrichment. His studies of Slavic philology and, to a lesser extent,
German-Slavic philology convinced him that different ethnic forms of man-
ifestation of the truth of beauty, sanctity and justice are assessed by the
degree of their peculiarities. These individual traits shed light on absolute
values from different angles which means that the national constants of the
Slavic peoples and their cultures are individual, self-sufficient and equal
only in the universal context.
Keywords: history, Slavic cultures, Slavic philology and German-Slav-
ic philology, cultural unification, universal context, Comeniology,
Chizhevsky studies.
http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/SSC.60231521
On April 4, 2019, the world of Slavic studies and a large part of the Slavic
world marked the 125th birth anniversary of Dmitry Chizhevsky known, and
with good reason, in academic circles as “Nestor of Slavic studies.” The high
value of his works in many spheres of Slavic studies were discussed and appre-
ciated in tens of books and hundreds of articles written in scores of different
tongues. Ukrainian researchers, working in Ukraine and outside it, are the lead-
ers with the greatest number of works to their names. In the first twenty years of
the new century, fundamental works by Chizhevsky and about him have already
appeared in Russia in the Russian language: in her article [7, p. 124], Irina
Fedoriv uses the Ukrainian term (that has already been accepted in its own right)
“chizhevskoznavstvo” to discuss and assess his works including Hegel in Russia
[3], the first volume of his three-volume biography edited by Wladimir Yanzen
[5] and the monograph of late Nina Nadyarnykh [11]. One should also mention
E. Zadorozhnyuk, D. Sc. (History), leading researcher, Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences. E-mail: elzador46@mail.ru. This article was first published in Russian
in the journal Slavyanovedenie (Slavic Studies. 2019. No. 6, pp. 99-109; DOI:
10.31857/S0869544X0006812-6). 
Chizhevsky’s other works, including his first publications (in particular, four vol-
umes of his philosophical works in Ukrainian) [4], and numerous articles about
him that appeared in journals dealing with scores of different subjects.
In Russia, the interest in Chizhevsky and his creative legacy is gradually
albeit slowly reviving without so far any noticeable results. Russian experts in
Slavic studies have justly pointed to this and deemed it necessary to say that he
“belongs to the elite of world Slavic studies” [10, p. 83].
This anniversary marked an important turn to comprehensive revival. These
efforts were expected and very much needed by the academic circles since even
purely academic studies of the subtlest philological aspects of Chizhevsky’s
works echo in politics. Throughout his life, he remained immersed in his analy-
sis of Slavic cultures and the processes of their interaction during the far from
favorable times when they existed under pressure (of Germany in the first place)
during two world wars. In 1919 and 1945, they left the Slavic world and its cul-
tures in the state of cultural “micro-wars” between neighboring peoples.
In his works, Chizhevsky brought together the strictly scientific approach
and a vehement protest against external pressure and internal wars. His works are
a convincing argument in favor of interaction of these cultures which diachroni-
cally and synchronically enriches the cultures of all other European peoples and
mankind as a whole. Irina Fedoriv has written with a great deal of reason that
Chizhevsky avoided excessive emphasis on “resemblances and diffferences” of
Slavic (including Russian and Ukrainian) cultures and insisted that they were not
just additions to or copies of European culture and that without them Europe
would have never been Europe [7, p. 131]. 
The authors of books and articles about Chizhevsky and of introductions to
his books invariably write that the richness of his ideas stands in bolder relief
against the background of his biography that can be described as tragic for any
scholar. Contrary to the disastrous living circumstances or, probably, thanks to
them, Chizhevsky was faithfully performing his duty to the science of culture,
Slavic, in the first place, and the cause of mutual understanding between all peo-
ples. He promptly caught up and deciphered the ethnically colored specifics of
this culture; he worked with the deepest cultural layers and their philosophical
meanings related to the subtleties of philological material.
Nobody of those who study Chizhevsky and his works or even those who
turn to his works in search of adequate materials (there is a rich choice) would
have disagreed with what N. Nadyarnykh wrote, in her time, about his authority
of a scholar: “At first I could not imagine the scope of his intellectual grandeur.
I was lucky to have Husserl to rely on. When recommending Dmitry Chizhevsky
to a teaching post at the University of Halle, he wrote: ‘This is a highly educat-
ed philosopher who thinks independently on the basis of his Slavic studies; he is
interested mainly in Hegel; at the same time, he is highly interested in phenom-
enology and demonstrates an amazing scope of erudition in highly varied fields
of culture” [11, p. 3]. The italicized words were meant to disclose the specifics
of perception of both Hegel and phenomenology by representatives of the Slav-
ic peoples. For example, they were the first to successfully perceive and pro-
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foundly interpret the achievements of Western thought, say, of German classical
philosophy; French and British were trailing behind.
Edmund Husserl said this late in the 1920s; late in the 1960s, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, the leading German philosopher of the latter half of the 20th century
who had done a lot to help Chizhevsky acquire a post in Heidelberg University,
said at the celebration of Chizhevsky’s 75th birthday: “Long ago, Friedrich the
Great allegedly said about Leibnitz that he was the entire Academy personified;
you may, within the narrower and wider frames of our century, claim the same”
(quoted from [5, p. 401]). Long before that, some of the Western scholars called
him “Nestor of Slavic studies”; others spoke of him as a highly original philol-
ogist of the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophical schools, still oth-
ers, as a humanitarian-universalist. Prior to the early 1980s, the Soviet Union
deliberately ignored him, mainly for ideological reasons, even if many of the
prominent scholars were aware of the impact of this giant. 
His life was far from easy; it was burdened by circumstances of his personal
life. The great scholar could repeat at each and every turn of his fortunes the words
of St. Matthew: “Foxes have dens and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no
place to lay his head” (Matthew 8:20). Some of his problems were created by cir-
cumstances, while others, by his Baroque personality. His creative, albeit fre-
quently antithetic, power of creative synthesis defined his life and his scholarly tra-
jectories as well as the trajectories of prominent thinkers that he had studied in
depth. Here are their names: Jan Amos Komensky (Moravia-Germany-Poland-
Holland-England-Sweden-Transylvania-Holland); Theophan Prokopovich (Rome-
Germany-St. Petersburg) and Gregory Skovoroda (St. Petersburg-Moscow-Hun-
gary-Vienna plus travels across Ukraine, his native land). Chizhevsky covered a
more or less similar road. He spent his youth in the Kherson Gubernia where he
was born; he studied in St. Petersburg and later in Kiev; in 1921, he had to emi-
grate to Poland and later, in 1924, to Prague where he lived and worked till his
move to Halle in 1932. During the hard times, he worked on the problems of Ger-
man-Slavic philology at the University of Halle (where he found the lost text of
Czech Jan Amos Komensky). His emigration continued in Marburg from 1945; in
Harvard between 1949 and 1956, where amid practically total rejection he laid the
foundations of contemporary Slavic studies. His creative and physical life ended
in Heidelberg where he died on April 18, 1977. 
In his work “On the Problems of Baroque” published in the literary journal
Zagrava in Augsburg in 1946, he wrote: “Frequently, it is hard to say why
Baroque people are attracted to other countries—whether by their own desire or
they are driven by disorder and poverty” [4, p. 75]. This is true. Let’s have a look
at the American period of his life and creative activities. He knew about ten for-
eign tongues but never learned English. He stirred up hardly explainable con-
flicts even with those of his colleagues who were well disposed to him—Roman
Jakobson and other Slavists, with the administration of the University and stu-
dents who did not bother to learn the subject. The problems were further exac-
erbated by poor living conditions, low salary, etc. Manfred Schruba wrote that
“Chizhevsky did not found his place in Harvard; the American academic com-
SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. 51, No. 2, 2020134
munity remained highly alien to him” [14, p. 64]. Judging by his vast corre-
spondence, Chizhevsky perceived America as culturally alien despite the fact
that it offered refuge to his wife who was a doctor and his daughter who became
a prominent expert in Slavic studies. It was separated from the Slavic and Ger-
man worlds dear to his heart. America responded by refusal to recognize his
authority of a scholar even though later many of his former colleagues accepted it. 
His relations with the Ukrainian émigré diaspora were far from simple; he
avoided its highly politicized and biased groups while the touching respect of the
Ukrainian national cultural values was obvious in his works. Starting with the
1920s, he had been avoiding the highly politicized slogans of Ukrainian émigré cir-
cles. On the one hand, elected in 1918 to the Central Rada from the Russian Social-
Democratic Workers’ Party (Mensheviks), he voted against Ukrainian independence
and supported the principles of federalism. On the other, he was contemplated, for
some time, as a possible minister of labor in the government of the Ukrainian Peo-
ple’s Republic and as such came close to being executed by Bolsheviks in 1918. In
1921, they sentenced him to death for the illegal crossing of the Soviet-Polish bor-
der. In emigration, tired of politics, he moved away from Menshevism and Ukrain-
ian nationalism to concentrate on academic studies. His studies of the deep roots of
Ukrainian culture strongly affected all those who studied Ukraine in Prague and in
Germany; he raised Ukrainian studies to the high and practically inaccessible level
while working in Harvard. His daughter Tatyana Chizhevsky followed in his foot-
steps first in Harvard and later in the Wayne University.
It should be said that he was steadily widening the scope of his research
within the frames of Slavic studies as a whole through comprehensive analysis
of cultures of practically all Slavic peoples. His works raised the status of Ger-
man-Slavic philology as a field of studies in its own right. He, however, careful-
ly avoided any publications on this subject during the war in order not to invite
disclosures of any, even if real, German impacts on Slavic culture and, by the
same token, highly politicized discourse. At the same time, he was never shy to
criticize unifying totalitarian trends in culture in its Soviet and Nazi variants. In
the hardest condtions in Nazi Germany, he demonstrated a lot of ingenuity to
support inmates in concentration camps, Jews and Slavs brought to Germany as
slaves.
He remained loyal to his principles of deciphering cultural codes especially in
places of their intersection, despite his personal problems that could have been eas-
ily settled by compromises. His firm uncompromising position on everything relat-
ed to science made him the target of base lies and denunciations. This is amply con-
firmed by the materials of his autobiography, reminiscences and letters.
In July 1945, he answered the request of the American military administra-
tion with a concise autobiography: “My life brought me from Russia to Poland,
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Sweden, etc. In all these places, I could see
that the borders, into which history squeezed these countries, do no good to the
economies and cultures of these countries and their peoples. A clear lesson of
what Europe would be without reconciliation of peoples was given to us by
Hitler’s Europe with its human horrors and material poverty” [5, p. 57]. In 1953,
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he wrote that he had been suffering because of denunciations: “Two years ago
those who wanted to harm somebody denounced that he was a ‘Nazi’; today, the
accusation of being a Communist is preferred” [5, p. 153]. He could not find a
job worthy of his genius in Germany because of denunciations; for the same rea-
son it took him a lot of time to depart to the United States; having arrived there,
he was confronted with suspicions of his colleagues.
He described his hardships in an epic and somewhat humorous style; they
were a background noise of his scholarly studies. He plunged deep into the cul-
tural codes of different peoples and discovered the sources of mutual under-
standing between their carriers.
He was engrossed in these studies at the harshest of times. On June 2, 1942,
he wrote to Alfred Böhm: “I am arranging the Slavic department of the Hungar-
ian institute in Berlin where I discovered several extremely rare Czech books of
the 16th-17th centuries and even several lost or totally unknown books: Psalms
of Netolický (1562) so far known from the index of banned books; one primer of
the 18th century, two collections of Czech poems published by Count Sporn,
several (about ten) Czech and Polish greeting poems published in the 17th-18th
centuries in Wittenberg by Czech exiles, etc. There are manuscripts, which I
have not yet studied” [11, p. 20]. The italicized words in the letter written in
Russian reflect the widest range of his work.
Chizhevsky identified the legacy of Jan Amos Komensky as the central
Bohemistic subject discovered and rediscovered by Czechs. “Looking back at
what has been done, I admit that Czechs will be probably more interested in my
works and for a longer time: discovery of manuscripts of Komensky, studies of
Church-Slavonic literature in the Czech lands and, probably, commentaries to
Czech mediaeval songs and my work on the Czech Baroque literature. My stud-
ies of Russian and Slovak poets and thinkers will be probably neglected in both
countries as being far removed from Marxist ideology” [12, p. 26]. 
Jan Amos Komensky was born in 1593 in South Moravia and died in 1670
in Amsterdam, far from his native land very much like Chizhevsky several cen-
turies later. This was not his choice; his ancestors had moved from Slovakia to
Czechia, he studied at Heidelberg University (where Chizhevsky worked during
his last years). Like Chizhevsky, he left his hostile native country for Poland
where he was successfully engaged in pansophy (teaching everything to every-
one); he personally realized his pedagogical ideas in England and Hungary; in
1656, he moved to Amsterdam. It was in the archives of Halle (where he taught
Slavic literatures and languages since 1932) that Chizhevsky discovered the
manuscript of Pansophy of four thousand pages that had been believed to be irre-
trievably lost. He personally typed it, supplied with commentaries amid the rag-
ing destructive war. In his commentaries “On the Comeniological Works of
Dmitry Chizhevsky,” Jan Patočka wrote: “All of us who study the works of
Komensky should be grateful for all times to Chizhevsky” [5, p. 330]. 
Seven years later after the discovery of Pansophy (in 1941, the year of Ger-
man aggression against the Soviet Union), Chizhevsky published in Prague his
book Ukrainian Literary Baroque in which he interpreted the Slavic Baroque as
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an important phenomenon of world culture. He was convinced that Pansophy
was another evidence of the universal and comprehensive nature of the Baroque.
The discovery of this manuscript can be interpreted as an awakening of a gener-
ation of Slavists dedicated to the studies of how this style manifested itself in
their cultures and the cultures connected not only with the Slavic peoples. Hav-
ing comprehensively studied the creative works of Gregory Skovoroda as a rep-
resentative of the Baroque, he placed this Ukrainian thinker between German
mystics and representative of the pre-Romanticism. He connected Skovoroda
with the bucolic motives in poetry of the Western and Southern Slavs. He detect-
ed certain pansophic traits in the Skovoroda’s instructions to future generations
also noted by Russian Slavists [18]. The parallels drawn by Chizhevsky between
the ideas of Komensky and Ukrainian spiritual writer Ivan Vyshensky (about
1550—after 1621) deserve special mention. 
The all-Slavic nature of the Baroque is the main concept of Chizhevsky’s,
the deciphering of which leads to an analysis of interactions of cultures of prac-
tically all Slavic nations, including Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian. Refer-
ring to the Ukrainian culture, Chizhevsky pointed out that it had been Simeon of
Polotsk (born in Belorussia) who brought the Baroque poetry to Moscow. This
thought is invariably present in the works of the scientists of the Institute of Slav-
ic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences [1; 15; 16].
Coming back to Chizhevsky’s ideas about Baroque and their impact on
Czech scholars, it should be said that he launched vast debates of this subject by
opening a highly fruitful discussion of the subject with historians of literature S.
Souček and J. Vašica, F. Šalda and A. Novak; later, this created a generation of
baroque students. In one of his letters to Alfred Böhm, he pointed out that in 1942
he had got 12 letters from Czechs and only two from Russians and two from
Ukrainians [11, p. 24]. Later, he did not abandon his active correspondence with
Czechs, not necessarily agreeable. Back in 1933, he had published in a German
journal his highly critical opinion about a book by Ferdinand Pelikán on con-
temporary Russian philosophy. Boris Yakovenko defended the author by accus-
ing his compatriot of “defamation” [2, pp. 52-52].
In 1968, Chizhevsky had been ready to present his paper on all-Slavic
Baroque at the Slavic Congress in Prague yet on August 18, 1968 when big
groups of Slavists had already gathered in the auditorium he suddenly announced
that he would not present his paper since his works had been for many years
ignored in the Soviet Union. Three days later, his amazing statement acquired
political dimensions when armies of its neighbors entered Czechoslovakia.
Chizhevsky, meanwhile, resumed his academic studies and never demonstrated
any vehement anti-Soviet sentiments. His demarche at the congress in Prague
was an outcrop of his rejection of Soviet power and the threats that had forced
him to move from Halle (the Eastern zone of occupation) to Marburg (in the
Western zone) and lose once again his archive and library. He had no intention
to join the ranks of political fighters or accusers; he was deeply immersed in his
studies. Hence is an extremely ambivalent attitude to him among the radical-
minded members of the Ukrainian diaspora.
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It was in Czechoslovakia or, to be more exact, in Prague that 
(a) Chizhevsky established close or even friendly relations with Russian
thinkers, Semyon Frank in the first place, and, to a much lesser extent, with
Ukrainians; 
(b) he cooperated with the Prague Linguistic Circle by planning for some of
his members (Jan Mukařovský in particular, whom he taught Russian and
Ukrainian and who after the war became rector of Charles University in Prague)
an exit beyond the dominant structural-functional paradigm; 
(c) he relied on narratology to identify the trend of his studies as moving to
phenomenology and, in particular, to the phenomenological personality theories
by which he meant the scope of phenomena embraced by personality—and the
manifestation of the world through the subject-ness of the personality (presenta-
tion of “Self” through the world and the world through “Self”). Jan Patočka, his
Czech colleague, worked on this set of problems; Polish phenomenologist
Roman Ingarden developed the same line in aesthetics. All of them were
Husserl’s students.
Chizhevsky not only maintained contacts with Ingarden but also organized
a group of Polish Slavists to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Pan Tadeusz
by Adam Mickiewicz. In Slovakia, he was interested in Ludevit Štúr and his
ideas which he analyzed in a voluminous work. In Bulgaria, he carefully studied
the Tyrnovo School of theology and literature of the 14th-15th centuries close to
hesychasm and spreading it across the Slavic world. Chizhevsky analyzed the
cultures of other South Slavic nations—Serbs and Croats in the first place as
well as Macedonians and Slovenes and pointed out that the traditions of euhe-
merism (the interpretation, according to which mythological accounts are pre-
sumed to have originated from real historical events) were present in the cultures
of all peoples of the Slavic South. Translations of Greek authors, condemnation
of heretics, hagiography as cultural phenomena came to the Eastern Slavic world
from Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Serbia.
In the 19th century, wrote Chizhevsky, there had been an opposite move-
ment. He indicated that euphony and musicality typical of Shevchenko’s poetry
was successfully recoded by Croatian poets Vladimir Nazor and Miroslav Krleža
and Slovenians Oton Župančić and Srečko Kosovel [6, p. 58].1
It was on the materials of Slavic studies and, to a slightly lesser extent, Ger-
man-Slavic philology that Chizhevsky arrived at one of his fundamental conclu-
sions: different ethnic forms of manifestations of absolute truth of beauty, sanc-
tity and justice are assessed by degrees of their specifics. Their individual
specifics shed light on absolute values from new, hitherto absent, angles. “It is
absolutely clear how the question of the relationships between nation and
mankind, between the national and the common to all mankind should be
approached from this point of view: each nation discloses one of the sides while
the ideal common to all survives thanks to these specific individually realized
disclosures. This explains why each nation in its specifics and originality, in its
‘one-sidedness’ and ‘restrictions’ is eternally and universally important in the
same way as varied human individuals are alive in society, as highly varied
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nations are united in mankind. Mankind can exist through them and in them” [11,
pp. 41-42]. National constants in culture are individual, self-sufficient and equal
precisely in the common historical context, wrote Chizhevsky.
He relied on genuinely humanistic foundations to interpret the content of
many concepts of Ukrainian philosophy, such as cardiocentrism, which points to
the heart rather than mind as the source of meanings. He discovered correspond-
ing ideas in works of German mystics. His ability to hear the quietest word hid-
den behind false scholarly constructs allowed him to arrive at the boldest con-
clusions. 
He demonstrated the same “delicacy” at the crossing points of different
thought-forms. His brilliant essay “G. S. Skovoroda and German Mysticism”
published in 1929 is the best example.2 Chizhevsky indicated that cardiocentrism
was present in the works of German mystics Sebastian Franck and Jacob Böhme,
while the mysticism of “the Teutonic genius” can be found in the thoughts of the
Ukrainian “old man” (how Skovoroda was called).3
The comparison of the Judaizers with the Czech Hussites in Muscovite Rus
in his paper “West European Philosophy in Old Ukraine (the 15th-18th cen-
turies)” read in Berlin in 1927 deserves special mention. Both were heretics from
the points of view of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches respectively. The lat-
ter demonstrated a lot of activity in Novgorod and Moscow in the late 15th—
early 16th centuries; the teaching developed, in particular thanks to the efforts of
diplomat Fyodor Kuritsyn. Many other names were lost—their bearers were
exterminated “with fire and sword” [4, p. 99]. 
Chizhevsky’s work on the philosophy of Hegel [3] that was recently pub-
lished in Russia is part of his impressive project “Hegel and the Slavs,” the ini-
tiative beyond the potentials of many others. His book The Philosophy of Life of
Ludevit Štúr (1941) in Slovak and the fundamental article “Hegel and the Slo-
vaks” (1961) in German faithfully reflected his perception of the leading repre-
sentatives of the Slovak thought. His materials on the perception of the philoso-
phy of Hegel by other Slavic peoples are still waiting for careful and attentive
researchers. The project should be presented in its entirety as an important or
even the most important element of German-Slavic studies and the decoding of
the moment of meeting of varied cultures. So far, enigmas predominate or even
multiply.
Dmitry Chizhevsky defended his thesis in Germany in 1933. His book Hegel
in Russia was first published in German in 1934; its second edition appeared in
1961. It was published in Russian in Paris in 1939; its Ukrainian translation was
part of the four-volume edition [4]. It betrayed the typically Chizhevsky method
of discovering philosophy on philology and vice versa, later borrowed as a cre-
ative instrument by Mikhail Bakhtin, Georgy Gachev, Sergey Averintsev, etc.
Chizhevsky presented Hegel as an important or even dominant figure who
changed the Slavic world which he short of despised and showed us that demon-
strative4 inattention to this world did not exclude that any system of thought
could exist in wide social and cultural contexts. The Slavic world was not an
exception: J. G. Herder [8] spoke of it as a culture-creating part of Europe.5
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Chizhevsky was one of the first to describe direct contacts, in February
1830, between the German philosopher and Russian thinkers, in particular, with
Ivan Kireyevsky, the future leader of Slavophiles. Andrzej Walicki has pointed
out that in Russia (and in Poland) Hegel’s philosophy was much more important
than the ideas of any other Western thinker, hence the phenomenon of “Ortho-
dox Hegelianism.” Orientated at revolution rather than preservation, it never
became the dominant trend [17, p. 339]. Tomáš Masaryk had said this before
Walicki and even earlier than Chizhevsky. He insisted that Ivan Turgenev was
obliged to Hegel for his interest in the philosophy of history and for his under-
standing of the laws of historical development and progress which made the
word “forward” his philosophical and socio-political slogan [9, pp. 297-298]. I
should add that it was Chizhevsky who offered the most comprehensive charac-
teristics of one of the “Hegelians” described by Turgenev and of the “nihilists”
who replaced them in his novel Fathers and Sons.
It should be noted that Chizhevsky disagreed with Masaryk who had said
(and was supported by Russian émigré researchers) that Slavophiles had been
impressed by Schelling, while Westerners tended to Hegel. Chizhevsky had the
following to say on this score: “To a great extent, the ideas of Herder about the
historical mission of each nation, about a special place of Slavs in history togeth-
er with a wide range of concepts, schemes and words (‘Spirit,’ ‘World Spirit’ and
‘Spirit of the Nation’) that are clear and acceptable to each Hegelian arrived to
Russia in the form created by Slovak Slavophile Ján Kollár in his articles on
‘Slavic reciprocity’ in 1830-1843. The idea of Slavic mission, as we will see
later, was not, by far, the main idea of Russian Hegelians and never moved to the
center of their ideas. Russian Hegelianism was and remained a theory. The turn
to Slavophilic ‘practice’—in the same way as the turn to the ‘philosophy of
deed’ of radical politicians was practically invariably interpreted by Russian
Hegelians as a retreat not only from Hegel bur also from philosophy in general.
Russian Hegelians never expected direct solution of practical questions from
philosophy” [3, p. 27].
Chizhevsky detected a trepidation of sorts in the texts by Slavic thinkers (not
only Russians and Ukrainians, but also Slovak Štúr and Pole August Cieszkows-
ki) about Hegel, an attitude absent in the Roman and Anglo-Saxon worlds. It was
Chizhevsky who registered this attitude to Hegel in a variety of texts, which is
his indisputable merit.6
Chizhevsky supported the opinion that perception of Hegel’s ideas in Rus-
sia was somewhat warped with a multitude of examples and observations that
made him a unique past-master of decoding mutual influence of cultures and,
what is even more important, the moment of their compatibility. This requires an
awareness of national specifics of details which creates new perspectives from
which the qualities of cultures are seen and are not deprived of their identities.
Generally, Chizhevsky was convinced that the values of mankind’s common cul-
ture should be assessed not by “either… or” but by “and… and.” An assessment
of his contribution to the analysis of these values will require some
time. 
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We can even say that Chizhevsky’s Hegel in Russia raises the level of stud-
ies of the assimilation of other prominent Western thinkers by the world of Russ-
ian or, wider, Slavic culture, be it emotionless Kant, fiery Nietzsche, and even
Marx. Chizhevsky’s works stand apart from what has already been written on the
subject: they open new horizons of thinking. 
I turned to this purely historical-philosophical subject—Hegelianism in Rus-
sia and the Slavic countries—because Chizhevsky had revealed, much clearer
than others, this philosophic trend as a historical-cultural phenomenon compara-
ble in its universality with the Slavic Baroque in the past centuries and Futurism
in Slavic literatures.7 These observations are substantiated in many of his texts
and are waiting for deciphering by future Russian scholars. 
When marking the 125th birth anniversary of Chizhevsky, we should point
to the great importance for contemporary culture of his rich ideas on the cultures
of Slavic peoples and the methods of their mutual enrichment for the Slavic
world as well, while its peoples are temporarily experiencing a period of mutual
misunderstanding. This phenomenon is alien to the very nature of this world
which is confirmed by Chizhevsky’s selfless life and his incredibly rich creative
work.
Chizhevsky’s creativity and its cultural, philological and philosophical scope
in the first place demonstrate an important vector orientated at cultural unity of
peoples of the Slavic area, Europe and the world. The fragmentary nature of
many of his works (mainly caused by his fate that forced him to move from one
place to another) throws this vector into bolder relief. Everybody agrees that it is
highly important to turn to his texts today at the time of numerous fault lines
enforced by factors that are alien to culture. Chizhevsky who lived through many
periods of this sort (in particular during the enmity between the German and the
Slavic worlds which forced him to postpone the publication of his works on Ger-
man-Slavic philology) was never tired of saying that in any historical time there
is no alternative to cultural unity. “Nestor of Slavic studies” interpreted this as
identical to historical existence.
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Notes
1 Chizhevsky did not exhaustively studied the extent to which Shevchenko
influenced the Slavic world; his impact was extremely wide and fruitful (for
more detail, see [19, pp. 242-267]. He preferred to compare the ideas of the
Ukrainian poet not so much with the works of P. J. Šafárik as, for example,
with the works of Left Hegelian David Strauß leaving the contacts of the
first type, as if deliberately, to future German Slavists.
2 For extracts from the paper read in 1929, see [13]. 
3 There is another, according to Chizhevsky, personified and distanced in time
meeting place of these elements: poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke that success-
fully combined mysticism and cardiocentrism.
4 Or carefully concealed if we remind our readers the well-known quote from
the letter of Hegel to Berend Johann von Uexküll: “You are happy, because
you have a Fatherland that occupies a considerable space in world history…
Other contemporary states, it seems, have already mostly reached their
development aims and, probably, have left the highest point of their devel-
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opment behind and entered the stationary stage. Russia is probably has
become the most powerful among all other states; internally it has huge
development potentials of its intensive nature. You are lucky to claim by
birth and due to your wealth, talents and knowledge not only a subordinate
position in this huge building” [3, p. 26].
5 The German thinker predicted great future to the Slavic peoples and was
convinced that Ukraine “would become a new Greece.” Chizhevsky liked to
quote Herder’s statements and deliberations of this type. 
6 It is interesting in this respect to quote Chizhevsky as saying that August
Cieszkowski who had perceived the ideas of Hegel to the extent that there
appeared an apocryphal story that the German thinker had handed the Polish
philosopher a ring as his successor. This could not have happened because
the Pole was 17 when the German thinker died. 
7 There is another cultural phenomenon shared by all Slavs and diligently ana-
lyzed by Chizhevsky and R. Jakobson—the elements of Slavic mythology in
poetry of Velimir Khlebnikov and Nikolay Aseev as well as Czech and Pol-
ish Futurist poets (see [11, p. 317]). 
Translated by Valentina Levina 
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The Soviet Union’s collapse, among other consequences, led to an interest-
ing phenomenon in the field of social sciences: the emergence of Russian-lan-
guage research independent of Russia in the former Soviet republics. This made
Russian a really international language in social sciences: it is used by scholars
in Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, and Azerbaijan. This
should not mean that social sciences in national languages are stalling. Yet, first
of all, not just anyone, at least in some of the new independent states, have a
good command of those national languages, which means that in some of the
multinational republics, Russian still remains the language of inter-ethnic com-
munication and, second, the audience of publications in Russian is much bigger
than that of the works written in the tongues of the post-Soviet republics. Eng-
lish can be used for this purpose, yet so far, command of Russian in the post-
Soviet space is much better. English-language publications are addressed to a
very different audience while the majority of authors in the post-Soviet states
seek recognition in the post-Soviet space. Today, we can watch how Russian-lan-
guage humanitarian studies are taking shape outside Russia’s borders.
This phenomenon is not unique: there is English-language academic writing
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and fiction in India, Pakistan and South Africa, all of them independent from
Britain; and there is French-language literature in the former French colonies in
Africa. In Russia, we are more interested, for obvious reasons, in the non-Russ-
ian studies of Russia written in Russian. Even though they have some specifics
and are not completely developed, they offer us a view of ourselves from a very
close distance. Our history and many of our problems shared by the post-Soviet
states are much better understood there than anywhere else in the world. 
The reviewed book, written by a well-known Kazakhstani political scientist
and expert in international relations Askar Nursha who deals with the Putin’s
period of the political history of Russia, is one of the best examples of the trend
discussed above. It is not only evidence of the high quality of political science in
Kazakhstan but also a truthful reflection of the situation over there. 
The author has pointed out in Introduction that he does not provide an
exhaustive coverage of all aspects of Russia’s political realities but concentrates
on the general trend of Russia’s post-Soviet history, its main directions and pos-
sible repercussions for his country. “I have posed myself the task to look at
everything that is going on in Russia and at its relations with the other post-Sovi-
et countries. As its closest neighbor, Kazakhstan, first of all, interacts with Rus-
sia on a wide range of bilateral, regional and international issues. Second, Kaza-
khstan exists in their common information and linguistic communicative spaces.
Third, it is involved in building an integrational project and a common regional
defense space. In these capacities, Kazakhstan affects, to a certain extent, Rus-
sia’s policy, while being an object of interest of its external policy” (pp. 14-15).
A. Nursha formulates his main foreign policy issue in his book’s subtitle: Has
Putin taken a geopolitical revenge (as many of Russia’s opponents in the West
see it) or forcefully defended his country (as people in Russia define it). The
answer supplied by the author (who does not belong either to Russian or West-
ern academic communities) is especially interesting. 
The book is arranged in chronological order; its main part is divided into his-
torical stages. Chapter One, Domestic and Foreign Policy of V. Putin in 2000-
2008, covers his first presidential term. The title of Chapter Two, Medvedev as
President (that covers the period from 2008 to 2012), means that the author
includes Medvedev’s presidency in the Putin period. Chapter Three, Putin
Returns: Was He Expected?, covers the years 2012-2014. The final chapter deals
with the post-Crimea period, which, according to the author, stands apart from
the previous periods. Each chapter is divided into three parts covering the three
issues which the author finds most interesting: the relations between Russia and
the United States and the West; Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space; and the
evolution of Russia’s internal policy. 
While analyzing in Chapter One, the colder relations between Russia and the
West, Askar Nursha talks about the simultaneous effects of the internal and exter-
nal factors. The former stemmed from bitter disappointment in the Yeltsin peri-
od that, on the whole, was negatively assessed by the Russian society, because
“Russia lost a considerable share of the Soviet Union’s international positions
and weight and a considerable part of the territory previously under geopolitical
and military-strategic control of the Union center.” As a result, “the Russian
society and the political elite painfully reacted to the loss by their country of the
superpower status” (p. 19). The external factor was created by highly contradic-
tory experience of cooperation with the West in the 1990s. The Yeltsin period
“remained in public consciousness of Russians as a time of geopolitical disillu-
sions, the country’s political weakness on the international arena and its contin-
ued retreat from the old strategic positions including its concessions to the
West.” The author offers a comprehensive answer to the question why Russia
had dropped its attempts to join the Western international system and moved to
confrontation: this happened due to two reasons, i.e., because the West was hos-
tile and because the Soviet anti-Western political culture was revived.
Assessing Russia’s policy in relation to the post-Soviet states, the author has
pointed out that even when Eurasian integration was not very important for
Moscow, the latter “was demonstrating increasing coolness toward the CIS and
the gradually growing awareness that the center of activity should be transferred
to the CSTO and the Customs Union, which was taking shape” (p. 131).
Analyzing the political situation inside the country, the author has described
in detail the mechanism and stages of consolidation of the vertical power struc-
ture created due to objective necessity to streamline the system of governance
and factor in the interests of the new elite. This is especially interesting since,
according to the author, it is wrong to say that by the end of the 1990s, the polit-
ical system of Russia was completely unbalanced and to “ascribe the achieve-
ments of political stabilization to the next generation of the country’s leaders” (p.
133). He has written that confrontation between Vladimir Putin and the oligarchs
was inevitable, “since the president’s course at stronger central power meant that
the influence of the clans and groups of pressure on the Kremlin would be lim-
ited.” The author has also written that “Vladimir Putin began actively building
up a new system of checks and balances, he moved his own team to the top and
increased the distance between himself and those of the oligarchs who had done
nothing to consolidate his presidential positions” (p. 135). The author has point-
ed out that the Kremlin established control over the State Duma and the Federa-
tion Council which did nothing good to the status of the parliament and its role
in politics. By the same token, the presidential administration gathered more
weight to become “a de facto center of political decision-making” (p. 140).
While taking note that the West was very critical of these changes, the author has
chosen to avoid assessments and stick to facts and events. Regional politics that
brought a new and more centralized model of federative relations are discussed
in one of the parts of Chapter One (p. 179). 
The chapter dealing with Medvedev’s presidency, supplied with the telltale
subtitle “new wine in new bottles,” contains a detailed and, on the whole, objec-
tive picture of the country’s external and internal life. The author mainly blames
Washington for the failure of the so-called reset of relations between Russia and
the United States and points to the reaction of the anti-Western part of the Russ-
ian elite to what it assessed as “excessively pro-Western” opinions of the presi-
dent of Russia.
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The first years of the second presidency of Vladimir Putin are described as
“dangerous maneuvering” of Russia and the West. In the domestic policy of Rus-
sia, they are defined as the “conservative-patriotic turn.” In the last chapter that
covers the “post-Crimea period,” the author uses the term “Ice Age” to define
Russia’s relations with the West. For obvious reasons, his analysis of Russia’s
relations with the post-Soviet republics is limited to the Ukrainian crisis. His crit-
icism of Russia is very moderate; this can be expected from an analyst of the
neighboring post-Soviet state. He has also written that “Russia was taken by sur-
prise by the earthquake events in Ukraine and so far has not yet found an adequate
response. In dealing with the revolutionary powers in Ukraine, Russia is guided
by negative assessments of risks and threats rather than by the task to maintain
good-neighborly relations. It should be said in all justice that the new people in
power in Ukraine, their actions and statements are not blameless for making it
inevitable” (p. 472). The author is obviously convinced that, no matter what, Rus-
sia should not interfere in what is going on in the neighboring states. It should tune
up relations with the new people in power in Ukraine despite their clearly anti-
Russian policy. There are people in Russia who think the same. 
Describing the conflict in the East of Ukraine, the author has admitted the
active or even organized activities of “citizens of Russia,” yet says nothing about
the involvement of regular units of the Russian army in the conflict. He has come
to the very interesting conclusion that, as the conflict was unfolding, the Russian
supporters of the “Russian World” and the Moscow leaders parted ways. The
Russian leaders started talking to Ukraine because continued confrontation was,
among other things, loaded with nationalist riots. This is highly interesting
because it indicates that the Kremlin sincerely wants an acceptable agreement.
The majority of Western analysts, on the other hand, are convinced that Moscow
uses the talks to bide its time and promote its own interests. 
Having assessed the annexation of Crimea in the part called Krymnash
(Crimea Is Ours), the author concludes that the Ukrainian crisis seriously affect-
ed the political situation in Russia; it deprived it of the alternatives that had sur-
vived the previous “conservative turn.” “Annexation of Crimea was not merely
an important event but evidence of the changed modality of political thinking
and behavioral imperatives. The Kremlin’s position on the Crimean issue signi-
fied a determined strategic choice of the country’s foreign policy that influenced
its domestic policies. It represented a much more rigorous strategy for Russia’s
relations with the West, on the one hand, and the extrapolation of foreign policy
challenges to the domestic political agenda, on the other” (p. 610). 
I can say that A. Nursha, who has offered a detailed and well-grounded expo-
sition of the material, demonstrated a good knowledge of Russian literature on
which he relies for his analysis. He relies on English-language or any other post-
Soviet works, to a much lesser extent; this is not a shortcoming—the level of
such publications is rather low. 
The last part of his book—Lessons for Kazakhstan—is highly interesting as
a clear confirmation of his position. He has written that Kazakhstan cherishes
friendship with Russia, yet close neighborhood and close ties with it are fraught
with serious risks and challenges. He traces these risks and challenges to Rus-
sia’s refusal to reconcile with its past and accept its present. “Having lost their
great power statuses and vast colonial possessions, many great European pow-
ers, with repentance and regret for their politics in the period of colonialism, nav-
igated the fairly painful stage of recognition of independence of the countries
that detached themselves from their metropolies. But not Russia. The Russian
political elite look at Russia as the descendant of the Russian Empire and the
USSR and are still far away from the recognition of the faults of Russian czars
and Soviet leaders. The Russian leaders interpret the USSR collapse as the
‘biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ thus giving Russian society the
reason to doubt whether the breakup and separation of the Soviet republics were
legally justified” (p. 647). 
This means that the author looks at tsarist Russia and the USSR as common
colonial empires and at contemporary Russia as their successor that should, very
much like Britain or France, confess to the “errors” of colonialism. This is a his-
torically incorrect, but indicative interpretation. It is incorrect, because the Sovi-
et Union was not a colonial empire. Its leaders never pumped riches from its
components in favor of the colonial power. They, instead, tried to raise their
development levels to those of the more developed regions. This means that even
though more developed republics (the Baltic states, in particular) could have rea-
sons to complain, Kazakhstan, as a backward territory, received much more from
the Union than returned to it. There was no discrimination by nationalitiy. On the
contrary, residents of national republics had certain privileges when enrolling in
higher educational establishments. 
What was meant by “errors”? The Soviet Union may have been an unpleas-
ant and repressive state, yet repressions, as a rule, did not target specific ethnic
groups. All repressions were illegal to an equal extent in relation to all Soviet
nationalities. Contemporary Russia is not, nor was the Soviet Union a successor
of tsarist Russia, either formally or factually, of its policy or the legal system. We
should not forget that the independence of the majority of Soviet republics
(Kazakhstan being one of them) became possible only due to the position of
Yeltsin and the government of Russia that never opposed the process and even hailed it. 
The point of view presented in the book is highly illustrative: it betrays the
post-colonial conscience of the national elite of Kazakhstan present in all newly
founded states, including post-Soviet ones. The central message is—everybody
had wronged us; our standards of life are not high enough because of the errors
or even crimes of “colonialists.” This type of consciousness creates myths of the
past or a myth of contemporary life allegedly destroyed by the invaders. It is not
by chance that Askar Nursha accuses Russia of denying the ancient Kazakh
statehood that, allegedly, existed in the 15th century, and even quotes Vladimir
Putin [7]. Without going into detail, let me say that it is enough to visit Kaza-
khstan to realize that it is retroactively building up a “glorious past.” Many West-
ern authors, likewise, have noticed this [5; 3; 4, p. 182]. In fact, excessive glori-
fication of the historical role of the Kazakhs in the multinational state can hard-
ly promote national agreement and stability in the country [1].
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Everything that the author has written about the predominance of the Russ-
ian media in the Kazakhstani media space and about the need to fight it even to
the point of to limiting broadcasting of news from Russia casts doubts on his true
attitude to Russia as a friend and ally of Kazakhstan, which, in fact, it is. Impacts
of friendly, even if foreign, media should hardly be feared. Indeed, Canada hard-
ly fears the American media or, for example, Belgium is hardly apprehensive of
the French media. 
The author, however, is concerned with the content of the Russian news pro-
grams and their impact on the population of Kazakhstan. There is another aspect:
Can the impact of the media of a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, in
which the freedom of information is ensured by the agreements, be blocked off
by its another member? It seems that it is much wiser to ponder the higher pop-
ularity of the Russian media and create professional Kazakhstani Russian-lan-
guage TV channels that will probably gain popularity in Russia due to the
specifics of its own media.
The author’s deliberations about Eurasian integration contain latent criticism
of the leaders of his own country. Here are several pertinent quotes: “The grad-
ual narrowing down of the post-Soviet space of economic integration first to the
EAEU and, later, to the absolute minimum—the ‘integrational trio’ of Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan—devalued, to a great extent, post-Soviet economic inte-
gration and trimmed the idea of a free access to the markets of the CIS countries
to an access to the Russian market. Despite this, Kazakhstan has chosen to
remain involved in the post-Soviet integration processes: it is focused at its rela-
tions with Russia and the present Russian leaders” (p. 656). 
The author is obviously opposed to deeper Eurasian integration; he believes
that Kazakhstan is guided not so much by its own economic considerations as by
its relations with Russia and is acting under its pressure. We all know, however,
that the EAEU was initiated by the first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan
Nazarbayev. On April 2, 2019, in an interview to the Rossiyskaya gazeta, the new
President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev confirmed: “Kazakhstan con-
sistently supports and will support the integration processes in the Eurasian space
and in wider scopes” [8]. Are the leaders of Kazakhstan acting against the eco-
nomic interests of their country? It seems that they are of a different
opinion.1
Further on, the author becomes even more outspoken: “It seems that, despite
mounting criticism, the leaders of Kazakhstan still trust Russia and have more
confidence in integration and its potentials to a much greater extent than Russia
itself. It seems that in the Ak Orda2 they think in the categories: the prospects of
post-Soviet economic integration and how Kazakhstan will profit from it…. The
advance that the leaders of Kazakhstan paid to Eurasian integration remains out-
standing” (p. 657). In plain words, the author has written that. having joined the
EAEU. Kazakhstan had paid a certain advance that was not reciprocated. Despite
this and in spite of the rising wave of criticism, its political leadership still trusts
Russia, that is, demonstrates political blindness. 
What does the author disapprove of in Russia’s approaches? He is convinced
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that the Russian leaders have not abandoned the imperial style of thinking and
might claim territories of its neighbors (the Ukrainian crisis is the latest confir-
mation) as its historical lands. It might flirt with nationalists or use them (with
the help of its media) for its own purposes. 
The author has further written that Russia’s confrontation with the West and
the alleged transformation, under Russia’s influence, of the CSTO into an anti-
NATO organization, do not correspond either to the political interests of his
country (it would have preferred to balance between Russia, China and the West)
or its economic interests (since it becomes a de facto object of anti-Russian sanc-
tions).
The Russian leaders should take these clearly stated sentiments into account.
Russia has found itself in a situation when even the closest post-Soviet states are
not prepared to support it unconditionally on all political issues, while the NATO
allies are always ready to join ranks with the United States. This is caused by Rus-
sia’s relative economic weakness, which explains why these states want to extract
as much as possible not only from it but also from the United States and China,
two other centers of power. They do not need Russia’s confrontation with the
West; they prefer to avoid siding with one of the sides and to continue their mul-
tifaceted cooperation. They are even more concerned about the policy designed
(as they imagine) to weaken the political regimes in the post-Soviet states and
undermine their territorial integrity. These situations are invariably seen as  a
real  threat to any of them. The Russian leaders should take this into
account.
On the other hand, Kazakhstan should bear in mind that the Ukrainian crisis
was caused by the coup that brought to power extreme nationalists and by their
infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking population that stirred up a
rebellion in the country’s East. Russia had no choice but to somehow help its
compatriots. 
If the same happens in Kazakhstan, the response in this multinational state
might be even more catastrophic. It is much wiser not to fan fears but to do
everything to prevent similar developments. So far, the leaders of Kazakhstan
are successfully coping with the task.
In Conclusion, the author gives Putin his due for consolidating the Russian
statehood and points out that his epoch (that has not yet been completed) cannot
be fully assessed. He is convinced that Russia shares with the West the respon-
sibility for eroding the international order and that “what has been happening in
the relations between Russia and the West is, in fact, an expected result of the
last three decades of their relations and their inability to patch up a dialogue” 
(p. 662). 
He is also convinced that the political regime in Russia, which “has little in
common with the Western model of democracy” and that protects similar
regimes and economies in the other post-Soviet states with their corrupt and oli-
garchic structures “creates a symbiosis of Russia’s economy and even less suc-
cessful post-Soviet economic and management models” (p. 664). This is practi-
cally the only assessment of Russia’s political system; regrettably, the author has
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not offered us a profound theoretical and typological analysis. In fact, he has
failed to provide a clear answer to the question formulated in the subtitle: Putin’s
Russia: Geopolitical Revenge or Aggressive Defense? 
Generally, this is an interesting and useful book for the Russian reader. It can
be used as a textbook or a reference book by those who study Russia’s politics of
the last twenty years. In Russia, similar publications are few and far between; the
majority of the available publications are highly politicized and, therefore,
extremely biased. The last pages of the reviewed publication offer enough food for
thought to those who want to understand the trends of the political assessment of
Russia by the expert communities of the post-Soviet states.
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in the Conditions of Electronic Culture; L. Markova. Materialization of Thought
in the Language and Drawing; T. Shiyan. On Schematization, Artificial Lan-
guages and Subject Closure of a Philosophic and of a Scientific Discourses;
I. Karpenko. Interpretation of the Several Corollaries of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics in the Context of Relevant Physical Research; N. Avtonomo-
va. The Translation Issue in Gustav Shpet: History, Criticism, Practice; 
T. Shchedrina. The Fate of Gustav Shpet’s Translation of the Phenomenology of
Spirit (Methodological Remarks); S. Horuzhy. Stages of a Big Path: 1917 as a
Landmark of the Historical Decline of Russia; Yu. Pushchaev. Soviet Platonism
(II): Platonical Features of Soviet Reality by A. F. Losev; I. Kanaev. Compara-
tive Analysis of Buddhism and Ancient Chinese Philosophy; A. Zelnitsky. On
the Historical and Cultural Context of the Forming of the Li Family Legend; 
I. Belaya. “Female Practice ofthe Internal Alchemy” in the Seven Poems of Sun
Bu-er; N. Rudenko. Li Zhi “Discourse on Husband and Wife” (Fu fu lun): Two
against One or Yin-Yang vs. the Supreme Ultimate; D. Dubrovskaya. Vision as
a Speculum: European Visual Theories, and Jesuit Artists’ “Accomodative” Style
in China; V. Meskov. Matetika and the Future of Pedagogy: A Paradoxological
Approach to Analysis of Problems Considered at the Conference; Yu. Gromyko.
Consciousness as an Archivist. On the Way to Psychosomatics: The Discipline
that Discovers New Intellectual and Spiritual Functions; K. Dolgov. East, Rus-
sia, West and Slavdom: The Problems of World Geopolitics; I. Pavlov. Three
Centuries of Christian Enlightenment in Russia: Becoming of Russian Euro-
peanism (from the Reforms of Peter the Great to the Neo-Religious Renaissance
of the Beginning of the Twentieth Century) (Conference Review).
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CHELOVEK
(Human Being)
No. 6, 2019: P. Rabinow. Sociobiology and Biosociality; S. Shevchenko. The
Meanings of Biosociality: From Risk Groups to “Genetic Nocebo”; R. Belyalet-
dinov. Biobanks in the Context of Techno-Scientific Biosociality: Ethics of
Genetization or Genetization of Ethics?; E. Bryzgalina. Medicine in the Optics
of Artificial Intelligence: The Philosophical Context of the Future; E. Greben-
shchikova. Biological Citizenship: From Patient Organizations to Consumer
Genomics; D. Mikhel. The Politics of Breast Cancer: Disease, Personal Experi-
ence and Social Activism in the Modern World; G. Yudin. The “Genetic Body”:
Politics of Genetic Reductionism in Contemporary Natural Sciences; 
A. Kurlenkova. “Naturally, Children”: Bio-Politics / Bio-Responsible Parent-
hood at a Medico-Genetic Consultation; K. Petrov. Public and Private in the
Study of Biosociality and Biocapitalism; E. Shkomova. Transformation of the
Ethical Regulations in the Context of the Medical Genetic Counseling Improve-
ment; O. Popova. Orphan Diseases: Biosocial Loci and Regulatory Practices; 
A. Antipov. Biopolitics, Biocapitalism and Biosociality: Formation and Devel-
opment of the Concepts.
PSYKHOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL
(Psychological Journal)
No. 3, 2019: E. Sergienko. Dynamics of Problems of Developmental Psychol-
ogy in the Publications of Psychological Journal; Yu. Bykhovets, N. Kazymo-
va. Modern Domestic Researchers of Psychological Factors of Terrorist Threat
Experience; M. Padun. Emotion Regulation and Psychological Well-Being:
Individual, Interpersonal and Cultural Factors; R. Apressyan. Moral-Philosoph-
ical Basis for Psychological Studies of Conscience. Part II. Conscience in Moral
Philosophy; R. Muhamedrahimov, L. Astamazova, E. Vershinina. The Role
of the Program of Psychological Support in Attachment Disorder Behavior
among Children in Substitute Families; A. Veraksa, M. Gavrilova, 
D. Bukhalenkova. Association between Language Development and Executive
Functioning in Preschool Age; N. Almaev, S. Skorik et al. Resource-Oriented
Approach in Psychoacoustics; A. Savenkov, V. Gorban. Modern Psychology of
Law and Legal Beliefs of L. I. Petrazhitsky; A. Zhuravlev, L. Pochebut. To
60th Anniversary of the Beginning of Discussion on Social Psychology Subject;
A. Yurevich. Psychological Factors of Confidence in Banks; T. Zhalagina, 
E. Korotkina. Global Psychology: From History to the Development Perspec-
tives.
No. 4, 2019: G. Vilenskaya. To 40th Anniversary of “Psychological Journal”;
H. Starovoytenko, V. Koltsova, E. Maximova. Unresolved Contradictions of
Personality in Life Movement towards Maturity; N. Bogacheva, E. Pavlova, 
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T. Komilova. Cognitive and Personality Regulation of Medical Risk Perception
in Practicing Doctors; E. Gavrina, E. Shchelkushkina, D. Sochivko. Deforma-
tion of Interpersonal Relations in Law Enforcement Officers Who Have Com-
mitted Crimes; V. Tolochek. Mental Performance Dynamics: P. I. Psychological
Features of Month and Oneyear Cycles; G. Soldatova, E. Rasskazova. Follow-
ing Communication Rules Online and Offline: Intergenerational Analysis; 
O. Smyslova, A. Voiskounsky. Cybersickness in Virtual Reality: Phenomenolo-
gy and Measurement; A. Chernyshev, S. Sarychev et al. Socio-Psychological
Laboratory of the Kursk State University: History of Creation and Development
Trends; N. Borisova. Sergey L. Rubinstein at the Turn of the Millennia.
OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)
(Social Sciences and Contemporary World)
No. 5, 2019: O. Antipina. How Much is the Digit? On the Nature of Value in the
Digital Economy; L. Lykova. Tax Incentives for Innovation in Russia; E. Pain.
Nation-Phobia and National Populism in a Globalizing World; S. Pshizova. Dig-
itally-Mediated Political Participation in a Comparative Perspective; A. Zha-
voronkov, S. Patrushev, L. Philippova. Political Field and Zone of Power: An
Attempt at Empirical Verification; P. Orekhovsky. Metropolitan Science by the
Eyes of a Native (A Marginal Note for the Discussion “Russia in Western Sci-
ence”); T. Zhukova, V. Tishchenko. Volunteer Computing in Russia: The
Empirical Model of Motivation Factors for Participation in VC-Projects; 
S. Chernozub. On Scientific Transactions, Communities and Academic Free-
dom (Reflections on the Book by A. N. Oleinik); R. Abramov. Attitude to the
Late Soviet Past as an Object of Sociological Research; Meleshkina A. Speci-
ficity of Gender Institutional Changes in Justice System; V. Komarovsky. The
Concept of Migration Policy and Labor Migration: What Can or Should Be
Done?; L. Bombieri, N. Lebedeva, V. Galyapina. The Impact of Teachers’ Pro-
Social Attitudes on Attitudes of Their Pupils towards Migrants in Italy and Rus-
sia; E. Balatsky. General Theory of Social Development and Cycles of Coer-
cion; O. Koshovets. Where Modern Economics is Heading? Horizontal
Progress, the Superiority of the Method and the Replacement of Theory with
Discourse.
No. 6, 2019: D. Asaturyan, L. Kosals. Organizational Social Capital as Factor
of the Survival of Russian Industrial Enterprises in a Crisis; T. Chubarova.
Modern Paternalism as a Product of Mainstream: Social Problems, Individual
Solutions; N. Lapin. On the Alienation of Citizens from the Right to Participate
in the Proceeds of the Use of National Assets and Possibilities to Overcome It in
Russia; A. Gofman. On the Theoretical Reconstruction of Durkheim’s Interpre-
tation of Morality; P. Pavlov. Economic and Political-Economic Factors of Reg-
ulatory Activity in Russia: Analysis in the Context of the Rule-Making Initiative
Subjects; K. Yanovsky, S. Zhavoronkov. Unlimited Government Endorsed by
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“Scientific Consensus”; S. Pshizova. Digitally-Mediated Political Participation
in a Comparative Perspective. Article 2; A. Kiva. Newly Industrialized Coun-
tries: The Asian Model. What Could Russia Borrow Here?; S. Lourie. The
National Script and Private Life in Contemporary Russia (Dynamics and Fea-
tures of Interethnic Marriage at the Post-Soviet Period); K. Velkova, N. Lebe-
deva. The Role of Liking and Social Identities in the Attitudes of Russians
toward Other Nations; V. Titov. The Legacy of M. Heidegger and A. Schutz in
the Context of the Development of Interpretative Sociology; D. Davydov.
Socially Necessary Work in Discussions about the Post-Capitalist Future: “Can-
cel” Can Not Be Socialized?
POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)
(Political Studies)
No. 4, 2019: A. Solovyov. Political Agenda of the Government, or Why the State
Needs the Society; N. Savin. Between Substance and Procedure: Two Traditions
in Deliberative Democratic Theory; E. Fidrya. Factors and Justification of
Reconstructing Meaning of Political Texts under Conditions of Cognitive and
Interpretative Uncertainty; T. Inoguchi. The Development of Political Science
in Japan; V. Avdonin, Ye. Meleshkina. What Do Ratings Say? Political Sciences
Journals in the RSCI System; V. Voynikov, E. Entina, M. Entin. Prospects,
Needs and Pitfalls of Constitutionalization of the EU and the EAEU; Yu. Pus-
tovoyt. How the Regime is Created? Power Coalitions in Siberian Cities; 
A. Salmina. Perception and Attitudes toward Democracy in Russia and Europe;
V. Barsegyan. Models of Career Trajectories of the Heads of Russian Regions;
A. Neklessa. Sinews of War & Nerves of Peace: Hybrid Metamorphosis.
Methodological and Prognostic Aspects of the Post-Modernity Co-Existence; 
E. Egorova-Gantman, E. Egorova. Character Assassination. Three Chronicles
of the Soviet Period; A. Glukhova, R. Savenkov. New Authoritarianism in Pol-
ish Vestment.
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO
(The State and Law)
No. 1, 2019: I. Bartsits. Constitutional Mythology: Origination, Purpose and
Practice of Application (Part 2); K. Agamirov. The Compelled Deviations and
Predictive Gaps as Categories of Jurisprudence; Y. Buravlev. Public Servant
Viewed as the Official and the Subject of Administrative Responsibility; 
V. Zhukov. Demography: National Interests, Morality and Law; I. Levakin. The
Fundamental Principles of Modern Constitutional Regulation of Religion; 
A. Chashin. Doctrinal-Legal Standards in Russian Judicial Practice; V. Tolstik.
The Problem of Evaluation of Scientific Results: Fetishization of Bibliometrics or
Common Sense; L. Hongyan. The Theoretical Paradigm of Ecological Jurispru-
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dence: Transit from Modern to Postmodern; D. Garbatovich. Forms of Criminal
Law of Russia; E. Ashmarina. The Structure of Economic Law as a Criterion of
Classification of Judicial Economic Expertise (JEE); N. Turishcheva. Pre-Elec-
tion Agency in the System of Legal and Social-Political Regulation of Elections;
A. Polukarov. Administrative Enforcement as a Method of Fighting Corruption
in the Social Sphere; N. Lisina. Principles of Legal Protection of the Environment
in Cities; A. Chernyavsky, N. Chervyakov Updated Theory of State (Search for
New Concepts); S. Chedgemov. N. M. Karamzin on Legal Acculturation as a
Means of Consolidating State Power in Multinational Russia; K. Rodionov. His-
tory of One Delusion. Part one; A. Petrov. Responsibility in the Workplace: The
History of Legal Regulation; M. Buyanova. Features of Insurance of Sportsmen
against Accidents at Production and Occupational Diseases.
No. 2, 2019: E. Svinin. Theoretical and Methodological Issues of the Conceptu-
al Abstraction of Series “Law and Order”; V. Eremenko. About Activity of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the Field of Intellectual Prop-
erty; A. Osavelyuk. The Concept and Place of Canons in Church Law (On the
Example of the Rank of Consecration); A. Yasinskaya-Kazachenko. History
and Scientific Forecasting of Development of Relationships on the Resolution of
Collective Labor Disputes; V. Vinokurov. General Regulatory Criminal Legal
Relations as the Content and Limits of the Object of the Crime; A. Khalikov.
Conclusion of a Pre-Trial Cooperation Agreement: Criminal Procedural and
Forensic Problems; D. Bachurin. Directions of Reforming the System of Legal
Regulation of Value Added Taxation; T. Polyakova, A. Minbaleev, N. Krotko-
va. Formation of the Information Law System as a Scientific Direction: Devel-
opment Stages and Prospects; K. Belsky. Professor I. T. Tarasov is a Herald and
the First Developer of the Functional System of Administrative Law (To the
170th Anniversary of the Birth); G. Luparev. Proverbs and Sayings as a Source
of Customary Law; A. Nikandrov. Failed res publica restituta 1948: The Origins
of Changes in the Basic Principle of the State System of the USSR in the Soviet
Political Discourse of the 30s; A. Smykalin. “Unknown” form of Ownership in
the USSR; S. Burmagin. Court Proceedings in Criminal Procedure: Concept and
Types; O. Fomicheva. The Author Legislative Ideas as a Special Party in the
Legislative Initiative Implementation; A. Guryanov. New Independent State at
the Turn of XX-XXI Centuries (The Problem of Accidents and Patterns of Edu-
cation); E. Subbotin. From the Legal Institution “Fixed-Term Employment Con-
tract” to the Legal Institution “Employment Contract for the Work for the Fixed
Period” (The Comprise Analysis of the Legitimation of Ukraine and Russian
Federation with the Sentence de lege ferenda); T. Yasnykh. Institute of Military
Personnel of the Armed Forces of the RF Outside the Russian Federation as a
Phenomenon of International Human Rights Law.
No. 3, 2019: A. Savenkov. The Values of the Constitution of the Russian Feder-
ation in a Changing World; N. Krotkova, Y. Shulzhenko, E. Vinogradova, 
I. Danilevskaya. A Quarter of a Century of the Constitution of Russia: Under-
Academic Journals 161
standing Experience (for Results of All-Russian Scientific Conference “XXV
Anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Transformation of the
Paradigm of Rights in the Civilization Development of Mankind”); M. Klean-
drov. On the Radical Transformation of the Mechanism of Assigning the Acad-
emic Title Professor; R. Makuev. The Application of the Law as a Process of
Realization of the Right of a Particular Form; A. Grishchenko. Problems of
Regulation in Area of Providing the State Services in the Field of Internal
Affairs; V. Zhukov. Anthropology in the Philosophy of Law: Problem State-
ment; O. Martyshin. The Debate about a Secular State in Russia; A. Salomatin,
A. Malko. State and Legal Life of the Society under Globalization; O. Gor-
bunova. Transparency and Respect for Private Property—the Basic Legal Prin-
ciples that Should Be Present in the Management of a Democratic State; A. Mys-
livchenko. Social State: Genesis, Formation and Perspectives; S. Polenina.
“The Woman Question” in the 21st Century; M. Alieskerov. Realization of the
Legal Social State Principles in Civil Procedure Law Method; O. Smolina. The
Expert’s Opinion as Evidence on Economic Disputes in the Arbitration Process;
L. Thabisimova, M. Tsapko. Taking into Account People’s Opinion when
Changing Borders or Transforming the Territories of Municipalities and Subjects
of the Russian Federation; E. Frolova. B. A. Kistyakovsky as a Methodologist,
Philosopher and Sociologist of Law; Z. Yenikeev. Historical and Legal Prereq-
uisites of Establishment of the Republic of Bashkortostan; A. Zryachkin.
Departmental Legal Nihilism: Reasons and Sources; S. Burmistrova. Legiti-
mate Interests, Subjective Rights and Freedoms as Legal Opportunities: The
Ratio of the Structure, Content and Implementation; A. Ivanov. The Order of
Wearing and Use of Hunting Weapons: Implementation Problems; M. Veni-
aminova. Reception of French Approaches in Spanish Law (On the Example of
Nationality); A. Snegireva. International Arbitration and Global Mechanisms of
Law Enforcement in the Sphere of Criminal Procedure.
VOPROSY EKONOMIKI
(Problems of Economics)
No. 6, 2019: B. Zamaraev, A. Kiyutsevskaya. Inflation Targeting in the World
Economy and in Russia; M. Mamonov. Depleting Net Worth of Russian Banks:
Changes in Banks’ Risk-Taking and the Interest Rate Policy of the Bank of Rus-
sia; O. Kuznetsova, S. Merzlyakov, S. Pekarsky. Shaping Public Confidence
as a Way to Overcome a Liquidity Trap; M. Giltman, N. Obukhovich, O.
Tokareva. Active and Passive Labor Market Policies on the Russian Labor Mar-
ket: Centralization or Regionalization?; M. Ivanova. The Demand for Older
Workers and Age Discrimination: International Experience and Russian Realities; 
K. Rozhkova, S. Roshchin. Does Knowing Foreign Language Pay off in the
Russian Labor Market?; A. Buzgalin. “Capital” as the Key to Solving Modern
Economic Problems (Offline Addition to the Discussion on the Revival of a Spe-
cial Seminar on Karl Marx’s “Capital”).
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No. 7, 2019: V. Radaev. Urban and Rural Millennials: Heterogeneity of the
Young Adult Generation; N. Kosareva, T. Polidi. Housing Affordability in Rus-
sia and Foreign Countries; A. Mishura, E. Shiltsin, S. Busygin. Social Aspects
of Impact of School Quality on Housing Prices in Regional Center of Russia; 
M. Deryabina. Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of Self-Organiza-
tion of Socio-Economic Systems; D. Katukov, V. Malygin, N. Smorodinskaya.
The Factor of Creative Destruction in Modern Economic Growth Models and
Growth Policy; R. Kapeliushnikov. Contra Pan-Institutionalism. Part I; 
S. Trofimov. Arctic Shelf as a Strategic Region of Development of the Russian
Economy.
MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA
(World Economy and International Relations)
No. 7, 2019: M. Strezhneva, D. Moiseeva. After the Elections: The Limit to
Growth of Political Influence of Eurosceptics; L. Khudyakova. Launching a
Sustainable Financial System in the European Union; I. Dezhina, T. Nafikova.
Evolution of “Internet of Things” Concept and State Policy; Ye. Domnich.
China’s Industrial Statistics; A. Mal’tsev, A. Mordvinova. Old Industrial Areas
Revitalization: Foreign Experience; G. Khetagurov. Effectiveness of Card Pay-
ment Systems: International Experience and Russian Practice; S. Volkov, 
A. Tkachenko. Economic Collaboration of Russian Federation with North
African Countries; K. Tur’inskaya. East Africa: Regional Political Integration;
A. Zagosky. China Accepts Rules in the Arctic; Kuang Zengjun, Ou Kaifei.
China’s New Arctic Policy; P. Koshkin. Think Tanks: Challenges and Opportu-
nities in the Era of “Fake News” and Digital Technologies; T. Rovinskaya. The
Crisis of Political Correctness in Western Media Space; A. Shumilin. Middle
East: Window of Opportunities or a Trap for the Atlantists?
No. 8, 2019: V. Dvorkin. Impact of Missile Defense Systems on Strategic Sta-
bility and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament; V. Obolensky. Stumbling Stones
in the Way of WTO Reformation; N. Rozanova. Evolution of a Firm in a Digi-
tal Economy; M. Ershov. Russian Economic Prospects with Low Inflation; 
A. Zimakov. European Strategic Approaches to Heating Decarbonization; 
D. Chumakov. Prospects of Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline; O. Barabanov, 
E. Maslova. The Concept of “Global Commons” as a Factor of Global Instabil-
ity; E. Burkova. Ecological Modernization in an Age of Globalization: The Role
of Environmental NGOs; A. Semenov, A. Tsvyk. The “Community of a Shared
Future for Humankind” Concept in China’s Foreign Policy Strategy; 
A. Chikhachev. French Defense Policy under Emmanuel Macron: Major
Trends; N. Goffe, G. Monusova. Misperception of Social Realities: Political
Implications; K. Gadzhiev. On Fragmentation of World Order in the Era of
Globalization.
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SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)
(Sociological Studies)
No. 1, 2019: V. Karacharovsky, O. Shkaratan. Different Goals of the Same
Society; A. Buzgalin, A. Kolganov. Transformations of the Social Structure of
Later Capitalism: From the Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie to the Precariat and
the Creative Class?; O. Yanitsky. Challenges and Risks of Globalization. Seven
Theses; L. Keesman, D. Weenink, V. Barsegyan. Sociologizing with 
R. Collins: An Interview about Emotions, Violence, Attention Space and Sociol-
ogy; V. Mikhailov, J. Runge. Identification of Individual. Territorial Communi-
ties and Social Space: An Attempt of Conceptualization; O. Bessonova. Civil
Complaints as a Democratic Feedback Form; V. Vasilkova, V. Minina. Com-
munication Barriers in Practices of Providing Public Services to Citizens; 
O. Bezrukova, V. Samoylova. Guidance for Foster Families or How to
Decrease Risks of Secondary Abandonment; V. Kuzmenkov. Criminal Anomie
as a Social Problem; P. Korotkov, E. Zagaynova. Suicide Rate and Time Use in
Daily Life and Leisure; V. Yumaguzin, M. Vinnik. Assessment of the Real
Rates of Homicides and Suicides in the Regions of Russia; V. Zvonovsky, 
M. Grigorieva, J. Solovieva. Contemporary Practices of Telephone Surveys in
the World; E. Popov. The Place of Sociology of Law in the Training of Future
Sociologists; Yu. Tolstova. On A. A. Chuprov’s Contribution to Sociology and
Statistics.
No. 2, 2019: A. Andreev. Face to Face with Modern World; N. Pokrovsky.
Against the Backdrop of Niagara Falls, International Sociology Marches Left;
O. Yanitsky. The 19th ISA Congress: Reflections of an Outsider Observer; 
Yu. Yepikhina. Stratification Research: Between Past and Future; 
S. Kravchenko. The Many Faces of Metamorphoses: About Innovations of Two
Canadian Sociologists; B. Mironov. The Fate of the Jewish Diaspora in Post-
Soviet Russia (The Case of Saint Petersburg); S. Ryzhova. Religiosity, Ethno-
Confessional Identity and Problems of Interethnic Accord; V. Volkov, 
V. Poleshchuk. Current State of Interethnic Communication in Latvia and Esto-
nia; A. Danilov, D. Rotman. Soft Power Priority in Destabilizing Contemporary
Socium (The Case of the Republic of Belarus); O. Mikhaylenok, G. Malyshe-
va. Political Effects of Social Networks in Russia; N. Aldoshina, J. Vaskina.
Human Rights in Mass Consciousness: A Regional Case; E. Dolgova, 
E. Streltsova. “Welcome to the Club”: Position of Women in Soviet Science in
the 1920s; I. Antoshchuk, V. Ledeneva. From Russia to the UK. On Migration
of Young Russian Computer Scientists; G. Abdiraimova, K. Biekenov et al.
Young Scientists in Kazakhstan: Experiences of Building an Academic Career;
I. Obraztsov. Reading Interests of the Red Army Soldiers in the 1920s (An
Empirical Analysis); E. Khlebtsevich. Studying of the Red Army Men Reading
Interests; A. Kiva. National Interests as They Are Understood in China and Rus-
sia.
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VOSTOK
(Oriens)
No. 1, 2019: N. Kradin. Contemporary Discussion on Politogenesis among the
Nomadic Pastoralists; A. Alikberov. “Land” as Territorial State: Cross-Cultural
Analysis of the Early State Forms; S. Kuzmin. The Problem of Vassalage in the
West and the East: Relations of the Qing Empire with Mongolia and Tibet; 
D. Mishin. Banû Kinda in Hadjar in the Second Half of the Sixth Century; 
A. Zakharov. The Angkor Borei Inscription K. 557/600 from Cambodia: An
English Translation and Commentary; P. Lapin. Essay on the History of Teach-
ing Russian Language in Xinjiang during the Qing Dynasty since the Late Eigh-
teenth to the Early Twentieth Century; L. Stezhenskaya. Revisiting Liu Xie’s
Concept of the Genre and Its Place in the Early Medieval Chinese Literary The-
ory; A. Korotayev, K. Meshcherina et al. Value Orientations of the Afrasian
Zone of Instability: Gender Dimensions; E. Zelenev, M. Iliushina. Islamic Edu-
cation and Social Mobility in the Circassian Sultanate (1382-1517); E. Kose-
vich. China’s Place in Priorities of Mexico’s Foreign Economic Policy; 
R. Gimatdinov, I. Nasyrov. Group of Strategic Vision “Russia—Islamic World”
as a Soft Power Tool in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; 
M. Zhantsanova, M. Khaidarova. To the Question of a Term “Cultural Space
of Chinese Hieroglyphics”; S. Malykh. Innovations in the Study of Egyptian
Ceramics 3rd Thousand B.U.: Problems and Perspectives.
VOPROSY LITERATURY
(Problems of Literature)
No. 1, 2019: M. Amusin. Trifonov’s and Makanin’s Eternal Themes; 
N. Godenko. Archaic Constructs in French Lessons, a Short Story by 
V. Rasputin; V. Tyupa. “Literary Theory Two” as a Threat to Humanities; 
Yu. Shcherbinina. People Bound: A History of the Anthropomorphic Bib-
liometaphor; G. Shulpyakov, I. Duardovich. “I Can Relate to the Invisible
Man...”; T. Gordon. Gusev, The Bishop, The Death of Ivan Ilyich: Comparing
Stylistic Systems; B. Tarasov. The Historiosophical and Journalistic Legacy of
Fyodor Tyutchev in the Mirrors of Interpretations; S. Korolyova. Byron and the
Russian Silver Age (1900s): The Protestant Cain as “Native” and “Foreign”; 
V. Serdechnaya. Not in Marshak’s Style. Little-Known Russian Translations
from William Blake in the Early 20th Century; Zhou Lu. Lermontov’s and
Baratynsky’s Poetry in China: The Past and the Present; A. Kholikov. Compil-
ing the 20th Century: The Compiler’s Marginalia; A. Lavrov. D. E. Maksimov;
E. Abdullaev. V. A. Chudovsky; E. Pogorelskaya. V. P. Polonsky; 
E. Andrushchenko. D. S. Merezhkovsky; A. Filatov, G. Filatova. 
A. D. Kamegulov.
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No. 2, 2019: V. Kantor. Imperial Europeanism, or Mikhail Katkov’s Truth vs.
Russian Society; A. Kolesnikov. Postmodernism is Dead, and I’m not Quite Yet;
D. Eremeeva. A Doubting Avvakum. Sergey Petrov (1911-1988); R. Katsman.
A Chaos Novel. Aleksandr Goldstein; E. Safronova. A Poet of Oxymora. Sergey
Gandlevsky; P. Ryzhakov. Notes on Easter in Ansali; A. Pavlovsky. On Pavel
Ryzhakov’s Notes on Easter in Ansali; A. Bokarev, T. Kuchina. Bella
Akhmadulina and the Sixtiers: Contacts, Contexts, and Poems; P. Glushakov.
“I See the Divine Will in Culture.” A 1994 Questionnaire Filled out by Boris
Chichibabin; D. Zakharov. Truman Capote in Russian Translations; L. Egoro-
va. On Translations and Translators. The Masters of Artistic Translation Series;
A. Urakova. “Injin Gifts”: Interracial Exchange and the Image of the White
Avenger in Frontier Fiction; O. Osovsky. Bakhtin in Shanghai. “Chinese
Lessons” for Bakhtin Studies; I. Duardovich. Yury Dombrovsky: Myth versus
“Agonizing Truth.”
IZVESTIYA ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK. SERIYA LITERATURY
I YAZYKA
(The Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Studies in Literature and
Language)
No. 5, 2019: Wenfei Liu. A Multivolume History of Russian Literature in Chi-
nese; V. Sannikov. On Pairs of Speech Acts of the Russian Language; V. Save-
lyev. About the Word-Order in an Old Russian Utterance (On the Material of
“The Tale of the Bygone Years”); Yu. Izumrudov. “In Memory of Our Ten-Year
Friendly Relations, which Have Not Been Marred by Anything...”: The Unpub-
lished Letters from Boris Sadovskoy to Alexander Block and Their Literary and
Historical Context; A. Syomina. Georgy Ivanov’s Personality and Work in Igor
Melamed’s Reception; Ye. Kozmina. A New Dimension of a Romantic Fantasy:
On Alexander Chayanov’s Novella “Venediktov, or Memorable Events of My
Life”.
VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA
(Problems of Linguistics)
No. 2, 2019: A. Nikunlassi. Syntax of the Focus Particle tol’ko i; T. Krylova.
Distinguishing between Animals and Other Living Beings in the Russian Lin-
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